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ABSTRACT 
 
DUSTIN LARRY MENGELKOCH: Papinian Mutability: Statius and 
Early Modernity 
(Under the direction of Jessica Wolfe) 
 
This dissertation examines the reception of the epic and lyric works of the 
Roman poet Statius in the early modern period.  Although the study of Statius is now 
relegated to only the most dedicated of classics departments, early modern readers from 
Dante and Petrarch to Shakespeare and Milton enthusiastically read Statius alongside 
other classical Latin poets such as Virgil and Ovid.  While Statius’s reputation during the 
period is well established, what is not as well known is how Renaissance readers 
interpreted Statius – how they made sense of his relationship to other ancient poets, how 
they understood his political sympathies, and above all how they labored to understand 
poems notorious for their opacity and difficulty.  Whereas other classical poets were 
perceived clearly to state their poetic (and even political) ends, and thus to guide the 
reader, Statius offered no such guidance.  The compressed nature of his poetry, in form 
and content alike, forced readers to fill in, rebuild, and expand wherever necessary.  This 
process yielded a uniquely participatory form of reading that came to be associated 
specifically with Statius.   
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For Natalie 
 
…etenim tua, nempe benigna 
quam mihi sorte Venus iunctam florentibus annis 
servat et in senium… 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Epic Reception and Interpretation: Statius and Early Modernity 
 
 
The subject of this dissertation is the reception of Roman poet Statius, and in it I 
investigate the social and intellectual interpretation of his works, the Thebaid and Silvae, 
in the early modern period.  Though he has largely been displaced in favor of Vergil, 
Horace, Ovid and Lucan (in the Roman corpus), Statius demands attention in the early 
modern period, for it was precisely because of his difference from the other great Latin 
poets that he received such a remarkably warm treatment.   
In this study I have tried to show only some of the instances of Statius’s 
reception.  I make no attempt to cover Statius’s reception in its entirety.  In the main, I 
have focused on points which I think show Statius at his broadest appeal, points which 
display just how rich and varied his interpretation actually was.  In fact, it is precisely 
Statius’s variability which has been most striking to observe, and the theme of mutability 
is underscored throughout.  Readers of Statius run the gamut from pedants to 
sophisticated statesmen, and they are all worth considering. 
You may rightly ask yourself, So, just what does Statius have to offer that these others do 
not? That is a fair question.  Statius, unlike those authors mentioned above used the 
matière de Thebes and everything that that entailed to draw a vivid picture of Roman reality 
and humanity at the end of the first century AD. Of course, Ovid describes Thebes in 
books three and four of the Metamorphoses, but he is concerned with mythology as most 
early moderns understood him – Statius is not. So, what about the Greeks? A fair question as 
well.  Greek literature on the whole was only available to a select few until the early-
seventeenth century, and there were only a handful of truly good readers of it until then.  
Thus, by and large the imaginative interpretation about Thebes’s role in western 
civilization came from Statius.  Additionally, Statius’s appeal was heightened by the 
rediscovery of his Sylvae and the kind of poetic heritage that connected him to both 
Roman and Greek literary traditions. As a result, publications of Statius’s works rival all 
his Latin fratres, with no less than fifty-five printings from 1472 to 1594 and one hundred 
and thirty-three from 1595 to 1700.   
*** 
Revival of interest in the works of Statius in the early modern period had what 
was certainly an unlucky start.  In the heady days of the early fifteenth century, book-
hunting had become a popular sport for northern Italian humanists, and the best among 
them was Poggio Bracciolini (1380-1459), a Florentine humanist and perennial 
combatant with Lorenzo Valla.  Poggio is the figure most responsible for rediscovering 
many of the classical texts we have today, from Quintilian to Lucretius, and one may 
legitimately wonder about the arc of the early modern period without his efforts.  In his 
letters to Niccolo Niccoli, a fellow Florentine bibliophile, he describes travelling 
throughout Europe on a quest for lost manuscripts. As much excitement as he recreates 
when describing the discovery of some new codex, Poggio is also as crotchety and 
pedantic towards those whose help he needs to make those discoveries.  Such is the case 
in 1418 when he discovers Statius’s Sylvae, a text that had been unknown for nearly 1100 
years.  According to Poggio, the most dimwitted scribe in all of Europe copied the Sylvae 
2 
 
for him afterwards, and because of his blundering (he) caused a great delay in sending 
the text back to Italy.  Of course, this is not the whole story.  Poggio himself bears as 
much culpability as his obtuse servant for this misfortune, since he refused to transmit 
this copy to the broader scholarly community until 1452 when he finally allowed five (or 
six) copies to be made.  The reception of these copies of the Sylvae immediately ignites 
interest in Statius among would-be poets and scholars, provoking various reassessments 
of Statius’s poetry throughout the early modern period.  
 It has been observed that those individuals engaged in a new or fundamentally 
transformed social task will likely find themselves adapting one of a set of pre-existing 
pretenses to new ends.  In the literature of early modernity we might more formally call 
this a recusatio; and indeed we find this to be the case with Statius’s interpreters, who 
attempt to make their novel social and intellectual task comprehensible to their readers. 
For readers of Statius found it convenient to define themselves not only in structural 
alignment with certain more familiar social roles but also in structural opposition to others.  
During the early modern period, Statius, who had been deemed the ultimate imitator 
during the Middle Ages, came to signify more specifically a recognized authority in 
literary and social judgment – someone whom lawyers, historians, theologians, and 
others outside the field of literary studies could appeal to for specialized knowledge.   
Statius came to early moderns by way of Italy, as I mentioned before, not by 
Poggio’s promotion, but rather courtesy of Angelo Poliziano, another Florentine 
humanist who was also a close advisor to Lorenzo de’ Medici and the leading scholar in 
Italy until his death in 1496.  According to Poliziano, Statius is, first and foremost, an 
equal to, and the successor of, Vergil – and all that that entails – not merely an imitator.  
As such, Statius is not only thought to deal in words but in ideas, in manner as much as 
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matter, and in comprehension as much as emotion.  His verse, syntax, vocabulary, 
because of the historical context, become the signs by which he is most readily 
identified: they are consistently overwrought, macaronic, and indulgently allusive.  But 
for Poliziano he is more:   
In hoc quidem, de quo agimus Statio, longe mihi ab iis, quae dicta sunt, 
aliena mens fuerit, ut enim non ierim inficias posse aliquid in tanta 
Latinorum supellectile inveniri, quod his libellis vel argumenti pondere vel 
mole ipsa rerum vel orationis perpetuitate facile antecellat, ita illud meo 
quasi iure posse videor obtinere eiusmodi esse hos libellos, quibus vel 
granditate heroica vel argumentorum multiplicitate vel dicendi vario 
artificio vel locorum, fabularum, historiarum consuetudinumque notitia 
vel doctrina adeo quadam remota litterisque abstrusioribus nihil ex omni 
Latinorum poetarum copia antetuleris. 
  
(But concerning Statius about whom we are speaking, my own judgment 
is very different from that which has been said. I do not deny that any 
number of things could be found in such a wealth of Latin writers, or that 
they would easily surpass these little books of his in the gravitas of their 
reasoning or the significance of their content or the timelessness of their 
eloquence; but I think that I can rightfully claim, as it were, that books of 
this sort, in which either heroic grandeur, richness of topic, varied manner 
of speaking or recognizing places, fables, stories and customs are gained 
by a particularly comprehensive learning in rarified letters, are such that 
you would prefer nothing in the entire anthology of Latin poets above 
them.)1 
 
It is important to note here that Poliziano’s point can only be made now that all of 
Statius’s works have come to light.  Prior to Poggio’s rediscovery, only the Thebaid and 
Achilleid were known – and well known at that.  With the distribution of the Sylvae, 
Statius has now complicated his own corpus, letting his Renaissance readers see just 
how much material he was able to adduce to the Latin literary tradition.  In many ways 
Statius’s position as second only to Vergil, was never really questioned; only that being 
second doesn’t necessarily mean to be secondary.  This is an idea that is lost over time 
during the early modern period, coinciding roughly with the uber critics Dryden in 
England and Bossu in France. 
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 I want to draw attention here to the fact that Poliziano built his understanding of 
poetics and historicizing poetry precisely from Statius.  In the most copious work he ever 
undertook, Poliziano began writing a commentary on the Sylvae which expresses his 
fascination and admiration for Statius.  And since he died before he completed it, one can 
still view his own manuscript with all the changes and redactions he made during the 
ten plus years he took to write it.  The careful excerpting of passages for exegetical work 
not only shows a participation in the commonplace book type of culture, but also binds 
early moderns with the rest of us here today.  We’ve all taken time to highlight and write 
down our favorite passages of an author; the only difference is that Statius was once 
considered eminently worthy of this honor.  In fact, Poliziano’s notes relate that the 
impromptu and epideictic nature of them is a type of poetic misdirection; and much as 
the modern New Historicist will come to do five hundred years later, Poliziano reveals 
the poetico-historical circumstances that make Statius’s mutability his defining feature. 
As a result, and specifically through his methods for interpretation according to 
historical context and philology, subsequent readers will revisit Statius when and where 
the guidance of so many other poets, including Vergil, fails.   
Indeed, whereas other classical poets were perceived clearly to state their poetic 
and even political ends, and thus to guide the reader, Statius, due to the difficulty of his 
poetry and content especially in the Thebaid, offered no such guidance.  Since he 
composed the Thebaid under and perhaps complicit with Imperial Roman ideology during 
the reign of the Emperor Domitian (81-96 CE), early modern readers gladly accept his 
ambiguous narrative on Theban incest, patricide, and civil war not as a sign of weakness 
but as a cultural connective that responds to both social and intellectual pressures. In 
two particular instances, George Buchanan (1506-82), itinerant scholar, diplomat, and 
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bane of James I and Mary Queen of Scots, and Hugo Grotius (1583-1645), the Dutch 
polymath lawyer and theologian, expand the intent of parts of the Thebaid to alter the 
intense legal debates about sovereignty, tyranny, and civil war during the French Wars 
of Religion (1562-98) and the Eighty Years’ War (1568-1648), respectively. Their 
attempts to nullify purely religious influence over the critical debates about authority 
allow them to develop and transform the Thebaid’s antithetical examples of natural law 
and absolutism into mandates for returning to republican government and the 
establishment of international law and rights. 
Beyond legal interpretation, readers of the Thebaid use its opacity for rebuilding 
how knowledge is organized in the early modern period.  Jan Bernaerts (1595), a Dutch 
lawyer from Mechelen (in what is now Belgium) uses the most difficult moments of 
Statius’s Thebaid to rewrite poetic commentary as an occasion for historical examination 
and broadly tangential exegesis.  His commentary, which modern classicists find to be an 
embarrassment not knowing quite what to do with it, recuperated the text for his 
readers in ways we no longer find relevant. Yet Bernaerts’ contemporaries knew precisely 
how to read his commentary.  For Bernaerts, the humanist propensity for universalizing 
and connecting with ancient precedent was manifest.  In Statius he would literally find a 
commonplace book, a florilegium of Christian morals, history, poetry; everything one 
man would need to live the good life is found by Bernaerts in Statius – or at least in the 
Thebaid.  Justus Lipsius, Bernaerts’ mentor and the leading continental humanist of the 
period offered this estimation of Statius: 
Eccum Papinium, benigne Lector. 
Quis hic Papinius? Poeta magnus, 
Vel dicam potius poeta summus;  
Certe proximus est poeta summo, 
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Quod fateatur ipse Livor… 
Quas grates tibi posteri et iuventus 
Praesens est habitura? Credo magnas; 
Debebunt equidem. Tuam ipse quercu 
Frontem Papinius libens coronat, 
Hac quam Caesar ei negavit olim. 
 
(Behold Papinius, kind reader! 
Who is this Papinius, you may ask? A great poet. 
Nay, I should say the best poet; 
Or certainly a poet nearest the best, 
As Envy himself confesses… 
What thanks the youth of the future 
Will immediately have for you? Great thanks I believe they  
Will owe.  Papinius himself  
Freely crowns your brow with the oak, 
With that which Caesar once denied to him.)2 
Prior to penning these verses, Lipsius had already put the art of commentating on the 
Thebaid into the realm of diplomacy and common good. For him, and for Bernaerts, the 
transmission of Statius’s knowledge was for good of all. He writes to Bernaerts:    
Statius autem tuus ubi est? Puto Antverpiae et ego ad Moretum scripsi.  
Quod rerum aliquid publicarum litteris inspergis, gratum est et saepe 
facito.  Stilum et iudicia haec scriptiuncula exercet et nos delectat, qui 
fautores bonae caussae sumus, etsi non auctores.  
 
(Where is your Statius? I think at Antwerp and I have written to 
Moretus.  That you sprinkle on only a limited amount in your letters 
about public affairs, it is welcome and often pithy.  Your style and 
judgment both exercise these small letters and please us, who are 
promoters of the good cause, if not the authors.)3 
 
Lipsius’s ease and directness in asserting that the act of producing a version of Statius 
makes him and Bernaerts “fautores et actores bonae causae” is indicative of his view of 
classical history and literature being entirely relevant to contemporary ills – much in the 
same way we attempt to make our course on literature today.  The result for Bernaerts is 
that whatever he can contribute to ending the current political strife engulfing Europe is 
relevant, warranted, and necessary.   
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  Bernaerts’ commentary sets in motion a wave, one might say a flood, of 
commentaries on Statius’s works throughout the seventeenth century, which as I 
mentioned, before numbers one and thirty-three.  Most of these commentaries and 
commentators were Dutch or studied under the tutelage of Lipsius or Joseph Scaliger.  So 
it is not surprising to see a somewhat renewed interest in Statius by the English at the 
beginning of the seventeenth century since there was a great deal of intellectual, 
theological and economic activity between the two countries. Still, it is not until 1648 
that Thomas Stephens (ca. 1617-1672) publishes the first English translation of the 
Thebaid. Stephens describes his work in translation by setting himself against those who 
have chosen to translate texts which have already been translated numerous times. He 
states: 
For those Criticall pens … would have deserv'd better of the Common-
wealth of Learning, if they had held a torch to the darke and mysterious 
places of the Poem: Which, I dare say, would not be so much neglected, but 
that it is so little understood. The subject matter of the worke, is the most 
ancient of any History recorded by the Poets: And were it not preserv'd in 
our Authour, it had been, long since, worne out by Time: Appearing now 
like old ruines, which preserve the memory of a place, although the forme 
be wholly decay'd.4 
 
Though incomplete, his translation paints an exemplary picture of how Statius’s 
“darkness” helps to mediate the beliefs and concerns of an Anglican priest and 
schoolmaster, grappling with a failing monarchy and with religious and political 
revolution during the English Civil Wars (1642-48). By making no attempt to mitigate 
the problem of untranslatability, Stephens anticipates and challenges the debates over 
the nature of epic poetry from his contemporaries Hobbes and Davenant.  For him, 
Statius contra Vergil and Homer questions whether epic poetry needs heroes or heroism 
at all.  This, in fact, is an important assertion since other, contemporary political poems 
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and translations by Thomas May, Abraham Cowley, and Sir Thomas Fairfax also explore 
the complex relationship between epic form and historical memory.  In a direct 
translation of Sylvae 5.2 Fairfax displaces much of Statius’s own thoughts for his own and 
translates it thusly: 
Oh Lett that Day from time be blotted quitt 
And lett beleefe of’t in next age be waved 
In deepest silence th’Act concealed might 
Soe that the King-doms-Credit might be saved 
But if the Power devine permitted this, 
His Will’s the Law & ours must acquiesce.5 
 
Such emotional torture is hardly found in the verses supplied to Fairfax by Statius, but 
he has rewritten them to suit his own needs after the execution of Charles I. 
  Following the Restoration in 1660 subsequent imperial expansion by King 
William III and Queen Mary produces doubt among intellectuals about England’s 
position as the new Rome. For John Dryden, Statius complies with and celebrates 
imperial despotism and authority, and as such Dryden harshly condemns him: 
A famous modern Poet us'd to sacrifice every year a Statius to Virgil's 
Manes: and I have Indignation enough to burn a D'amboys annually to the 
memory of Johnson. But now, My Lord, I am sensible, perhaps too late, 
that I have gone too far: for I remember some Verses of my own Maximin 
and Almanzor which cry, Vengeance upon me for their Extravagance, and 
which I wish heartily in the same fire with Statius and Chapman: All I can 
say for those passages, which are I hope not many, is, that I knew they 
were bad enough to please, even when I writ them… and am resolv'd I will 
settle my self no reputation by the applause of fools ... If the Ancients had 
judg'd by the same measures which a common Reader takes, they had 
concluded Statius to have written higher than Virgil: for… Virgil had all 
the Majesty of a lawfull Prince; and Statius onely the blustring of a 
Tyrant.6 
 
Dryden’s vitriol, however, has a unique consequence: by having such an adverse reaction, 
Dryden politicizes Statius’s poetry, particularly the Thebaid, and in doing so strips it of 
the ambiguity for which it had been so prized.   
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In response to Dryden’s vehemence, Alexander Pope translates the first book of 
the Thebaid (1712), radically rewriting its focus on civil war and political intrigue as a 
manifesto against tyranny, slavery and imperialism.  One need only read a few of his 
verses to hear the altered cadence of Statius’s words: 
But Fortune now (the Lots of Empire thrown) 
Decrees to proud Etheocles the crown: 
What Joys, oh Tyrant! Swell’d thy Soul that Day, 
When all were Slaves thou cou’dst around survey, 
Pleas’d to behold unbounded Pow’r thy own, 
And singly fill a fear’d and eny’d Throne! 
But the vile Vulgar, ever discontent, 
Their growing Fears in secret Murmurs vent, 
Still prone to change, tho’ still the Slaves of State, 
And sure the Monarch whom they have, to hate; 
Madly they make new Lords, then tamely they bear, 
And softly curse the Tyrants whom they fear. 
And one of those who groan beneath the Sway 
Of Kings impos’d, and grudgingly obey; 
(Whom Envy to the Great, and vulgar Spright 
With Scandal arm’d, the Ignoble Mind’s Delight,) 
Exclaim’d – O Thebes ! for thee what Fates remain, 
What Woes attend this inauspicious Reign? 
Must we, alas! Our doubtful Necks prepare, 
Each haughty Master’s Yoke by turns to bear, 
And still to change whom chang’d we still must fear? 
These now control a wretched People’s Fate, 
These can divide, and these reverse the State; 
Ev’n Fortune rules no more: - Oh servile Land, 
Where exil’d Tyrants still by turns command!7 
 
Pope’s translation marks an ethical sensitivity to the glory of epic poetry and recreates in 
modern English terms the essential meaning of Statius’s poem for him. A recent effort to 
read his Windsor Forest as his first politically charged poetic work – a claim that rests 
primarily on Pope’s careful handling of verses 407-412, and in particular the half verse 
that states, “Slav’ry be no more” – is perhaps jumping the gun a bit.  For it is clear his 
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translation to Statius’s Thebaid is clearer and more substantial evidence of Pope’s political 
and social concerns, making it perhaps Pope’s first political poem. 
*** 
One final observation must be made here before launching full-bore into the 
reception of Statius: each reader of Statius presented in this study, including Dryden, is 
an admirer of his poetry first and foremost. The political, historical, societal, and 
religious aspects of his poetry are a far second place in terms of interest.  It is a problem 
perhaps of scholarship today that relies solely on the historical to “prove” how one reads 
or has read a text.  That is unfortunate, since this kind of study necessarily becomes one-
sided.  Whether it is a lack of comfort with aesthetic opinion or some other preventative 
measure that impedes these insights, it is to the benefit of those who can read Statius in 
the original to consider this characteristic of his reception. 
Early modern readers enjoyed Statius’s poetry; they reveled in his difficulty, 
wordplay, and lyrical brilliance.  Early moderns understood that Statius’s poetry was 
inherently interesting precisely because of its nature.  In his Poetics, Julius Caesar Scaliger 
often mentions that Statius is only second to Vergil, he is hands down the second greatest 
poet of all time.  This is the highest praise he extends to a poet.  Whereas Dryden will 
understand Statius to be a “Capaneus of a poet,” Scaliger approves of Statius’s rivalrous 
behavior precisely because it is hubristic.  It takes great fortitude to compete with Vergil 
on his own turf, and if Statius can do it, it gives everyone else hope that he may too.  
Hence, the detractors of Statius are very few and far between in the early modern period 
– I can really only think of three.   
Though I have focused throughout this work on the historical import of Statius’s 
poetry, I have tried to maintain, at times, an element of aesthetic appreciation as well.  
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Statius’s poetry is not easy to master in any real sense.  However, in specific instances it 
is startlingly great.  I hope I have done him some justice in this regard; his poetry is worth 
reading now just as much as it ever was. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
The Mutability of Poetics: Poliziano, Statius, and the Silvae1 
 
 
By 1480 Angelo Poliziano had been hard at work for at least five years composing a 
commentary on Statius’s Silvae. It was a response to what he deemed an atrocious and 
deplorable effort at emending and commenting on the Silvae put out by his former 
mentor, Domizio Calderini, in 1475.2 Unfortunately, Poliziano never published his 
commentary – that took the extraordinary effort of Lucia Cesarini Martinelli nearly five 
hundred years later – and it was a substantial loss to Renaissance scholars that he was 
not able to do so.3 Within its confines, that is, all 750 plus pages in the modern edition, it 
is a comprehensive unpacking of Statius’s work that would not be rivaled until that of 
Kasper van Barth’s three volume edition of Statius in 1664−65, which notably had the 
advantage of adducing the commentatires of Calderini, Bernaerts, Morel, Gevaerts, 
Cruceus, and Gronovius on the Silvae to produce five hundred plus pages of 
animadversiones on the Silvae.4 Excepting Calderini and Bernartius, each of these 
commentators were true viri Papiniani, absorbing and following the poetics displayed by 
Statius in the Silvae; Poliziano, especially. 
It is remarkable to note, in fact, just how thoroughly Poliziano absorbed the 
poetics of this Silver Age Latin poet, an observation that has yet to be made seriously. 
The recondite and erudite nature of his Silvae appealed to Poliziano like no other, except 
perhaps the Alexandrians, whom he paralleled in so many ways. Yet, it was Statius’s 
genre-bending hybridity that presented an opportunity for enriching Poliziano’s own 
multa et remota lectio (much recondite reading). Thus in Statius’s Silvae, Poliziano found a 
model not only for his own Silvae but also his sense of poetics and poetic history. 
I 
Commencing, “magni nomen celebrare Maronis” (“to celebrate the name of the 
great Maro”) in the first of his Silvae, Manto, Angelo Poliziano relates two remarkably 
similar tales, one of Orpheus and Achilles in the preface, and another of the goddess 
Nemesis in the introduction to the poem proper.5 Ostensibly anecdotes about a type of 
poetic translatio imperii et studii, the two display on a more fundamental level Poliziano’s 
conception of evolution in the poetic process: Achilles’s mimetic display harkens to the 
transfer of eloquence and classical inheritance expressed in Nemesis’s glance from 
Greece to Rome via Homer and Vergil, and now, presumably, to Florence.6 Since 
Poliziano now embodies these characteristics, he has become the vehicle through which 
adaptation of poetic alterity (i.e. historical, emulatic, and inherited contexts) and 
interpretation will occur. What I would like to put forward, then, is that Poliziano’s use 
of the silva genre in a certain sense is precisely the arena in which he will express how the 
imitative literary traditions (primarily poetic) of Greece and Rome are now alive within 
his own work; and, in specific, that his perspective is extensively attuned by one author, 
namely, Statius. Throughout all four Silvae, Poliziano is openly concerned with imitation, 
inheritance and rivalry; his intense (and long-lived) scrutiny of Statius’s Silvae in the 
Commento, Miscellanea, Oratio Super Fabio Quintiliano et Statii Sylvis and Libri epistularum, 
suggests that he develops these concepts in terms of how he sees Statius dealing with his 
own poetic belatedness, novelty and mutability in comparison with Vergil (Manto), 
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Hesiod (Rusticus) and Homer (Ambra).7  
Though the recent reliance on grammarians, such as Diomedes, Hermogenes, 
Priscian, Demetrius, and Quintilian, to explain Poliziano’s sense of poetics is certainly 
valid, it should not eschew the importance of his engagement with the poets of Greece 
and Rome – especially, Homer, Callimachus, Vergil, and Statius – who occupy his 
formative years during the 1470s.8 It is Statius, in particular, who appears for Poliziano 
to serve as a way of introducing classical poetry from a perspective which accounts for 
literary tradition in terms of its historicity and rivalry.9 Indeed, there is a somewhat 
nostalgic chronology to be seen by leading with the Oratio super Fabio Qunitliano et Statii 
Sylvis as his entrée to the Studio. For from it, Poliziano goes back to the beginning of 
poetry through the Silvae presenting his particulate style of scholarship, one which 
incorporates both Greek and Roman poetry and promotes pluralism over purism.10 
Grounding this type of pluralistic paideia in Statius not only supports intellectual 
exchange but also creates a means of understanding poetry and poets in their 
appropriate contexts, treating culture (both intellectual and historical) as a whole.  
Returning briefly to the anecdote about Achilles mentioned above, two 
observations can be made. First, the scene of repose and banqueting at Chiron’s cave on 
Mt. Pelion resembles that found in Statius’s Achilleid (1.78-94), where Achilles, too, takes 
up the lyre to sing in a symbolic translatio of sorts. This time, however, Achilles takes his 
cue from Chiron and not Orpheus. Second, the instance of imitatio itself suggests the 
purpose of the silvae for Poliziano, namely, a genre of mimetic and interpretive responses 
to poetic forbearers – even if seemingly inappropriate, since Achilles’s singing is 
classified as “indoctumque rudi personat ore” (“singing an unlearned tune with a rough 
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voice”). The allusion to Statius made here by Poliziano would have been easily 
recognized by his pupils, who, as Robert Black has recently shown, would have been 
very familiar with the Achilleid and its contents.11 Thus, the tale harkens back to Statius’s 
classical and medieval designation as the greatest imitator of Vergil, while 
simultaneously highlighting Poliziano’s initial claim in the Manto, “Me quoque nunc 
magni nomen celebrare Maronis.” For those students at the Studio who were familiar 
with Poliziano’s first course there is an additional acknowledgment of Statius’s position 
as second only to Vergil among Latin poets in the Oratio super Fabio Quintiliano et Statii 
Sylvis.12 Simply put, Poliziano is now taking up the mantle that Statius relinquished; he 
has become the poet of: uiue, precor; nec tu diuinam Aeneida tempta, / sed longe sequere et uestigia 
semper adora.13 Still, these references are merely surface allusions; there is one more 
assertion to be made here, and it incorporates those aforementioned. 
In his Commento on Statius, Poliziano specifically relates Statius’s Silvae to a type 
of poetry that Aristotle described through a reference to Chaeremon’s Centaur, writing 
that it is:  
ut Centaurus ille Chaeremonis, cuius Aristoteles meminit, quod opus 
mixtum ex omni genere metrorum erat. Sed haec omnia uno communi 
nomine poemata appellari possunt, quemadmodum et singulae Statii 
Sylvae.14 
 
(Just like the Centaur of Chaeremon, which Aristotle mentions, because it 
was a composite of every style of meter. But all these poems can be labeled 
under one common name, just as Statius’s individual poems are 
collectively called the Sylvae.) 
 
It bears keeping in mind, no doubt, that Chaeremon is recognized by Aristotle and 
Poliziano as a poet, although his poem is a hybridization of different meters and genres, 
“a rhapsody in a medley of all meters,” as McKeon translates.15 This hybridity, recognized 
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in the name, Centaur, deliberately parallels that of Chiron, the half-human, half-horse 
figure of Greek legend already mentioned above. Chiron’s liminality and status as tutor 
to Achilles, among others, allows Poliziano to construct a much more complex 
suggestion than has been established so far.16 By summoning Chiron first, the 
pedagogical stage is set: the Minyans, a motley bunch if there ever were one, become 
students for the evening, readying themselves for an Orphic, if not learned, display, much 
like Poliziano’s own audience of young pupils would be doing.17 Both audiences, then, 
represent the blending of the best of their respective, contemporary cultures, which is 
underscored by both the act of Hylas mixing the wine, and Poliziano’s pun on Hylas’s 
name, or more specifically, its root, hyle. In the “Vita Statii” of the Commento, Poliziano 
remarks that, “sylva indigesta materia a philosophis appellatur, ea quam Graeci hylen 
vocant” (“silva is called by the philosophers raw material, which the Greeks call 
wood”).18 At first glance, this statement seems to be a sweeping categorization of the 
silva genre as one which lacks refinement and coherence, or being a crude miscellanea. 
Poliziano is, in fact, quite clear that this is not the case. While the references to Chiron 
and Centaur exemplify what the silva achieves in varietas of style and content, Poliziano 
carefully shows that Statius’s poems are “emendatiores” (“very polished”). Poliziano 
underscores the Silvae’s refinement by noting that Statius follows Horace’s advice, 
through a reference to Sidonius Apollonaris, that, “multis iisdem purpureis locorum 
communium pannis, semel inchoatas materias decenter extendit” (“once he has 
introduced the subject he appropriately enlarges it by the repeated use of stock purple 
passages”).19 Statius, according to Poliziano, makes certain that his silvae are in reality 
individuated as “‘eglogam’ et ‘soterion’ et ‘epicedium’ et ‘epithalamium’ et 
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‘propempticon’”.20 By doing so, Poliziano legitimates Statius’s understanding of his Silvae 
as singular poetic efforts while concluding his synopsis of Statius’s introduction to the 
Silvae. Still, there remains to be understood how Poliziano attempts to open his 
Commento, for the preface has far reaching consequences for Statius’s Silvae, which, 
though unknown to his students, manifest themselves in his own silvae.  
II 
In opening the Commento, Poliziano writes at length about the idea of epistolae as 
the means of communicating to a multitude of audiences: “quoniam et civitatibus 
aliquando et principibus scribimus” (“sometimes we write to princes and sometimes to 
citizens”).21 More notably, however, he discusses how epistolae can introduce one person 
to another through the appearance of being extemporaneous, and hence singularly 
impressive. What Poliziano describes, in fact, is how Statius’s prefatory epistolae relate to 
a type of rivalrous emulation in which Statius can account for the ambitious nature of his 
Silvae. He says:  
duo characteres epistolae accomodatissimi eique inter se mixti, alter qui 
subilitatem, alter qui gratiam prae se ferat: illum ischnon, hunc charienta 
Graeci vocant…22 
 
(There are two characteristics that are most suitable for a letter and 
which merge into each another: one which exhibits subtlety, the other 
congeniality; the former the Greeks call ischnon, the latter charienta…) 
 
Since a letter is both subtle (ischnon) and pleasant or graceful (charienta), the elaborate 
coverage of the prefatory epistolae becomes Poliziano’s attempt to give structure to 
Statius’s work. It is precisely this attempt which will validate Statius’s Silvae as an 
opposing or recusatorial poetic structure, which Poliziano needs in order to advance 
himself as a scholar and poet. In doing so, Poliziano both gainfully dismisses Statius’s 
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attempt to relate his Silvae to that of Vergil’s Culex and Homer’s Batracho(myo)machia and 
presents the silva genre and Statius himself as exemplars of “self-fashioning.”23 In other 
words, as McLaughlin notes concerning the preface to the Miscellanea, Poliziano is 
certainly interested in using remote and rare language and learning in order to grab the 
attention and approval of his audience straightaway.24 Unlike Greenblatt’s contention 
that self-presentation necessitates breaking down or destroying a predecessor, Poliziano 
is more interested in discovery and invention in light of the Silvae: he is concerned with 
innovation and imitation through rivalry.25 In the context at hand, he presents this 
action as the re-appropriation and transmission of poetic identity: from Orpheus to 
Achilles, then Statius to Poliziano via the silva genre--since the silva genre is not his own 
invention--and, finally, Vergil to Poliziano.26 Hence, Poliziano’s Silvae are innovative 
poetic manifestoes, signaling an amalgamating effort, much like the Miscellenea 
themselves. 
To be sure, Poliziano’s Silvae are a series of encomia on Vergil, Hesiod, Homer, and 
poetry in general, published in 1482, 1483, 1485 and 1491, respectively. All serve as 
prolusiones to the courses he taught on these authors.27 As has been long acknowledged, 
his Silvae are firmly rooted in the classical tradition, sampling broadly and deeply from 
Homer to Claudian and everything in between including philosophy, law, medicine, etc. 
They are, however, particularly indebted, as their title suggests, to Statius.28 In his 
praelectio of 1480, Oratio super Fabio Quintiliano at Statii Sylvis, Poliziano sets the stage for his 
approach to classical literature. Instead of presenting his students with the apices of 
Republican and Augustan Latin literature and eloquence--Cicero and Vergil, 
respectively--Poliziano chooses to teach first the under-appreciated Quintilian and 
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Statius, whom he deems to be at least the equals of those aforementioned authors: 
In hoc quidem, de quo agimus Statio, longe mihi ab iis, quae dicta sunt, 
aliena mens fuerit, ut enim non ierim inficias posse aliquid in tanta 
Latinorum supellectile inveniri, quod his libellis vel argumenti pondere vel 
mole ipsa rerum vel orationis perpetuitate facile antecellat, ita illud meo 
quasi iure posse videor obtinere eiusmodi esse hos libellos, quibus vel 
granditate heroica vel argumentorum multiplicitate vel dicendi vario 
artificio vel locorum, fabularum, historiarum consuetudinumque notitia 
vel doctrina adeo quadam remota litterisque abstrusioribus nihil ex omni 
Latinorum poetarum copia antetuleris. 29 
  
(But concerning Statius, about whom we are speaking, my own judgment 
is very different from that which has been said. I do not deny that any 
number of things could be found in such a wealth of Latin writers, or that 
they would easily surpass these little books of his in the gravitas of their 
reasoning or the significance of their content or the timelessness of their 
eloquence; but I think that I can rightfully claim, as it were, that books of 
this sort, in which either heroic grandeur, richness of topic, varied manner 
of speaking or recognizing places, fables, stories and customs are gained 
by a particularly comprehensive learning in rarified letters, are such that 
you would prefer nothing in the entire anthology of Latin poets above 
them.) 
 
A habit of consistently challenging the perceived academic authority (in this case, 
Cristoforo Landino) would become the hallmark of Poliziano’s career, to be sure, but 
more importantly this speech suggests an innovative way of considering classical 
literature. By proposing that Quintilian and Statius were equally useful in terms of paideia 
to the likes of Cicero and Vergil, Poliziano has to make the argument that what these 
particular authors offer is a way of receiving and amending their own literary and 
intellectual traditions according to their own places in history.30 In other words, each 
author is an interpreter of the preceding generation’s wisdom, which is found by them in 
poetry, oratory, and philosophy; or better still, “vel in fabula vel historia vel 
consuetudine,” as noted above in the Oratio. Moreover, in this oration Poliziano 
repeatedly refers to Statius and Quintilian as paths for literary models (“viae novae”), 
stating bluntly at the beginning: “Novas tamen quasique intactas vias ingrediamur, 
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veteres tritasque relinquamus” (“Let us nevertheless venture upon new and pristine 
paths, leaving behind the old and worn”).31 Poliziano carefully states that he is not 
rejecting Cicero for Quintilian, or Vergil for Statius. Though he manages to develop his 
presentation with much veiled praise of the new models at the expense of the established 
ones, Poliziano’s comment about the paths offered by an author like Quintilian borrows 
“inusitatas vias indagamus” from Cicero’s Orator.32    
In the years before he joined the faculty at Florence in 1479−80, Poliziano began 
collecting and organizing his observations on the philosophy and history of poetry, 
establishing much of his work on the concepts outlined by Plato in the Timaeus and 
Phaedrus, and Aristotle in the Poetics. His interest in the chronological (and, hence, 
historical) range of poetry, however, crystallizes while reading, copying, and annotating 
the Planudean Anthology and Eusebius. On the one hand, Poliziano had been studying the 
Planudean Anthology since 1472, noting with particular care that these authors of epigrams 
spanned the time from Plato to Callimachus, and, specifically, how each author fit 
historically into that time.33 On the other, Poliziano found in Eusebius a way of 
classifying all poetry, placing “Zoroaster and Prometheus at the beginning of poetry, 
along with Orpheus and Linus, and establishes the end of classical poetry with 
Claudian.”34 Poliziano’s efforts to scrutinize poetry through these works are notable for 
three reasons: they establish a Greek tradition as the touchstone for all poetry, a Roman 
end for classical poetry, and a taxonomy according to historical context, delineated 
neatly above in the Oratio (i.e. “ex omni…”).35 In essence, what Poliziano seems to 
conclude from his readings of various epigrams of the Planudean Anthology (Callimachus 
and Meleager, in particular) and Eusebius is a sense of poetics that is synchronic in 
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nature, relying completely on a dynamic, pluralized perspective. In other words, 
Poliziano adheres to a poetics which accepts innovation and hybridity as a given.  
Simultaneous to this research, Poliziano was also emending Calderini’s 
commentary on Statius’s Silvae (1475), an effort from which he intended to produce his 
own commentary.36 During the composition of this Commento, Poliziano realizes the 
parallels of his own traditions and output with that of Statius. It was for him, then, 
personal in the sense that he and Statius are court poets relying on patronage for 
subsistence; cultural, in that each is a part of an autocracy, living at the pleasure of their 
respective leaders; and intellectual, in that both recognize and privilege the inheritance 
of Greek poetry over that of Latin, with the exception of Vergil.37 This shared 
recognition ultimately underscores both authors’ use of the silva genre, where each is able 
to convey moments of insight and brilliance gained through their learned observations 
and adaptations of other genres and poets.38 Poliziano, in fact, shows a thorough 
understanding of Statius’s historicizing and pluralizing tendencies through his 
philological unpacking of much of Statius’s Silvae in terms of poetics, rhetoric, 
philosophy, and science. This penchant has recently led Michael Koorbojian to relate 
Poliziano’s efforts in epigraphy and textual criticism as a type of literary archaeology, 
digging through the disparate likes of Pliny the Elder, Quintilian, Aristotle, Galen, and 
Pausanius (to name but a few) to explain Statius’s allusions.39   
Turning to Poliziano’s own Silvae, then, one must assume he is attempting to 
distill his own vast investigations into a type of ekphrastic display, rivaling Statius by 
producing his own legacy through new, interpretative poems.40 A brief qualification is 
necessary, however, since no other author except Homer occupies Poliziano’s poetic 
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interests longer. Indeed, in terms of personal attention, no work (published or 
otherwise) is more dedicated to one author than his Commento on Statius. Its copiousness 
alone, even while incomplete, emphasizes Statius’s significance for Poliziano. Through a 
close reading of his Commento, ones sees the range of material Poliziano found available in 
Statius’s Silvae. Especially apparent is a reliance on Greek authors, Homer initially, and 
the Alexandrians in particular, whom Poliziano cites as being instrumental in the 
shaping of poetry. This proclivity has led Peter Godman to conclude (correctly) that, 
“Alexandrian learning and literature…provided the context from which his 
understanding of the Greek canon grew: an understanding rooted in the particular; 
concentrated on personalities; mistrustful of broader periods, general trends, or wider 
movements; and largely exclusive of the evidence provided by Latin.”41  Statius’s and 
Poliziano’s Silvae, therefore, are intimately engaged with “the reshaping of the artistic and 
literary exchange of traditions,” consistently drawing from other genres and poets, 
though, it seems for Poliziano, always in competition with Vergil.42  
A contentious, if not emulatic, relationship is important for Poliziano, since he 
relates that Statius not only celebrates but entreats Vergil: “Fuit enim omnino hic poeta 
candidus, officiosus, pius, pudens ac modestus…Maronem ipsum quasi numen aliquod 
adoret ac celebret”43 (“All together he is a brilliant, dutiful, devoted, modest, and 
restrained poet… and he adores and celebrates Maro as if he were some kind of god”). He 
also imitates him better than any poet who preceded him:   
Itaque ut in Thebaide atque Achilleide secundum sibi inter eius ordinis 
poetas suo quasi iure locum vindicarit, ita in his Sylvarum poematis, in 
quibus citra aemulum floruit, tam sese ipse – ut meum est iudicium – post 
se reliquit, quam eundem Virgilius Maro in superioribus antecesserat.44 
 
(Thus, when in the Thebaid and the Achilleid he claims second place rightly 
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for himself among the poets of his classification [i.e. epicists]; so that, 
with regard to these Sylvae, in which he flourished without a rival, he has 
left them behind – at least in my judgment – as much as Vergil had 
excelled his predecessors.) 
 
Though Statius ultimately does not surpass Vergil, Poliziano recognizes the relationship 
of aemulatio (aemulum, above) between Vergil and Statius. It derives, “from the technical 
adeptness of the poet, whose attitude to his precursors is both mimetic and agonistic, 
involving progressive refinement and increasing complication.”45 As such, both Statius’s 
and Poliziano’s Silvae take the shape of imaginative heuristics, discovering, confronting, 
and amending the specificity of prior texts in order to develop new ones. The silva genre 
offered Poliziano a chance for “[r]ecording and welcoming the process of change,” boldly 
contesting and reshaping Greek and Roman poetic traditions and their related systems 
of value in order to reflect its use of varietas and the complexity of its erudite 
environment.46 Poliziano, after studying the Alexandrians for so long, heads directly for 
Statius, since his genre suits this catalytic, multi-valent role.47  
III 
From its inception in Statius, then, the silva had become the proving grounds for 
the received critical wisdom about form, style and content: violating formal and stylistic 
preconceptions of the hexameter as a means for praise; sparking recurrent controversy 
on topics such as the literary value of varietas; perceiving of a form in terms of 
accumulation and incompleteness as in indigesta materia; and legitimizing it in terms of a 
raw literary style composed subito calore as opposed to the rhetorically finished and 
embellished. Yet, Statius’s appeal to Stella in the epistola to the first book of his Silvae, that 
he has composed his poems extempore, was rejected both by Quintilian and Poliziano, 
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with the latter referring to him in many instances as precisely the opposite, emendatus. 
Poliziano, therefore, dismisses the silva genre as a type of poetry-on-the-spot. However, 
the silva as a collection genre--a poetic form derived from a variegated genre heritage--is 
an important feature for both Statius and Poliziano. Since silva in Latin literally means 
“wood” or “forest,” its use as a literary term interacts with several metaphorical 
meanings, especially “pieces of raw material” or “material for construction,” i.e. materia.48  
In an informative anecdote, Poliziano describes the poetic process of praising 
Vergil. Thus at the beginning of Manto (39-46), he likens the undertaking to being a 
lumberjack in a silvae on Mt. Ida: 
Unde ego tantarum repetam primordia laudum? 
Aut qua fine sequar? Facit ingens copia rerum     
Incertum. Sic frondifera lignator in Ida 
Stat dubius, vastae quae primum robora silvae 
Vulneret: hinc patulam procero stipite fagum, 
Hic videt annosam sua pandere bracchia quercum, 
Illic succinctas caput exesertae cupressos    
Metiturque oculis Phrygiae nemora alta parentis.49 
 
(Where shall I begin to sing his praises? Or where shall I end? The 
abundance makes me uncertain. Thus does the woodcutter on leafy Mt. 
Ida stand undecided about which tree of the vast forest he will first strike 
down: here he sees a spreading beech rising on its towering trunk, here he 
sees an aged oak stretching out its branches, there he sees the bushy-
topped pines reaching into the sky; and with his eyes he scans the deep 
groves of the Phrygian mother.) 
 
Like a lumberjack, Poliziano stands there looking (videt) and judging (metitur) how all the 
trees have grown: fagus patula, bracchia quercus annosa pandere, and cupressi succinctae. The 
entire scene is, on the one hand, deliberately facetious, and, on the other, deliberately 
indicative of Poliziano’s poetic conceptions. The establishment of copia foregrounds silvae 
and plays on his use of incertum and dubius, which allows for the suggestion that the silvae 
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are indeed indigesta materia. But this is hardly true: by using the verb metitur, Poliziano has 
already declared that the silvae is only indigesta materia ad primum. That is, within the space 
of six lines he has decided which trees to harvest for the time being, and he begins to 
build his encomium immediately following. Moreover, the use of hinc, hic, illic underscores 
Poliziano’s own methods of research. He is not content to survey one author 
(represented, here, by trees). He looks high-and-low, noticing the varied attributes of 
each: it is a process of discovery and privilege.50 This sanction of selection and 
Coleridgian “fancy” provides for literary forms of mixed character and content, and 
proves to be of the greatest importance to Poliziano as the silva genre offers the means to 
display his erudition, or critical reflections (i.e., metitur). Thus, as Godman observes, 
“[t]he wood is relegated to the background; at center stage stand the trees--individual 
and the detail, meticulously observed.”51 What might be understood today as 
Heideggerian overtones of Lichtung are, here, recognized by Poliziano through 
highlighting and explaining his recognition of a Statian turn. The silva as a genre and 
physical location is not a place of darkness and confusion; but rather a place of openness, 
one that presupposes an act of recognition and comprehension, or “resonance and 
echo.”52 Returning to Poliziano as lignator suggests, as well, that silvae is not indigesta 
materia; for at its root lignum is distinctly the opposite of materia, being timber for 
construction. Being a lignator, therefore, is the first step in the civilizing project of poetry 
– the outline of which, in the guise of history, will come to fruition in the Nutricia--and 
the selection of trees (authors and their words, as well as “their sound, their rhythm”) 
produces an atmosphere of contention, emulation and innovation.53 As a result, there is a 
great degree of genre sophistication which is capable of registering conflict and 
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difference in the poetic sphere. For Poliziano, and hence for Statius, it provides a 
flexibility and comprehensiveness that encourages varietas in its intertextual 
arrangement, maneuvering between Greek and Latin poetry.54 
Indeed, the image of varietas in the silva genre shows the vestiges of the 
Alexandrians for poikilia and gives the genre a refined disorder, rather than one of indigesta 
materia – the type of improvisation Quintilian condemns.55 All the same, the dissonance 
in Statius’s Silvae between varied form and style and pluralistic inheritance has led to 
another powerful stereotype of the Silvae as “mannerist” works that exalt artifice (ars) 
over sense. Perhaps, however, as Curtius and Vessey have suggested, we should think of 
“mannerism” not as a style of decadence but rather as the expression of a certain type of 
adventurous and incisive sensibility directly related to the concepts of ingenium and 
iudicium, both of which have been accounted for so far by Poliziano.56 Additionally, there 
is an argument to be made about how the Homeric concept of poikilia and poikilos are 
used as terms of intellectual strength, being a quality of people as well as of things and 
works of art. Applied to poetry poikilia may have something to do with certain poetic 
skills or skills of heuristic imitation, since poikilos creatures are often ones that can 
change their appearance (or who have more than one aspect). Hence, innovation through 
variety.57 Statius’s and Poliziano’s Silvae are therefore self-reflexive poems that 
continually draw the reader’s attention to the diversity of their sources and inspiration, 
reshaping their varied poetic plunder into moving poetic verses.58 This concept 
expresses itself particularly in the Nutricia, “where Poliziano openly presents the problem 
of the relationships between culture, poetry, and history.”59  
IV 
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Poliziano composed the Nutricia as an inaugural lecture for his course on poetry 
and poetics at the Studio for the university year of 1486−87. Contrary to his three 
preceding Silvae, the Nutricia does not introduce a lecture on a particular author. Rather it 
proposes a history of the transmission of poetry and an inventory of poets both obscure 
and famous. The poem begins with an allegorical fable dedicated to the divine mother-
goddess, Poetry, who is able to both initiate civilization and nourish the arts. The 
goddess cures man of his savageness and ignorance by her charming mind and virtuous 
spirit, all for the common good of humanity.60 After this introduction, Poliziano begins 
to narrate the history of poetry and poets from its origin. Importantly, however, is the 
missing and first preface to the Nutricia, where he refers to his objective as “poetica et 
poetarum historia per membra decurrens” (“poetry and a history of poets explained 
through genre”).61 This statement, which is absent from the later dedications to Gentili, 
concludes clearly that Poliziano necessarily renders historia to lack historical fidelity; 
instead he places the emphasis of taxonomic assemblage on membra, or genre. It is quite 
clear from this statement that Poliziano has moved past Quintilian in terms of the 
organization of poetics, since he is willing to hold form as a means to an end, rather than 
the author himself, and certainly rather than ethnicity (e.g. Greek or Roman). Quintilian, 
however, remains a “reference” for him since he is allied with Statius, as we have seen 
before.62 Poliziano is privileging Diomedes over Quintilian, since membra is precisely the 
way Diomedes denotes the different types of comedies in the section of his grammar 
designated De poematis, where he underscores the difference in type or form versus that of 
era (e.g., golden age versus silver age).63  
The catalogue of the Nutricia then proceeds according to a division of genres and 
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individuation in terms excised from Diomedes. Poliziano is not willing to concede total 
disparation, though: it is precisely this type of poetic alterity and mutability (again, 
fabulae, historiae, consuetudines), which has played a part in Statius’s development of the 
silva genre that unifies them. The same holds for the Nutricia.64 Additionally, Diomedes’s 
chronological perspective and contemporaneity with Claudius Claudianus (ca. 400 AD) 
would have been attractive to Poliziano. Diomedes’s grammar, consequently, would be 
highly prized, as it was a retrospective in the sense that, Claudian, or more precisely the 
era of Claudian, signifies the end of the classical period for Poliziano. Diomedes, 
therefore, allows Poliziano to draw the conclusion that these genre distinctions were 
clearly understood to serve different social and communicative purposes, with a 
particular form engaging a particular class of readers (eglogae, propemptica, epithalamia, et 
al.) and arousing distinct readerly and critical expectations, while preserving the 
importance of the poets themselves.  
As such, in the Commento on Statius, Poliziano employs three classes of genres, 
which are then highlighted by types of speech, and then further reduced to 
characteristics of style--all of which he copies directly from Diomedes:65  
Est igitur primum genus eorum, qui poetae per excellentiam appellantur, 
qui etheroico utuntur metro et fabulam allegoricam usurpant et antiquam 
historiam asciscunt et sua quadam peculiarique oratione utuntur. 
Quorum, qui heroicum tantum usurpant metrum, cetera omittunt, hi 
graecae epopoisi dicuntur, ut si nos versificatores dixerimus.66 
 
(There is, therefore, the first type of these who are called poets par 
excellence – those who use the heroic meter, present allegorical fable, and 
adopt ancient story while using its own distinctive idiom. Of these, those 
who use only the heroic meter and omit the other qualities are called 
epopoioi in Greek, and we may call them versificatores.) 
  
Poliziano is explicit in the refinement of poetics, which he describes above with the 
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word genus and then subsequently illustrates with a list of authors.67 The first category is 
that of the poets who write in hexameters, which he designates as the poets of 
excellence; however, within this group he includes allegorists, like Ovid, and ancient 
history, like Ennius, since they too write in the epic meter. This evaluation holds true 
throughout, and Poliziano counts among the excellent poets all who write in dactylic 
hexameter, whether their subjects are epic or not. He consents to them the Greek title, 
epopoioi, which Diomedes has most likely glossed from Aristotle. Moving on, Poliziano 
groups into the second category those poets who are not necessarily fond of any one 
particular meter: lyric, comic, elegiac, iambic, bucolic, hymnic, etc. He then concludes 
with the rare and obscure meters: ichthyphallic, linic, etc.68 
 The significance of this classification can be seen through Poliziano’s privileging 
of particular writers and genres in his following analysis, where he further divides poetry 
into three forms, distinguished by particular Greek, and their corresponding Latin, 
terms: 
Poematis autem genera sunt tria. Aut enim activium ve imitativum, quod 
Graeci gramaticon vel mimeticon, aut enarrativum vel enuntiativum, quod 
Graeci exegetikon vel apologetikon dicunt, aut commune vel mixtum, quod 
Graeci koinon vel mikton appellant…69 
 
(Nevertheless there are three types of poetry: Either active or imitative, 
which the Greeks call dramatic or mimetic; the narrative or declarative, 
which the Greeks call exegetikon or apologetikon; the common or mixed, 
which the Greeks call koinon or mikton …) 
 
This classification reflects the manner of poetics found in Plato and Aristotle where the 
dramaticon consists of dialogue with no inherent commentary; the apologetikon is narrative 
and observation; and the mikton is mixed with both the aforementioned. In addition, 
Poliziano gives an example for each genre: Lucretius for the apologetikon, theater for the 
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dramaticon, Homer for the mikton, Vergil for the dramaticon in his Bucolics and the 
apologetikon in the Georgics. Finally, Poliziano relates that Statius’s first Silvae is of the 
mixed, or common, genre: 
Koinon vel commune, in quo poeta ipse loquitur et personae loquentes 
introducuntur, ut est scripta Ilias et Odyssea tota Homeri. Haec ergo Sylva 
communi genere est. Nam poeta ipse loquitur in ea et Curtius loquens 
inducitur, ut suo loco videbitis.70 
 
(The Koinon or common genre, in which the poet himself speaks and 
people speaking are led to the fore, as the entire Iliad and Odyssey of 
Homer was written. The Sylva, therefore, is of the common genre. For the 
poet himself speaks in it and Curtius is brought in speaking, as you shall 
see in its place.) 
 
It is the mixed genre that Poliziano refines by drawing out the qualities of style that each 
category retains. He distinguishes four parts: makros, brachus, mesos, and antheros.71 As can 
be seen, the first three characteristics (makros, brachus, mesos) correspond to style, 
respectively: the copious, the brief, and the intermediate, with the distinctions being 
about articulation and arrangement. To illustrate this point Poliziano presents examples 
only from the Aeneid, emphasizing, as Séris notes, that the fundamental stylistic 
distinction between these three characteristics is that of abundance versus brevity, or 
omnia complectatur and castigata narratio.72 However, the final characteristic Poliziano 
mentions is antheros. His quote from the Aeneid describes precisely how antheros is 
employed in the narrative; namely, it is a pleasant rush provided by (literally, in this 
case) verdant description. The distinction, therefore, is one of depiction and observation. 
Using the varietas of images and sounds, Vergil’s description of the Tiber is pleasant both 
aesthetically and intellectually – something that Poliziano has already noted is present in 
the Statius’s use of the epistola as a preface to his poems. This is clearly Poliziano’s 
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preference in the estimation of the silva’s and Statius’s attributes.73  
V 
Beyond this last point, however, Poliziano does not elaborate on his thoughts 
about the characteristics of the remaining Silvae, leaving off with an ellipsis in order to 
signal that he is going to come back and most likely expand at a later date. Still, since 
Poliziano is participating in the new style of commentaries which are written “for 
scholars, by scholars,” the lack of explication is not necessarily an impediment. As is 
shown in the Miscellanea, whatever information he deemed obvious – which for Poliziano 
was extensive--he would leave for the reader to conclude.74 Therefore a crucial point 
must be inferred: since Poliziano does not take the time to explain antheros fully, he is in 
fact using the term to describe Statius’s Silvae entirely.  
This assertion is more substantial than it first appears, since it is fundamentally 
aligned with the concept of varietas already noted as being substantive for the silva genre. 
For antheros, roughly translated, means “florid, ornate or decorative” and in Latin has its 
counterpart floridus. The apparent reciprocative simplicity of these terms belies antheros’s 
actual difficulty. At the root of antheros is the noun anthos, “brilliance,” which relies upon 
the Greek concept of color and perception as it is tied together in this stylistic instance 
above with the production and vigor of flowers – something that Poliziano had to deal 
with in his translation of Homer’s Iliad 2.468.75 The term antheros, therefore, is 
observational in nature, relying on a person’s acuity to notice and distinguish the many 
and varied colors produced by flowers in bloom. Alice Levine Rubenstein has noted as 
well Poliziano’s penchant for “expanding and emphasizing the images of light and color” 
in his translation of Homer, concluding that he has more than is necessary.76 Admittedly, 
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there is an alternate and much more sexual explanation of anthos. One which finds its 
way most noticeably, and often, into the Planudean Anthology, where the term is applied to 
a young male and indicates that the flowering of his adolescence is being actively 
noticed. But even this salacious use helps return us to Poliziano’s reliance on his earliest 
endeavors in poetry as the foundation of his poetics, and specifically through Homer.  
Poliziano’s interaction with Homer is relevant and pertinent to the discussion 
and comprehension of Statius. For as noted above, Poliziano designates Statius’s Silvae as 
mikton or commune, and places it on the same level as Homer’s Iliad and Odyssey. 
Interestingly, and importantly, in the Pseudo-Plutarch, which Poliziano used as the 
foundation for his Oratio in expositione Homeri, Homer, like Statius, is also deemed antheros 
through no less than his use of poikilia: 
Hoti de kai to antheron eidos ton logon esti polu para toi poietei, kallos 
echon kai charin eis to terpein kai edein hwsper anthos, ti an tis kai legoi; 
meste gar estin he poiesis tes toiautes kataskeues, e men de tes phrasews 
idea toiauten echei poikilian para toi Homeroi hoian dielthomen, oliga 
paradeigmata themenoi, ex hon esti kai ta alla katanoein.77 
 
(Why would one think it necessary to add that the flowery style – with 
beauty and grace to warm the heart, like a flower--is frequently 
encountered in the works of the poet? His poetry is filled with sort of 
thing. The form of the diction of Homer’s poetry shows tremendous 
variety, as we have demonstrated with a few examples. These will be 
sufficient to suggest the rest.) 
 
In many ways the observations by the Pseudo-Plutarch and Rubenstein, though 
millennia apart, highlight the perspicacity previously noted in the Manto. Poliziano 
reinforces the varietas adhering to the style of Homer’s narration, which he deems to be 
composed of “sublime, tenue et medium” styles, all of which are bound by the over-
arching pattern of enrichment in his works. In fact, it is this very use of florid language 
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that makes his poems so grand. Poliziano states: “Neque item apud eundem floridum 
elocutionis genus desiderabis, ubi scilicet et pulchritudine splendeat et gratia … plena 
quippe his ornamentis tota sunt Homeri volumina” (“Similarly, you will not find any 
category of his style lacking in floridity, since he naturally shines in both beauty and 
pleasantness … indeed, every book of Homer is filled with such decorations”).78 For 
Poliziano, antheros and floridus become terms synonymous with poikilia or varietas, with no 
discernible derogatory affiliation such as “merely decorative.” As is clearly indicated, the 
Plutarch whom Poliziano was consulting deemed Homer’s poems to be quite often 
decorative and varied. Though he seems to be displeased by this ornament, he concedes 
that it is nevertheless a great part of Homer’s work. In a similar fashion, both Ida Maïer 
and Rubenstein underscore Poliziano’s transition from a strict reliance on a type of 
“Vergilian cast” for his translation of Homer to a looser, more descriptive style.79 Yet, 
both are at a loss to account for such a shift.80 By viewing Homer and Statius together, 
the importance of antheros as a key component of poetic necessity becomes apparent. 
Antheros and mikton, therefore, are the true measures of great poetry for Poliziano, and the 
shifting nature of poikilia (or poikilos), varietas and floridus allow for greater intellectual, if 
not aesthetic, achievement.81  
 Additionally, as Quintilian is never far from Poliziano’s thoughts, his passage on 
antheros (12.10.58-59), though not cited in the Commento, must also be kept in mind. 
Quintilian states:  
Altera est divisio, quae in tris partis et ipsa discedit, qua discerni posse 
etiam recta dicendi genera inter se videntur. Namque unum subtile, quod 
ischnon vocant, alterum grande atque robustum, quod hadron dicunt, 
constituunt, tertium alii medium ex duobus, alii floridum (namque id 
antheron appellant) addiderunt. Quorum tamen ea fere ratio est, ut 
primum docendi, secundum ovendi, tertium illud, utrocumque est 
35 
 
nomine, delectandi sive, ut alii dicunt, conciliandi praestare videatur 
officium…82 
 
(There is another division--also into three parts--by which distinctions 
can be made even between correct styles of speaking. One style is defined 
as plain (ischnon, the Greeks call it), a second as grand and robust (Greek 
hadron), and to these has been added a third, called by some 
“intermediate,” and by others “flowery” (for the Greeks call it antheron). 
The guiding principle, more or less, is that the first supplies the function 
of giving information, the second that of appealing to the emotions, and 
the third, whatever name it is given, that of pleasing or, as others say, 
conciliating.) 
 
Quintilian’s concern here is a further elaboration and clarification of his definition of 
eloquence, which he gives as having three divisions: ischnon, hadron, and antheron. 
Arguably, there remains for Poliziano, in this reference, an eye towards the shift in 
eloquence that Nemesis has already indicated in the Manto, but more importantly there is 
a reiteration of subtlety and pleasantness that Poliziano already noted in his reference to 
the epistolae’s inherent characteristic of ischnon. 
VI 
Since many of Statius’s poems are encomia, his main goal is to impress and win-
over (conciliare) his audience with his skill as a keen and subtle observer of their 
attributes, whatever they may be. In the same vein, Poliziano’s goal for the Silvae becomes 
to display his own observations, founded on his multa et remota lectio, as mentioned in the 
preface to the Nutricia. He gives himself the chance to promote a pluralized paideia and 
inspire his own students to follow him in further exploration of the past.83 In this 
dynamic context, the re-emergence of the silva genre invites Poliziano’s students to 
explore the supple and nuanced relationships that each poem and tradition draws upon, 
according to each its own cultural weight and situation. It also further “underscores 
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rather than obscures the historicity of its sources, and so permits a flood of imaginative 
energy to flow through it unimpeded.”84 In Statius’s own words, it allows for “qui mihi 
subito calore et quadam festinandi voluptate fluxerunt” (“those [poems] which poured 
out in a sudden heat and a particularly delightful rush”).85 
Because their intended audiences were such that would be receptive to a display 
of this kind of erudition, it is not surprising to see Poliziano relate Statius’s poetry in 
terms of rhetorical artifice and eloquence. In fact, immediately following his remark in 
the Commento that the first silva can be classified as antheros, Poliziano states:  
Sed ut distinctius agamus utque vos facilius singula percipiatis, talem 
rationem inivimus, ut sententiam primo ipsam explicemus, tum ordinem 
lectionis aperiamus, mox singula ipsa verba diligentissime exponamus, 
deinde quae ad artificium pertinerent exequamur ac, siqua interim 
adnotatione digna elici sententia possit, eam ex abdito erutam afferamus 
in medium.86 
 
(Be that as it may, so that I may speak more clearly and so that you will 
very easily comprehend each word, I have come upon a specific method of 
argumentation: First, I will unfold the basic idea, then lay out the 
structure of the reading, next comment on each word very diligently, and 
then investigate the craftsmanship of the work; if in the process I can 
tease out some worthy thought by annotation, I will bring it forward into 
the middle ground already having been extracted from its hiding spot.) 
 
Within this statement, Poliziano uses a number of verbs (explicare, inire, aperire, exponere, 
exaequeri, afficere) which evoke a sense of scholarly care as well as the apprehension of 
Statius’s refined artifice and hidden (ex abdito) wisdom; all of which Poliziano both 
complicates and compliments the in composition of the Nutricia.  
In the Nutricia the poets par excellence are now divided according to Poliziano’s 
conception of their genealogy, both in terms of their manuscript traditions and their 
larger cultural exchange. What Poliziano realizes more precisely than any other 
humanist of the period is that “the Latin poets – whose works were his primary interest 
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– had drawn heavily on Greek sources in a variety of ways.”87  Only a critic trained in 
Greek poetry could adequately explain its history (vv. 1-132). Thus Poliziano starts with 
hymns (133-338), passes to the heroic (339-407), then the allegoric (407-498), the 
historic (499-539), and, finally, all other genres (539-714). While the order and the 
distribution has very clearly been dislodged from that established in the Commento, 
Statius and his Silvae still retain a prime place among the epopoioi, following no less than 
Homer and Vergil themselves (353-360). Poliziano concludes the genres with elegiacs 
(540-554), bucolics (555-557), lyrics (558-639), satire (640-651), tragic (652-678), comic 
(679-702) and epigrammatists (703-719).88  
VII 
On closer inspection, the difference appears to be between those poets who use 
the epic meter and those who do not – à la makros versus brachus as seen earlier. The poets 
who were separated in the Commento according to terms like exegetikon and mikton are no 
longer separated in such a manner in the Nutricia, with some categories  apparently 
disappearing completely.89 Still, the Nutricia explicitly lays out how Poliziano treats the 
generic structure and limits of the silva, using the genre itself as a compendium of 
aphoristic and encyclopedic knowledge continuously in dialogue with his research, and 
presenting proper exegesis by identifying the philosophical theories and myths which 
were interchanged between poets; though using their own metaphors and grammatical 
constructions to do so.90 The result is a form “intended to transfer culture and to 
communicate important values” by highlighting sources.91 Hence, varietas or poikilia 
indeed lends an authoritative nature to the Nutricia, acting as references for his students 
and readers.  The Nutricia, therefore, undeniably acts as an encyclopedia of ancient 
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poetry, delivering a whole system of knowledge, and offering readers a sense that an 
entire intellectual world has been condensed into a series of verses.92 At least one scholar 
has deemed it an autobiography of Poliziano, which displays a lifetime of wisdom.93  
Although the Nutricia is by far the longest silva Poliziano composed, at nearly 800 
verses, much erudition is compressed into a small form and that very smallness makes his 
expertise effortlessly “communicable.”94 Certainly, Poliziano’s affinity for the Planudean 
Anthology (and to a lesser degree, Martial) suggests a source for this type of compressed 
epigrammatic explication of inheritance; but it does not adequately explain the paideia 
and sense of rivalry so far noted in this compressed genre. For that, there is yet again 
Statius. 
In his Silvae there is one especially revealing moment where Statius clearly 
indicates his views on poetry, inheritance and rivalry; namely, the poem dedicated to his 
father, 5.3. As Poliziano knew, Statius’s family was distinguished by intellectual 
achievements, not by birth. Statius’s father competed and won all the important contests 
in the Greek literary world, and was the tutor of rhetoric and poetics to the elites of 
Rome during the Flavian dynasty, including Domitian.95 What is understood and 
intimated by Poliziano throughout the Commento is that the loyalties of Statius as a poet 
lay within the competitive Greek culture as much as with the civic Roman culture.96 In 
other words, as Carole Newlands has recently commented, “in the Silvae [Statius] 
provocatively fashions Naples as a kind of counter world to Domitianic Rome.”97  
The passage that is the poem’s most instructive is Statius’s recollection of his 
father’s poetic pedagogy: 98  
Hinc tibi vota patrum credi generosaque pubes 
te monitore regi, mores et facta priorum 
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discere, quis casus Troiae, quam tardus Vlixes, 
quantus equum pugnasque virum decurrere versu 
Maeonides quantumque pios ditarit agrestes           
Ascraeus Siculusque senex, qua lege recurrat 
Pindaricae vox flexa lyrae volucrumque precator 
Ibycus et tetricis Alcman cantatus Amyclis 
Stesichorusque ferox saltusque ingressa viriles 
non formidata temeraria Chalcide Sappho,          
quosque alios dignata chelys. tu pandere doctus 
carmina Battiadae latebrasque Lycophronis atri 
Sophronaque implicitum tenuisque arcana Corinnae. 
sed quid parva loquor? tu par assuetus Homero 
ferre iugum senosque pedes aequare solutis           
versibus et numquam passu breviore relinqui. (146-161) 99 
 
(Hence parents’ hopes were entrusted to you and noble youth governed 
by your guidance, as they learned the manners and deeds of men gone by: 
the tale of Troy, Ulysses’ tardiness, Maeonides’ power to pass in verse 
through heroes’ horses and combats, what riches the old man of Ascra and 
the old man of Sicily gave honest farmers, what law governs the recurring 
voice of Pindar’s winding harp, and Ibycus, who prayed to birds, and 
Alcman, sung in austere Amyclae, and bold Stesichorus and rash Sappho, 
who feared not Leucas but took the manly leap, and others by the lyre 
approved. You were skilled to expound the songs of Battus’ son, the 
lurking places of dark Lycophron, Sophron’s mazes, and the secrets of 
subtle Corina. But why speak of trifles? You were wont to bear equal yoke 
with Homer, matching his six feet with verse turned to prose, never 
outpaced and left behind.) 
 
At first glance, the passage is obviously a much more succinct, and yet similar, inventory 
than that offered by Poliziano in the Nutricia – and similarly, the poem as a whole is the 
longest of Statius’s Silvae. Nevertheless, Statius cites twelve poets (or at least suggests 
them), distributing them into groups pertaining to specific genres. Homer stands 
appropriately enough as the progenitor, and following him is Hesiod and Epicharmus 
(whom Statius appears to have cultivated from, one of Poliziano’s favorites, Columella); 
next the lyricists, Pindar, Ibycus, Alcman, Stesichorus, and Sappho; following them the 
Alexandrians, Callimachus and Lycophron; then, curiously, Sophron and Corinne. 100  
 The order of these poets is significant, since they are composed somewhat 
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chronologically. However, it is clear that Statius is not wholly concerned with the 
chronology itself, but with the transference from form to form, a type of poetic 
sprezzatura, which clearly appears as Statius places Pindar in the first row of the lyricists. 
For some, Sappho should precede all, yet she occupies the final position of Statius’s 
testimony. The reason for her position is not well known at this point, but the reason for 
Pindar’s prominence is. In Silvae 4.7, Pindar, according to Statius, inspires a new type of 
verse:  
 tuque, regnator lyricae cohortis,  
da novi paulum mihi iura plectri, 
si tuas cantu Latio sacravi, 
 Pindare, Thebas. 
Maximo carmen tenuare tempto. 
nunc ab intonsa capienda myrto  
serta, nunc maior sitis, at bibendus 
 castior amnis.101 (5-12) 
 
(And you, Pindar, ruler of the lyric band, grant me for a little while the 
right to change my quill, if I have hallowed your Thebes in Latian song: for 
Maximus I essay to trim my verse. Now my garlands must be taken from 
unpruned myrtle, now my thirst is livelier but I have to drink of a purer 
river.) 
 
Pindaric poetry was forged out of competition and was freshly attuned to a dynamic 
literary and social culture in its own context – the same type of environment in which 
Statius was reared--and takes advantage a culture’s new found magnificence and 
luxury.102 Hence, Statius’s transition back to Homer with “sed quid parva loquor?” (5.3. 
159) grants a double meaning to parva. Statius’s father, and so, too, Statius, is not content 
with solely interpreting poets, he wants to rival them; however, parva suggests that 
Statius, after having evoked the greats (i.e., Homer and Hesiod), is free to investigate the 
poets of other genres and periods, if only to return to Homer, and thus frame his 
development.103 The parallel with Poliziano’s development is just as clear. For Poliziano 
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also begins with Homer – his first claim to fame – then ventures through the rest of 
poetry, only to arrive back again at Homer. 104 
Statius’s erudition permits him to become a much more liminal, or intermediary, 
poet, since he partakes of the problems found in the very difficult Greek lyricists. It is 
through his attempts to imitate and praise Pindar that he is able to illuminate his 
obscurity and necessity. Thus, “Tu pandere doctus” 105 qualifies both Statius and his 
father as poetae docti – better still, lignatores – of poetry, placing importance on the 
selection from the very great through the supposedly inferior, or what we might term the 
subtle or liminal poets. 106  Subtlety, indeed, is all the final poets named by Statius have 
in common (e.g., Lycophron, Sophron and Corrina): seemingly all ars, and no ingenium. 
Statius is, however, clear that it is only through Homer that poets such as Pindar (and to 
a great degree, alleged lesser poets) exist. Consequently, the self-fashioning ars and 
inventio (Pindar) necessarily equates with ingenium (Homer). 107  
It is not necessary to insist on the idea of varietas or poikilia here, for Statius, as an 
intermediary figure, assumes it. The concept of ars, encompassing all mimetic art and 
assimilating the poet to an abstract, impersonal tradition, was the polar opposite of 
Poliziano’s Alexandrian insistence on the importance of individual writers, and the same, 
too, for Statius in his preference shown for Pindar. Statius’s historical pluralism, 
espoused in Silvae 5.3, specifically denies any type of natural perfectibility or historical 
decline from its inception. Statius is, in fact, just as eager to return (“recurrat”) to the 
lyricists, as Poliziano is to Statius and Homer. Neither is not content to describe virtuoso 
poetic production, but seek to cultivate the material of the multi-colored mélanges left to 
them.  
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VIII 
In The Light in Troy, Thomas Greene contends that a subtext exists for the most 
adept imitators of the Renaissance, who would always acknowledge up-front whom and 
what they were imitating, thereby allowing their readers to acknowledge the distance 
traveled between the author or work being cited and themselves.108 Yet, Poliziano does 
not easily ally himself to this concept. It seems that instead of a subtext Poliziano’s own 
philology makes him more prone to a dialectical approach to literature. That is, for him a 
text does not remain in the background but occupies the foreground. The premise for 
such a claim is bound closely to his perception of rivalry with those ancients whom he is 
in dialogue with, providing a means of cultural continuity. Accordingly, as the “[h]eir of 
Cicero, beneficiary of the Latin heritage and interpreter of the Greek, Poliziano stationed 
himself on par with the ancients, not beneath them,” and “the assumption of equality is 
borne out in his practice, which unites exegesis with poetry.”109 Hence, Poliziano’s 
conception of inheritance in the poetic sphere was conversational, simultaneously 
mediated and complicated by one’s interaction and imitation of those past, as 
McLaughlin has indicated earlier. In the end, it strives for its own uniqueness in terms of 
fabulae, historiae, and consuetudines. 
Still, it is important to note just how far Poliziano is willing to take his theory of 
imitation. In his oft-cited letter to Paolo Cortesi, Poliziano refused to accept the 
constraints of Ciceronianism weighed down by its Neo-platonic overtones; and in a 
forceful and unmistakable way he condemns Cortesi as an ape for his unquestioned 
mimicry of Cicero.110 As harsh as these censures seemed, they were mitigated by his 
suggestions of other literary models worthy of imitation, or at the very least 
consideration (i.e., Horace, Seneca, Quintilian, or Plautus). What is notable about the 
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use of these authors is Poliziano’s lack of concern for the chronological distance away 
from Cicero, for whom Cortesi advocates, and, therefore, the alleged apex of Latin 
literature. Indeed, Poliziano’s own statements that “Non enim sum Cicero. Me tamen, ut 
opinor, exprimo” (“Of course, I’m not Cicero. Though, I trust, I make myself clear”) and 
“Postremo scias infelicis esse ingenii nihil a se promere, semper imitari” (“And, lastly, you 
should know that there is nothing but miserable ingenuity in always imitating rather 
than producing from your own mind”) are indicative of his emulatic and pluralistic 
approaches to literature relative to its history. First, as McLaughlin has made clear, 
Poliziano places tremendous importance on his ability to express himself, and, second, as 
Scaglione and Grafton have suggested, Poliziano does not see history as being able to 
repeat itself.111 Thus, to imitate only Cicero would be at the very least anachronistic and 
at its worst would belittle Poliziano’s own sense of worth, if not his multa et remota lectio. 
If we linger for a moment on Poliziano’s use of “me exprimo” a telling observation can be 
made concerning his vast readings. By separating himself from the ancient world, 
Poliziano is better able to perceive how its culture was transmitted and amended 
according to each period – hence, the reliance on Diomedes as a model surveyor already 
noted. This separation ultimately comes to fruition for him in the ancient poetic sphere 
through Statius’s Silvae and the modern poetic sphere through his Nutricia. Here the 
culmination of Greek and Roman poetry is expressed, and is able to take advantage of all 
the attributes that Poliziano thinks important in poetry.  
Poliziano’s reliance on philology to compare and diligently evaluate his sources in 
a historical and chronological way presented him with various kinds of problems, some 
more trivial than others. However, by relegating the value of chronology to textual 
criticism and not to the poets themselves he freed himself from the mimicry that 
44 
 
enthralled Cortesi and many others. Instead, reveling in the quality and quantity of his 
sources, he creates a true encyclopedic knowledge. Beginning with Statius’s Silvae, then, 
Poliziano is able to address the feature he deems most interesting: exegeses of the varietas 
found in the “qui poetae par excellentiam appellantur.”112 What is notable here is the fact 
that though Poliziano is willing to categorize poets according to form, he is never 
amenable to the idea that poets ought to be chained to them.113 Rather, it is through 
authors like Statius (and to a lesser degree the grammarians like Quintilian, Diomedes, 
Priscian, Demetrius, et al.), who provide some kind of poetic definition, that Poliziano 
can make the claim that poetry itself. The mutability of poetry is what first bound, and 
continues to bind, human civilization together: 
Haec igitur una res et dispersos primum homines in una moenia 
congregavit, et dissidentes inter se conciliavit, et legibus moribusque 
denique humano cultu civilique coniunxit.114 
 
(Therefore, this one event first gathered into one fortified place for the 
first time men who had been previously scattered, and united them, even 
though they disagreed among themselves, and finally joined human 
refinement and civilization with laws and customs.) 
 
In other words, poetry as it is represented in the Nutricia is about cultural change as 
much as it is about poetic change; each goes naturally with the other. What is unique, 
however, is that 
Poliziano sees this process as a type of pluralistic synchronism best exemplified and 
capturedby Statius in the silva genre, where he is able to introduce his own version of 
“poetica et poetarum historia.” 115 Moreover, as “conciliavit” indicates above, a certain 
degree of floridity orantheros, along with its inherent reliance on varietas or poikilia, is 
expected and even necessary when composing silvae. 
 Since Statius’s Silvae purport only to be occasional poems, they were often 
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dismissed as trivial--and still are to some to degree today.  It is clear, however, that to 
Poliziano these poems were bold and dynamic literary devices, taking seemingly 
mundane events or objects and transforming them into energetic explorations. They 
celebrated and surveyed all the variety of a flourishing literary and artistic culture during 
a time of heavy-handed dynastic rule, but they retained “eternally valid principles” of 
poetics and rhetoric. 116 By understanding the complexity of Statius’s Silvae, Poliziano 
attempts to follow as closely in his vestiges as the Florence of the 1480s would allow. The 
shift from the busy scholar-citizen, e.g. Coluccio Salutati, had clearly given way to a 
much more specialized and relished scholarly otium. 117 The product of such otium is the 
varietas which Poliziano’s multa et remota lectio produces in the Nutricia, but which he 
fashions by innovation, invention, and re-appropriation of Statius’s Silvae.  
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NOTES 
 
1 I am indebted to the many readers of this chapter and would like to extend a very 
gracious thanks to all of them, including those at MLN. Nevertheless, I am especially 
obliged to Jessica Wolfe and Charles Fantazzi for their careful suggestions and patience, 
as well as to Alan Cottrell for his advice on translating Poliziano’s prose into English--a 
task which he makes easier than it is, for Poliziano’s Latin has a Horatian kind of 
slickness to it that is matchless in Quattrocento Italy, and I dare say the rest of the 
Renaissance.   
  
2 Poliziano’s dislike of Calderini following his publication of Statius’s Silvae was well-
known during his life. In rather crass fashion, he never missed an opportunity--whether 
in his correspondence, the Miscellenea, or his burgeoning commentary on Statius--to 
condemn Calderini for his blunders. Beroaldo, among others, disapproved of his vitriol 
towards a fellow humanist, especially after his death. See Carlo Dionosotti, “Calderini, 
Poliziano e altri,” Italia medioevale e umanistica 11 (1968): 151-79 for an unparalleled analysis 
of this relationship. 
 
3 Poliziano, Commento inedito alle Selve di Stazio, ed. Lucia Cesarini Martinelli (Florence: 
Sansoni, 1978). From here referred to as “Poliziano, Commento.” 
 
4 Domizio Calderini, Hoc volumine Domitius inseruit Sylvarum Statii Papinii quinque a se 
emendatos Comentarios quos in Sylvas composuit (Venice: Johann von Köln and Johann 
Manthen, 1475); Johannes Bernartius, Joh. Bernartii Ad P. Statii Papinii Silvarum libros, 
commentarius (Antwerp: Plantin, 1599); Federicus Morellus, In Papinii Surculi Statii Syluas 
Fed. Morelli commentationes et coniectanea (Paris: Morellus, 1601); Casperus Gevartius, Publii 
Papinii Statii Opera Omnia (Leiden: Marcus, 1616); Emericus Cruceus, Publij Papinij Statij 
opera (Paris: Blaise, 1618); Johannes Fredericus Gronovius, Johannis Frederici Gronovii In P. 
Papinii Statii Silvarum libros V (Hague: Maire, 1637). Of these, Bernartius’s commentary on 
the Silvae is the weakest and most paltry. Still, his and Gevartius’s commentaries rely on 
Poliziano’s Miscellanea for textual exegesis--I have never been able to confirm which 
edition each used, however. Returning to Barth for a moment, his three volumes included 
a horse-choking, twelve-hundred plus page effort commenting on the Thebaid. 
 
5 All translations are my own unless otherwise noted. I have chosen to transliterate the 
Greek even though the intention and preference of Poliziano is clear: Greek is privileged 
and expected to be understood with as little reference to the Latin equivalent as possible. 
I have also provided translations of the Greek texts in the notes while not retaining this 
practice for the Latin, a measure done out of expediency and expectation. Both languages 
are translated where appropriate in the main text. 
 
6 See Francesco Bausi, Angelo Poliziano: Silvae (Florence: Olshcki, 1996) 4-7; Attilio 
Bettinzoli, A proposito delle “Sylvae” di Angelo Poliziano: Questioni di poetica (Venezia: Instituto 
Veneto di Scienze, Lettere ed Arti, 1990) 22-24; and Perrine Galand-Hallyn, Ange Politien: 
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Les Silves (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1987) 31-33. Each aforementioned scholar reaches 
essentially the same conclusion, albeit naturally in different respects, that Poliziano’s 
preface indicates a type of anecdotal poetic translatio. 
 
7 It is interesting to note that the chronology of authors here may suggest how Poliziano 
waded into classical poetry from a pedagogical perspective. If the actual poetic 
chronology of his courses is observed, the outcome looks like this: Statius, Ovid, Vergil 
(explained via Theocritus and Hesiod), Horace (and Persius) and lyric satire, Homer, 
then poetry in general. For a detailed delineation of Poliziano’s course chronology, see: 
Francesco Tateo, Lorenzo De'Medici e Angelo Poliziano (Bari: Laterza, 1972) 71. 
 
8 In many ways, this essay builds on the argument by Martin McLaughlin’s Literary 
Imitation in the Italian Renaissance (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1995), concerning Poliziano’s 
concept of imitation. McLaughlin makes a number of critical points in his chapter about 
varietas which are, I think, correct and critical to understanding Poliziano’s literary 
career. More to the point: whereas McLaughlin has had to take a broad look at 
Poliziano’s poetic endeavors because of his book’s trajectory--leaving him to suggest that 
there is no one model to follow--I am taking a much narrower tact. In doing so, I hope to 
show that Poliziano did have one specific model he emulated and imitated beyond 
others; and he did so for a historically (one might even say, chronologically) based 
reason, something that McLaughlin does not suggest. 
 
9 On Poliziano’s historical perspective, see: Aldo Scaglione, “The Humanist as Scholar 
and Politian’s Conception of the Grammaticus,” Studies in the Renaissance 8 (1961): 49-70; 
Anthony Grafton, "On the Scholarship of Politian and its Context," Journal of the Warburg 
and Courtland Institutes of Ideas 40 (1977): 155-88 and Joseph Scaliger: A Study in the History of 
Classical Scholarship (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1983); Peter Godman, From Poliziano to Machiavelli: 
Florentine Humanism in the High Renaissance (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1998).  
 
10 On pluralism in Poliziano, see Scaglione. 
 
11 Robert Black, Humanism and Education in Medieval and Renaissance Italy (Cambridge: 
Cambridge UP, 2001). See especially “Appendix IV” for a detailed list of manuscripts and 
locations. Moreover, it has been well documented that Statius was a part of the Liber 
catonianus, a medieval epitome and schoolbook containing Cato, Theodolus, Maximianus, 
Avianus, Statius, Claudian. See, Paul Clogan, Medieval Achilleid of Statius (Leiden: Brill, 
1968). As an aside, it would be worth investigating these manuscripts to see if any of 
them may contain the hand of Poliziano, since currently only two copies of Statius have 
been retained and it seems all together likely that one may have been lost either during 
the subsequent disbursement of his library after his death, or perhaps following the 
conquest of Napoleon and the disbanding of the Medici collection.  
 
12 See Harald Anderson, The Manuscript Tradition of Statius (Washington, DC, 2000); and 
Dominique Battles, The Medieval Tradition of Thebes (New York: Routledge, 2004) 1-16. A 
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further discussion on this topic follows below. 
 
13 Statius, Thebaid 12.816-17. 
 
14 Poliziano, Commento, 59. 
 
15 Aristotle, Poetics, trans. R. McKeon (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1973) 1447.23. 
 
16 The various students of Chiron include Achilles, Actaeon, Aeneas, Ajax, Aristaeus, 
Asclepius, Aristaeus, Caeneus, Theseus, Jason, Peleus, Telamon, Heracles, Oileus, 
Phoenix, and even Dionysus. 
 
17 The Argonauts were truly a motley bunch comprised of Jason, Oedipus, Orpheus, 
Amphion, and Theseus, to name only a few. 
 
18 Poliziano, Commento, 8. 
 
19 Poliziano 9. Sidonius Apollonaris, Poems and Letters, trans. W. B. Anderson (Cambridge, 
MA: Classical Library, 1963)1: 283. 
 
20 Poliziano, Commento, 9-10. 
 
21 Poliziano, Commento, 16. 
 
22 Poliziano, Commento, 17. 
 
23 Stephen Greenblatt, Renaissance Self-Fashioning From More to Shakespeare (Chicago: U of 
Chicago P, 1980) 9. 
 
24 McLaughlin 196-97. 
 
25 That is, imitation and rivalry of ancient poets, not his contemporaries, like Michele 
Marullo. 
 
26 It should be noted as well that Orpheus was in many ways Vergil’s model; one thinks 
easily of Orpheus when thinking of the Georgics. 
 
27 There was some confusion as to whether Poliziano actually published the Nutricia in 
1486, or if the editio princeps was produced in 1491.It has now been well concluded that 
Miscomini published the Nutricia at Florence in 1491; though it was recited in 1486 and 
dedicated twice to Mattias Corvinus before Poliziano dedicated it to Gentili. See the 
detailed explanations in Mario Martelli, “Il ‘Libro delle Epistole’ di Angelo Poliziano,” 
Interpres 1 (1978).  
 
28 Statius’s novelty as an author rises quickly in the middle part of the Quattrocento. 
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Following Poggio Bracciolini’s rediscovery of the Silvae at Lake Constance in 1417 and its 
subsequent publication and commentary by Domizio Calderini in 1475 (a mentor to 
Poliziano in the 1470s), Statius becomes appealing to many humanists. However, the 
transmission following Poggio’s rediscovery of the Silvae is fairly complicated. Barring the 
lull in interest (due to Poggio himself), it is sufficient to say that when Poggio returns to 
Florence in 1453 manuscript M is copied and emended at least six times before 1463. 
These emendations bear fruit in the editio princeps of 1472 and Puteolanus’s 1473 edition; 
though Perroti works on a commentary during 1469−70. Indeed, interest in Statius reads 
as a veritable who’s who of Quattrocento Italy: Battista Guarino, Niccolo Perotti, 
Pomponio Leto, Angelo Poliziano, Ermolao Barbaro, Philipo Beroaldo, to name only the 
most notable, all exhibited interest, and were not solely focused on the Silvae, either. 
Additionally, if we allow our imagination to run free for a moment, there is a conjecture 
to be made about how Poliziano arrived at teaching Statius over Vergil. Namely, that 
during his exile in Ferrara and Mantua, Poliziano would have seen Guarino teaching the 
Thebaid to only his most capable students, a tradition his father had initiated long before, 
with the explicit goal of detailing Statius’s imitation and mastery of Vergil. Thus, it 
seems, at the very least, that Poliziano (long the tutor of Piero di Lorenzo) would have 
been able to question Guarino about Statius’s effectiveness as a model for poetic 
imitation. For further details on the MS tradition, see: L. D. Reynolds, Texts and 
Transmission (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1983) 398; Abraham Wasserstein, “The Manuscript 
Tradition of Statius’ Silvae,” The Classical Quarterly 3 (1953): 69-78, and Wasserstein’s 
continuation, “The Manuscript Tradition of Statius’ Silvae,” The Classical Quarterly 8 
(1958): 111-112; M. D. Reeve, “Statius’ Silvae in the Fifteenth Century,” The Classical 
Quarterly 27 (1977): 202-25. 
 
29 Poliziano, Oratio super Fabio Quintiliano et Statii Sylvis, Prosatori latini del quattrocento, ed. 
Eugenio Garin (Milan: Riccardo Riccardi, 1952) 872. 
 
30 Promoting Quintilian as superior to Cicero in terms of pedagogy was nothing new, 
Valla made the same argument well before Poliziano; however, the use of Statius was 
completely unique at the Studio in Florence, and still is, generally speaking. In addition, 
Poliziano also carefully adapts the sentiments of Aper (at the beginning) and Maternus 
(at the very end) from Tacitus’s Dialogus de oratoribus, in the Oratio super Fabio Quintiliano et 
Statii Sylvis, to express what his perspective is: “Quintilianum vero non nos quidem illum 
Ciceroni praetulerimus, sed has certe eius Oratorias institutiones rhetoricis Ciceronis libris 
pleniores uberioresque esse exitimamus…” (Garin 876); and “Postremo ne illud quidem 
magni fecerim, quod horum scriptorum saeculo corrupta iam fuisse eloquentia obiciatur, 
nam tam corruptam atque depravatum illam, quam dicendi mutatum genus intelligemus. 
Neque autem statim deterius dixerimus quod diversum sit” (Garin 878). The emphasis is 
my own, and is meant to highlight the similarities between Tacitus and Poliziano. On 
Valla’s work, see Salvatore Camporeale, Lorenzo Valla. Umanesimo e teologia (Firenze: Nelle 
sedi dell’Istituto, 1972) 91-100, and Lorenzo Valla, Antidotum Primum. La prima apologia 
contro Poggio Bracciolini, ed. Ari Wesseling (Amsterdam: Assen, 1978) 1-2. See, Godman 44-
45 and McLaughlin 194 for similar discussions on Tacitus. 
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31  Garin 870. 
 
32 Orator 3.11.  
 
33 For Poliziano’s interaction with the Planudean Anthology, see James Hutton, The Greek 
Anthology in Italy Before 1800 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 1935) 124-40. 
 
34 Godman 56. 
 
35 The use here of “touchstone” is deliberate, since it is well known that Poliziano 
accepted, at least somewhat, the conception of poetic transference found in Plato’s Ion.  
 
36 Ida Maïer, Ange Politien; la formation d'un poète humaniste, 1469−1480 (Genève: Droz, 1966) 
119, and Wasserstein. See, too, Poliziano’s “Statius,” known as the exemplar Corsinianum, in 
which his notes range from the early 1470s through the early 1490s, including 
annotations that are contemporaneous with his first year at the Studio. 
 
37 The relationship of Lorenzo and Poliziano is developed through his encomiastic 
poetry: Galand-Hallyn 17-61.  Additionally, it needs no elaboration here concerning the 
fear and oppression with which Domitian ruled, but the repression following the Pazzi 
conspiracy, Poliziano’s own exile, and the remembrance of his own father’s murder may 
do well to be remembered. Alan Cottrell thoroughly discusses the subtleties of 
Poliziano’s early relationship with Lorenzo de’ Medici: “Calliope and Clio: The influence 
of historical context on Angelo Poliziano's classical scholarship,” diss., U of Texas, 
Austin, 1995, 82-144. 
 
38 Poliziano’s reliance on Statius, however, belies the actual importance of his own Silvae’s 
influence throughout the Renaissance, which in terms of pedagogical praelectiones (i.e. a 
showcase for erudite observation, adaptation, and praise) is practically nil. Later poets, 
such as Balde, Buchanan, Beze, Heinsius, Quevedo, and Jonson will adopt the more 
traditional role of silva as a genre with a pronounced, occasional bent. While it is true 
that their poems are a mixture of encomia and lamentation, and still very learned, none 
will attempt to display such knowledge, fidelity, and understanding--not to mention 
forsaking the genre as a useful and entertaining prolusio--in their own silvae. Besides, 
perhaps, Hugo Grotius and Johannes Vaccaeus, it seems no one grasps Poliziano’s change 
in form concerning the silva genre, leaving the ground that he has carefully furrowed and 
cultivated to lay shamefully fallow. See Harm-Jan van Dam, “Wandering woods again: 
from Poliziano to Grotius,” The Poetry of Statius, eds. Johannes Smolenaars, Harm Jan van 
Dam, Ruurd R. Nauta (Leiden: Brill, 2008) and Perrine Galand-Hallyn, Un professeur-poète 
humaniste: Joannes Vaccaeus, La sylve parisienne (1522) (Geneva: Droz, 2002). 
 
39 Michael Koorbojian, “Poliziano’s role in the history of antiquarianism and the rise of 
archaeological methods,” Poliziano Nel Suo Tempo, ed. Luisa Secchi Tarugi (Florence: 
Franco Cesati, 1996) 265-74, especially, 272. See, too, Grafton’s two works mentioned 
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earlier and for general discussions on Poliziano’s antiquarianism, Alan Cottrell, 
"Renaissance Codicology: Poliziano's Early Practice of a Modern Discipline," Manuscripta 
41 (1997): 110-26. 
 
40 McLaughlin only allows for Poliziano’s interest in ekphrasis to be a quality of his 
Italian poetry, not his more serious Latin poetry:  McLaughlin 212. 
 
41 Godman 59. 
 
42 See Carole Newlands, Statius' Silvae and the Poetics of Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 
2002) 7; and David Vessey, “Transience preserved. Style and theme in Statius' Silvae” 
ANRW 32.5 (1986): 2754-802. 
 
43 Poliziano, Commento, 5. 
 
44 Garin 872. 
 
45 Godman 69. 
 
46 Godman 69. Poliziano cites a passage from Lucretius (3.11-12) in the Oratio to express 
his distaste for purism: “Itaque cum maximum sit vitium unum tantum aliquem 
solumque imitari velle, haud ab re profecto facimus, si non minus hos nobis quam illos 
praeponimus, si quae ad nostrum usum faciunt undique elicimus atque, ut est apud 
Lucretium, Floriferis ut apes in saltibus omnia libant, / omnia nos itidem depascimur aurea dicta”: 
Garin 878. 
 
47 The silva genre is generally considered to be Statius’s; though not the inventor of the 
form, he is the only classical model left. Lucan is said to have also produced silvae. 
 
48 Poliziano pieces this definition together from those offered by Sidonius, Quintilian, 
and Cicero primarily. It is, however, described similarly by other authors, such as, 
Macrobius and Aulus Gellius. 
 
49 Poliziano, Silvae, ed. and trans. Charles Fantazzi (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP 2004) 
8-9. 
 
50 Robin Nisbet has keenly noticed the tradition of lignator and poetic privilege and its 
symbolic use: “The Oak and the Axe: Symbolism in Seneca, Hercules Oetaeus 1618ff,” Homo 
Viator: Classical Essays for John Bramble, eds. M. Whitby and P. Hardie (Bristol: Bristol 
Classical Press, 1987) 243-51. See, too, Perrine Galand-Hallyn, Les yeux de l’éloquence: 
poétiques humanistes de léevidence (Orleans: Paradigme, 1995) 147-48.  
 
51 Godman 59. 
 
52 For an interesting explication, see: Poliziano, Miscellanea I. XXII, “Echo,” Opera omnia 
53 
 
 
(Basel, 1553). 
 
53 Ernesto Grassi, Humanism and the End of Philosophy (Binghampton, NY: MRTS, 1988) 11-13. 
 
54 Poliziano, Commento, 52-61. 
 
55 Godman 66. 
 
56 Ernst Curtius, European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages (Princeton: Princeton UP, 
1973) 296-97; Vessey 2754-2760. 
 
57 Marcel Détienne and Jean-Pierre Vernant, Cunning and Intelligence in Greek Culture and 
Society (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1978) 11-23. 
  
58 Perrine Galand-Hallyn, Le reflet des fleurs: Description et métalangage poétique d'Homère à la 
renaissance (Geneva: Droz, 1994) 259-60. 
 
59 Alain Michel, “La parole et la beauté chez Ange Politien,” Angelo Poliziano. Validità 
Perenne Dell'Umanesimo, ed. Giovannangiola Tarugi (Florence: Olschki, 1986) 198-99. 
 
60 Emilie Séris, Les étoiles de Némésis: La rhétorique de la mémoire dans la poésie d'Ange Politien, 
1454−1494 (Geneva: Droz, 2002) 323. Interestingly, this anecdote’s soothingness sounds 
vaguely similar to that told by Juvenal about Statius’s abilities to quell the turba vulga in 
Satire 7.82-86:  “curritur ad uocem iucundam et carmen amicae / Thebaidos, laetam cum 
fecit Statius urbem / promisitque diem: tanta dulcedine captos / adficit ille animos 
tantaque libidine uolgi / auditur.” 
 
61 Poliziano, Epistola, IX I, Liber Epistolarum (Lyon: Gryphium, 1553) 258-62. See, also, Peter 
Godman, “Poliziano’s Poetics and Literary History,” Interpres 13 (1993): 113; and Mario 
Martelli, “Il ‘Libro delle Epistole’ di Angelo Poliziano,” Interpres 1 (1978): 235-36.  
 
62 Godman 66. 
 
63 H. Keil, ed., Grammatici latini ex recensione Henrici Keilii, Diomedis Artis Grammaticae Libri III 
(Lipsiae: Teubner, 1897)1: 491. 
 
64 Séris 324. 
 
65 The following description of Poliziano’s generic descriptions closely parallels the 
analysis and substance provided by Séris 328-331; but it is critically different in aim and 
tenor, with the intent being to propose a reliance on antheros, and not merely the 
breakdown of genres as each corresponds to the Commento and Nutricia. Still it is 
necessary here to tread the same path, if only lightly.  
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66 Poliziano, Commento, 52. 
 
67 Their distribution corresponds directly with that found in the Panepistemon. See Séris 
328 and Poliziano 52-59. 
 
68 Séris 328-29. 
 
69 Poliziano, Commento, 60.  
 
70 Poliziano, Commento, 60.  
 
71 Poliziano, Commento, 60: “Quattuor sunt poematos characteres: brachus, macros, mesos, 
antheros. ‘Macros,’ ut apud Vergilium in X de Camilla facit narrationem sic: pulsus ob 
invidiam regno, viresque superbas (Aen. 11.539)… aut ut se habent secundi et tertii libri 
narrationes. Brachus, ut in V ubi Ganymede strictum narrat sic: victori chlamydem 
auratum, quam plurima circum/ purpura maeandro duplici Meliboea cucurrit,/ 
intextusque puer frondosa regius Ida / veloces iaculo cervos (Aen 5.250-53). Mesos, ut in 
primo: Huic coniunx Sychaeus erat (Aen 1.343). Est enim castigata narratio, sic tamen ut 
omnia complectatur. Antheros, ut in VII, ubi amoenitatem luci ac fluminis describendo 
facit narrationem sic: Hunc inter fluvio Tiberinus amoeno/ vorticibus rapidis et multa 
flavos harena/ in mare prorumpit; variae circumque supraque/ adsuetae ripis volucres et 
fluminis alveo (Aen. 7.30-33). Atque in genere est huius primae Sylvae character…” 
 
72 Séris 331. 
 
73 Poliziano states at the beginning that he thinks Statius clearly excels in this type of 
genre, and that he prefers it to his Thebaid: “Atque eius generis ii sunt Statii libelli, in 
quibus adeo excelluit, ut etiam putetur reliquos suos libros emendatories supervectus. 
Credo quod in longo opere, quasi vasta planitie…flaccescebat oratio”: Poliziano, 
Commento,  9. See, too, Séris 331.  
 
74 Grafton 156. 
 
75 It can also mean “flower.”  It makes one think as well of “anthologia.” 
 
76 Alice Levine Rubenstein, "Imitation and Style in Angelo Poliziano's Iliad Translation" 
Renaissance Quarterly 36 (1983): 55-56. She notes, here, the range of use Poliziano gleans 
from words related to light, heat, etc.  
 
77 J. Keany and R. Lamberton, eds., [Plutarch] Essay on the Life and Poetry of Homer (Atlanta: 
Scholars Press, 1996) 139; the emphasis is my own. As a point of reference, the modern 
concern over the speciousness of the Pseudo-Plutarch versus the legitimacy of (the real) 
Plutarch is irrelevant, since the wholesale pilfering that Poliziano undertakes for his 
Oratio in expositione Homeri indicates quite clearly that he relies on the Pseudo-Plutarch for 
his historical and philosophical understanding of the Iliad and Odyssey.  
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78 Poliziano, Oratio in expositone Homeri, ed. Paola Megna (Rome:  Edizioni di Storia e 
Letteratura, 2007) 19. 
 
79 Poliziano, Oratio in expositone Homeri, 52. 
 
80 Indeed, Rubenstein sees Poliziano as both failing and misrepresenting the original 
Greek in his translation of the Iliad. Still, she notes Poliziano’s penchant for poikilos.  See, 
Rubenstein 64. 
 
81 Here, we also have the opportunity for conjecture and further substantiation of 
Poliziano’s interest in the concepts of poikilia, anthos and antheros. Namely, the way these 
words are used in Diodorus Siculus 2.52.5-7. It is worth quoting in full (the emphasis is 
my own): Paraplnsiws de kai tas ton orneon morphas epichrozesthai, tas men 
holoporphyrous phainomena, tas de kata meros pantoiais chroais dieilhmmenas: tas men 
gar phlogina, ta de krokode, tina de smaragdizonta, polla de chrysoeide phainesthai kata 
tas pros to phos engkliseis auton, kai katholou polyeideis kai dusermeneutous 
apoteleisthai chroa: hoper kai epi tes kat' ouranon iridos orasthai ginomenon hypo tou 
peri ton helion photos[. . .]katholou de kai tes peri ta anthe diaphoras tes chroas kai tes 
tes ges poikilias touton hyparchein aition kai demiourgon: ou ten phusiken energeian tas 
thnetas technas mimesamenas baptein hekasta kai poikillein mathetrias genomenas tes 
phuseos. (“In like manner, it is reported, the different kinds of birds get their colouring, 
some kinds appearing to the eye as pure red, other kinds marked with colours of every 
variety one after the other; for some birds are flaming red in appearance, others saffron 
yellow, some emerald green, and many of the colour of gold when they turns towards the 
light, and, in brief, hues are produced in great variety and difficult to describe; and the 
same thing can be seen taking place in the case of the rainbow in the heavens by reason 
of the light of the sun…And it is generally true, they continue, that of the varied colours of 
the earth the sun is the cause and creator; and the arts of mortal men, imitating the 
working of the sun in the physical world, impart colouring and varied hues to every 
object, having been instructed in this by nature.”): Diodorus Siculus, Bibliotheca historica, 
trans. C. H. Oldfather, Classical Library (Cambridge, MA, 1933)2: 56-57. The point, 
keeping in mind Poliziano’s substantial use of Diodorus, is that poikilia and antheros are 
fundamental principles of poetry and clarification on these notions for him is not in any 
way out of his reach. Additionally, if a close eye is kept on the quotation above, there is 
an apparent connection between the terms energeia and entelecheia, though not cited, and 
dynamis, revealing Poliziano’s reliance on Aristotle (and later Galen), which would be 
easily supportable as points of discussion about Statius’s poetics. For a very early 
citation of dunamis via Quintilian in the Commento, and Miscellanea I.1 for his thoughts on 
entelecheia, see Poliziano, Commento, 8.   
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
The Disintegration of Natural Law: George Buchanan, Hugo Grotius, and 
the Thebaid. 
 
In the previous chapter I focused on how Angelo Poliziano transformed Renaissance 
poetics, finding a philosophical and aesthetic exemplarity in the occasional nature of 
Statius’s Sylvae,  one, in my view, that sets a standard for the interpretation of Statius in 
the early modern period.  By recognizing that the impromptu and epideictic nature of the 
Sylvae as a type of poetic misdirection, Poliziano reveals the poetico-historical 
circumstances that make Statius’s mutability his defining feature. As a result, Poliziano 
places interpretive agency in the hands of the individual learned reader, and it is my 
contention that his methods for interpretation according to historical context and 
textual philology, found especially in the Miscellenea, Oratio, and Silvae, impel subsequent 
readers to revisit Statius when and where the guidance of so many other poets fails.   
It is a significant fact that Poliziano’s work on Statius remained largely (and 
deliberately) apolitical.  With the exception of his treatise on the Pazzi Conspiracy and 
his eulogy for Lorenzo de’ Medici, Poliziano rarely expresses political or social ills 
openly; and, as was mentioned before, he had very good reason not to do so. For 
Poliziano the understanding of later scholars, such as Muret and Lipsius, among others, 
of similitudo temporum as a normative impetus for Renaissance scholars and politicians 
does not hold up.  Poliziano did not see his world as a simile of Rome, in which studying 
the ancient authors becomes a way of defining, correcting, and, in some cases, predicting 
modern social ills.  Rather he maintains a conviction that to pursue antiquarian 
knowledge was important for its own sake, participating in a type of Petrarchan vita 
contemplativa.  But this view was not widely shared even during his own time.  As a result, 
both during his life and especially afterwards, during the great Ciceronian controversy, 
Poliziano’s work comes under heavy scrutiny.1  Nevertheless, scholars neither condemn 
wholesale nor disregard his philological discoveries and methodological improvements in 
textual emendation and conjecture.  Poliziano, in fact, remains a guiding figure for much 
of the sixteenth century; only limited approximately to matters historical, philological, 
and antiquarian.  Thus, the otium Poliziano so valued and cherished is not the path 
chosen by our subsequent readers of Statius.  In fact, quite the opposite.2   
I 
Speaking very generally, in northern Europe at the beginning of the sixteenth 
century more and more humanists attempt to access and seize ancient and classical 
precedent so that they may gain political and social authority rather than explore it 
purely on its own merits.  This movement coincides with the efforts of many humanists 
to include their versions of Christianity in intellectual endeavors, and ultimately helps 
reform not only the Catholic Church but also the remaining medieval social and 
intellectual structures and institutions.  Promoted most vociferously and vigorously by 
Erasmus of Rotterdam, this movement has far-reaching consequences throughout the 
period and across Europe, many of which are outside the scope of this chapter.  Yet, 
through the intellectual battles fought by Erasmus and many other scholars a different 
kind of scholarship arises and then coalesces. 
Responding to reforming efforts within and without the Catholic Church, the 
moral and ethical treatment of classical precedent and ideas generally pertaining to 
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religion, philosophy, government, and law, and their application within the modern 
context of a reformed (albeit thoroughly fractured) Europe, causes dramatic shifts in the 
thoughts and perceptions of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century humanists.  Their 
reconsideration of classical precedent paves the way for bold new ideas especially within 
government and law, both positive and natural – the latter being the heart of this 
chapter.  Consequently, the focus on classical texts in terms of law and philosophy 
allows for scholars to engage in politically sensitive debates without necessarily having 
to make direct overtures toward different Christian sects.  Since ancient authors were 
very often precluded from being “enlightened,” their contributions could be used in 
purely epistemological excercises, a point which must not be overlooked. 
The turn to classical precedent for many scholars of the period naturally begins 
with its leading Roman lights: Vergil and Cicero.3 Entries from commonplace books of 
the period make it quite clear that the notions offered by both writers are absorbed and 
steeled in any number and variety of ways.  What needs noting here, however, is that the 
reason each of these authors has such authority is not necessarily found solely in the 
ideas contained within their works – though this is certainly part of their appeal.  Rather 
it is that the ideas they express are clear and for the most part well-defined.  Cicero and 
Vergil, in other words, offer clear guidance to their readers, since there is very little 
ambiguity in their works.  This is not to say that there are not dust-ups along their well-
worn paths about various problems in lacunae, emendation, or interpretation; only that 
the authors themselves are not inherently difficult to read and digest.  Their styles and 
content are, in the main, clearly and deliberately intelligible.4 The same goes for many 
other classical authors as well.  Yet, there are a select few Roman authors who could not, 
and were not to, be among the ranks of Vergil and Cicero with regard to these 
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aforementioned generalizations, authors such as Tacitus, Seneca, Lucan and Statius.  
Interest in such authors rises impressively during the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries in northern Europe due to their perceived political and social relevance.  
Indeed, of the first three authors much has already been said and needs no further 
elaboration here; for Statius, however, there is almost nothing. 
Whereas other classical poets were perceived clearly to state their poetic and 
even political ends, and thus to guide the reader, Statius, due to the difficulty of his 
poetry and content, offers no such guidance.  Since he composed the Thebaid under and 
perhaps complicit with Imperial Roman ideology during the reign of the Emperor 
Domitian (81-96 CE), early modern readers gladly accepted his ambiguous narrative on 
Theban incest, patricide, fratricide and civil war not as a sign of weakness but as a 
cultural connective that responds to both social and intellectual pressures. Two such 
readers of Statius, George Buchanan (1506-82) and Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) expand the 
understood intent in parts of the Thebaid to alter the intense legal debates over 
sovereignty and tyranny put forth by the Houses of Stuart and Orange, respectively.  
Buchanan’s and Grotius’s attempts to nullify purely religious influence over the critical 
debates about authority allows them to develop and transform the Thebaid’s antithetical 
examples of natural law and absolutism into mandates for returning to republican 
government and the establishment of international law and rights.5 
It is, indeed, rather unheard of to mention Statius's Thebaid as an essential or even 
noteworthy text in Renaissance discussions on natural and positive law.  And perhaps 
this is unjust.  For through one of the happier coincidences of the Renaissance, Buchanan 
and Grotius both comment in their very own copies of the Thebaid in a manner which 
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suggests that Statius’s text epitomizes the very breakdown of natural and positive law, 
and plays a significant role in their own primary works on law and moral philosophy.  In 
light of this, Buchanan’s De iure regni apud Scotos Dialogus (Dialogue) and Grotius’s De jure 
belli ac pacis (DJBP), works that treat both topics – albeit in very different fashions – 
warrant a closer look with regard to Statius’s Thebaid.6   
It must be stated immediately that neither Statius nor his Thebaid is  necessarily 
the impetus for the ideas expressed by Buchanan and Grotius in theirs works.  Instead, 
the extant  evidence suggests that Statius and the Thebaid help to refine and confirm the 
normative, lego-political thoughts that Buchanan and Grotius were struggling to resolve 
within their respective periods.  In the Thebaid they read a work which commented on its 
own time during the reign of Domitian, but is also appropriate for understanding the 
politics of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Furthermore, it must be made clear 
that Buchanan’s and Grotius’s readings of the Thebaid are predicated upon the 
commentary proffered by Lactantius Placidus (5th - 6th century CE), one which explicitly 
highlights the degeneration of natural law and nature through terms such as fas and ius.  
To clarify, my assertion is not that Statius is explicitly interested in positive and natural 
law per se; but rather that both Buchanan and Grotius recognize, through Lactantius’s 
commentary, the underlying moral and ethical concepts of fas / nefas and ius / lex to be 
uniquely employed and corrupted within the Thebaid.  This recognition, in turn, 
ultimately helps order their respective treatises where they pertain to natural and 
positive law.  
II 
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 Looking at the Thebaid, one may first ask the question of why a reading of it would 
be important for either Buchanan or Grotius.  To answer this question by simply stating 
that both scholars see the Thebaid through a lens of civil war, though somewhat 
differently, is tenuous at best.  The obviousness of brother against brother, which would 
have easily appealed to any classical scholar of the sixteenth and seventeenth century, 
not the least of which to those in France, Scotland and the Netherlands, is too vague and 
unconvincing since these simplistic notions strain the understood political and historical 
import of Statius among Roman epicists during this period. Similar to our contemporary 
understanding of Statius, the early moderns held that, in contrast to the Aeneid where 
Vergil carefully reconstructs Rome’s foundation in terms of religious motifs such as 
mores, pietas, and fas / fatum, Statius composes the Thebaid in terms of destruction and 
decivilization, that is ira, odium, and nefas – similar to Lucan’s Pharsalia.  Peeling away the 
Vergilian veneer, Lucan goes a step further than Statius and eliminates the gods 
themselves, removing all remaining notions that morals and ethics have any religious and 
(hence, substantive) political connection.  Statius, however, maintains the presence of 
the gods throughout, and Jupiter himself holds the leaders and citizens of Argos and 
Thebes (and even Athens, eventually) accountable for their thoughtless transgressions.  
Statius’s retention of the gods, specifically Jupiter’s actions is, in my mind, particularly 
responsible for Grotius’s and Buchanan’s interest in the Thebaid.  For through Jupiter, 
Statius shows how religion intersects with law; these are precisely the topics which are 
of most value to our scholars. 
Further binding our scholars together are a number of similarities as both were 
equally prolific in matters literary, historical and theological.  Each was a political exile 
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in Paris; each imitated Statius in the silva genre; each wrote legal treatises pertaining to 
the rights of man; each wrote famous Latin biblical dramas; and each even translated 
Euripides from Greek into Latin (Medea and Alcestis for Buchanan; the Phoenissae for 
Grotius).7  This final connection through Euripides proves more than a little revealing, 
since it is from the Phoenissae that the ideas expressed by both Buchanan and Grotius 
merge – and why should they not, since the Phoenissae is the Thebaid’s precursor.   
The seemingly simple comparison between the Thebaid and the Phoenissae is 
perhaps not so simple, especially when it is understood that during Buchanan’s lifetime 
Greek texts were generally hard to come by and there were very few people who could 
actually read them.  In fact, Buchanan himself becomes one of a handful of translators of 
Euripides, following the precedent of Erasmus; so it is no surprise to find him thinking of 
the Phoenissae when reading and commenting on the Thebaid.8 It is equally unsurprising to 
find Grotius doing the same, since by his time (the late sixteenth, early seventeenth 
centuries) the greatest Greek scholars, except Isaac Casaubon, reside in the Netherlands 
and teach at Leiden University where Grotius was schooled.  Still, while we might 
reasonsably expect these scholars to have read the Phoenissae, it is quite unexpected to see 
them embrace both Statius and Euripides for similar ends.  So it needs explaining how 
and why they did so; and to do that we must first turn to Cicero.  
To reach the comparison of the Phoenissae with the Thebaid would not necessarily 
have been to simply compare one text with the other.  Rather it seems much more 
probable that since the topics discussed under the pretext of moral philolosphy 
(including natural and positive law, tyranny, and proper rule) are continually present in 
the minds of our scholars it is more likely that texts which pertain to them specifically 
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would have been at the forefront of their thoughts.  In the early modern period, the 
classical author with the most to say about these topics and who was respected most 
was Cicero.  In particular, his work entitled De officiis comments specifically on the 
topics that most interest Buchanan and Grotius.  Here it bears stating how important the 
De officiis is to the early modern period, as it is literally the second book printed with 
movable type after Gutenberg’s Bible.  In total, there are ninety-one versions of it 
produced in one hundred years; and Erasmus and Melancthon published a pocket-sized 
version of it, so that it could always be at arms’ length.  Additionally, during the medieval 
period there were more copies of the De officiis produced than any other classical text. As 
a result church fathers, such as Jerome, Augustine and Aquinas, use it to develop their 
own perspectives on moral philosophy.  All this is to say that the De officiis stands alone 
in importance and serves to a fair degree as a type of commonplace-book for early 
modern scholars, including Buchanan and Grotius.  
One instance where the De officiis certainly retains this effect is in the third book 
where Cicero recalls an anecdote about Caesar and Thebes and addresses Euripides’s 
Phoenissae. Specifically, he discusses how Caesar comes to use the perverted logic of 
Eteocles for justifying his pursuit of power.9  Cicero quotes him as saying: 
Ipse autem socer in ore semper Graecos versus de Phoenissis habebat, 
quos dicam, ut potero, incondite fortasse, sed tamen, ut res possit 
intellegi: 
‘Nam si violandum est ius, regnandi gratia 
Violandum est; aliis rebus pietatem colas.’ 
Capitalis [Eteocles vel potius Euripides], qui id unum, quod omnum 
sceleratissimum fuerit, exceperit!...ecce tibi, qui rex populi Romani 
dominusque omnium gentium esse concupiverit idque perfecit! Hanc 
cupiditatem si honestam quis esse dicit, amens est; probat enim legum et 
libertatis interitum earumque oppresionem taetram et detestabilem 
gloriosam putat. Qui autem fatetur honestum non esse in ea civitate, quae 
libera fuerit quaeque esse debeat, regnare, sed ei, qui id facere possit, esse 
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utile, qua hunc obiurgatione aut quo potius convitio a tanto errore coner 
avellere? Potest enim, di immortales, cuiquam esse utile foedissimum et 
taeterrimum parricidium patriae, quamvis is, qui se eo obstrinxerit, ab 
oppressis civibus parens nominetur? 
 
(Caesar was always quoting those lines from the Phoenissae of Euripides 
(Ishall translate them as well as I can, giving attention to intelligibility 
rather than elegance:  
“If right be contravened, let it for rule 
Be contravened; or else pursue the good.” 
Eteocles, or rather Euripides, deserved to be put to death for making such 
an utterly unscrupulous exception… For here you have a supreme example 
of a man whose ambition was to be absolute ruler of the world, and 
achieved it!  Anyone who says that this is an honourable goal is mad: for 
he not only assents to the abandonment of law and liberty, but glories in 
the foul and detestable act of their subjection.  But what of the man who 
admits that it is wrong to establish absolute rule in a state which has a 
tradition of freedom which it deserves to maintain, and yet considers that 
it can be to a man’s advantage to gain such rule? Is he not to be deterred 
from such a wrong idea by every conceivable condemnation and reproach? 
What advantage, in Heaven’s name, could be deferred from that most foul 
and disgusting murder of the state? And yet the man who perpetrated it 
was given the title of ‘Father’ by the very people he had enslaved.” 10 
 
Cicero is more than clear here: the moral degeneration and the devolution of government 
under tyrants, both ficitional and real, are  detestable; and the loss of pietas (as Cicero 
translates and cites Caesar’s rendering) in the Phoenissae is at the very heart of a 
corrupted state.  Indeed, for Cicero both Eteocles and Caesar are madmen (amentres), 
literally losing their ability to rationalize while in pursuit of power as well as losing sight 
that duty should always be maintained.  
There are two points here in which Cicero’s work is eminently important to 
Buchanan and Grotius.  First, is how he maintains the connection between reality and 
fiction vis-à-vis Caesar and Euripides; second, is how Cicero puts in its proper 
perspective a state’s degeneration and death by underscoring that without pietas both 
liberty (libertas) and law (ius) also vanish.  Both of these must be thoroughly unpacked 
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before moving on to a reading of each of our scholar’s major works at hand in this 
chapter. Since there is no prima facie victrix causa for the story within the Thebaid, nor its 
primary source Euripides’s Phoenissae, “fraternas acies” is nothing more than blood spilled 
in vain; in other words, it was done merely out of “regnandi gratia violandum est” and not 
for the good of the people. 
III 
According to Theban mythology, it is the citizenry who decree the rules for 
governing Thebes, since they “elect” their king.  It may seem somewhat misguided to call 
Oedipus an elected figure, but for Buchanan and Grotius Oedipus did not inherit the 
throne of Thebes, but was given it by the citizenry.  Any and all power given to the king 
of Thebes after the murder of Laius is representative and not given by god. So it is this 
very electoral process that is precisely the backdrop to the entire Theban saga for both 
Buchanan and Grotius, though, not necessarily Statius or Cicero.  It bears keeping in 
mind as well that Oedipus does not begin to seek out Laius’s murder until he has four 
full-grown children, so that his leadership via the people has started a tradition, which 
for Buchanan and Grotius, cannot be overturned. As evidenced by their life-long efforts 
to combine civic and public acts such as communion, marriage, baptism, piety in the 
form of self-informed biblical study into a soteriological and civic existence, the people’s 
will was of manifest importance to any governing philosophy set forth by Buchanan and 
Grotius.  Hence, the subversion of normative politics in the Thebaid and Phoenissae, and by 
Caesar in the De officiis, too, underscores contemporary debates about what is good for 
the city and state.   
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In the case of Thebes, these disputations always take place out of sight of the 
citizens themselves – and most certainly to their detriment – while they ought to occupy 
the public space in which they were first debated and approved.  For example, in the 
Phoenissae Jocasta moderates a clandestine meeting between Eteocles and Polynices, 
leaving Creon to search the entire palace and city for Eteocles, only to find him having 
concluded this meeting and a made a declaration of war.  Grotius addresses this very 
topic in the DJBP, proclaiming that to declare war without public consent in a society 
that is organized through citizen involvement was against natural law: 
Sed ut justum hoc significatu bellum sit, non sufficit inter summas 
utrinque potestates geri: sed oportet, ut audivimus, ut et publice 
decretum sit, et quidem ita decretum publice ut ejus rei signifatio ab 
atlera partium alteri fact sit… Cicero Officiorum  primo: at belli quidem 
aequitas sanctissime feciali populi Romani jure perscripsit est: ex quo intelligi 
datur, nullum bellum esse justum, nisi quod aut rebus reptitis geratur, aut 
denuntiatum ante sit et indictum.11 
 
(But that War may be called just in the Sense under Consideration, it is 
not enough that it is made between Sovereigns, but (as we have heard 
before) it must be undertaken by Publick Deliberation, and so that one of 
the Parties declare it to the other: ...  Cicero in his first Book of Offices 
observes, There is no lawful War but what is made after redemanding what was due, 
or after a Decleration in form.) 12 
 
The disparagement of clandestine decision making becomes only heightened during 
Buchanan’s and Grotius’s eras where public debate in the form of town-hall meetings, 
known as classis, encourage participation which, much like the humanist enterprise itself, 
not only takes place in the public eye via publication of books, pamphlets, letters and 
debates for anyone with sufficient skill and learning to join in; it also entails at its heart a 
collective, or synchronic, commemoration of historical time past and the willigness to 
use established precedent to the advantage of the contemporary citizen.  For Buchanan 
and Grotius, the citizen of Thebes as well as of Scotland and Holland is in possession of a 
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contract (foedus, pactum), consent (condicio) and duty (pietas, officium), not the government 
– a sentiment echoed throughout the De officiis. For our own purposes “contract” here is 
meant to be understood in terms of existing historical agreement between citizen and 
government resulting in expressed rights and laws; “consent,” a contemporaneous and 
dynamic agreement between fellow citizens and government, continuously modified and 
rethought; and “duty” or “commitment,” the obligation to maintain both contracts and 
consent. This last concept naturally leads to a broader understanding of civic and 
Christian pietas (not to say piety).  Both Buchanan and Grotius hold a deliberate view of 
pietas,13 one which continually interweaves both political and religious assumptions, at 
points making them nearly coterminous For each  its source can be found in the poetry of 
Statius and Euripides (for our current purposes) no less than in the sermons of Calvin, 
Beza, or Arminius.14   
Returning for a moment to the passage quoted earlier from Cicero’s De officiis, it is 
easy to notice that the way Cicero has translated Euripides’s Greek is in fact to term the 
breaking of laws as the very destruction of pietas, something our humanist scholars notice 
as well.  In fact, analogous acts of civic piety, Buchanan and Grotius emphasize, had been 
experienced by the great empires of antiquity and were examples of what should be 
done.  Thus, according to Buchanan, Brutus used “holy daggers” on behalf of his country 
to rid itself of the malignity of Caesar in his preface to Muret’s play Julius Caesar 
(1552).15  For him, Brutus’s act of pietas is at once political and spiritual, at once classical 
and Christian.  In attempting to restore Rome’s civic patrimony, i.e. representative 
government, Brutus adheres “in omnibus rebus pietatem colare.”  Indeed, Buchanan 
would return to the same subject again in the preface to Jacques Grevin’s 1561 French 
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drama, César, where he further proclaims that Gaul’s revenge is at long last present.  
Grevin, according to Buchanan, dresses him in his “own spoils” and shows him for what 
he was, a power-hungry tyrant.16 
 If Buchanan’s reaction to Caesar’s ancient imperial asperations seem vivid, one 
need only look at how he responds to Mary’s public declaration about the birth of her 
son James VI.  In 1566 Mary expressed her desire to see the newborn James VI become an 
imperial ruler, and proclaimed him the next Charlesmagne.  Buchanan’s response was 
less than enthusiastic.  In fact, his genethliacon for James provides an utterly different 
political and moral trajectory.  Buchanan’s James will achieve a golden age by being a 
vastly more modest figure, and his power will derive not from the armies he commands 
but from the example he provides.  The poem is indicative of Buchanan’s aversion to 
imperium for its own sake, and it is worth quoting at length to get a better 
understanding of his position: 
Cresce puer patriae auspiciis felicibus orte,   1 
Exspectate puer, cui vatum oracla priorum 
Aurea compositis promittunt secula bellis… 
Pene tuo toties excisa Britannia ferro 
Jam dehinc pacatis conjungent foedera dextris. 
Vos quoque felices felici prole parentes, 
Jam tenerum teneris puerum consuescite ab annis 
Justitiae, sanctumque bibat virtutis amorem 
Cum lacte; et primis pietas comes addita cunis 
Conformetque animum, et pariter cum corpore crescat… 
Ut populi pendent a Principe mores… 
Ut verae virtutis honos, moresque modesti 
Regis, et innocui decus et reverentia sceptri  25 
Convertunt mentes ad honesta exempla sequaces.  
 
(Thrive boy, born in happy times to be your country’s prince, 
To whom the oracles of the early prophets 
Promise a golden age and the end of warfare… 
And you Britannia, so often destroyed by your own iron. 
From here on they will take pen in hand to sign peace treaties. 
You also, father and mother, happy in the happiness of parenthood, 
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Accustom the tender child from his young years 
To the idea of justice, and let him imbibe the sacred love of virtue 
With his mother’s milk; let piety be attendant on his cradle… 
So do the people found their behaviour on the character of the prince… 
As does the reputation for genuine virtue, the character of a good king, 
The glory and respect owing to blameless rule, 
Convert the souls of subjects to an honorable way of life.)17 
 
Talem Romulidae tranquilla pace fruentem 
Sacrificum videre Numam, Solomonta potentem 65 
Palmifer Euphrates: non illis lethifer ensis, 
Non bellator equus firmavit regna, nec axis 
Falcifer, aut densis legio conferta maniplis, 
Sed pietatis amor, sed nulli noxia virtus, 
Fretaque praesidio majestas juris inermi… 
Dux Macedum, quique Ausoniam tenuere superbo 
Imperio Reges, aut ferro aut tabe veneni 
Effudere animas, et caedam caede piarunt. 
Hanc seu Rex vitiis contaminet ipse pudendis, 
Sive alius ferro violet vel fraude, severas 
Sacrilego Deus ispe petet de sanguine poenas, 
Contemtumque sui simulacri haud linquet inultum. 
Sic Nero crudelis, sic Flavius ultimus, et qui 
Imperio Siculas urbes tenuere cruento, 
Effigiem foedare Dei exitialibus ausi 
Flagitiis, ipsa periere a stripe recisi.   85 
 
(The descendants of Romulus saw Numa offering sacrifice, fostering 
peace and tranquility, 
The palms of the Euphrates saw mighty Solomon [wisdom/intellect 
incarnate]. 
Neither the deadly sword nor the snorting warhorse strengthened their 
kingdoms, 
Nor did the two-edged axe, nor the legions in densely packed columns, 
But love of piety and virtue injurious to no one, 
And majesty supported by the power of unarmed law. 
The Macedonian general, and those kings whose arrogant imperium 
prevailed in Ausonia, 
They died by the sword, they died by poison, and their blood paid for the 
blood they had shed. 
 
But if the king should contaminate this image by shameful vices, 
Or if some person should desecrate it by force or fraud, 
God Himself will exact a bloody punishment for such sacrilege [Jupiter, 
contamination to root, punishment, Domitian Roman examples instead of 
biblical] 
Nor will he leave unavenged an insult to his image. 
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Thus did cruel Nero, thus did the last of the Flavians, 
And those who cruelly held sway in the Sicilian cities, 
Daring to disgrace the likeness of God with their execrable crimes. 
Thus did they [and their name] perish root and branch from the face of 
the earth.)18 
 
Through James’s sense of duty, that is, through his pietas, he will become a mirror for 
citizens and, for Buchanan, the antithesis of such leadership as evidenced in the historic 
past and in the immediate present.  James, therefore, must never be like Alexander, “the 
conqueror who made his way to the riches of India;” nor ever must he be like the 
emperors of classical Rome, “those kings whose arrogant imperium prevailed in 
Ausonia,” who “died by the sword” and “poison,” and whose “blood paid for the blood 
they shed.”19  Instead, James will exalt the law, preserving it by imposing it upon himself 
not his subjects.  In Buchanan’s estimation monarchy is not tyranny only so long as it 
recognizes that the positive law, which gave authority to a ruler, was established by the 
people.  
Grotius goes further in condemning Caesar than Buchanan.  In the preface to his 
translation of the Phoenissae, he accuses Caesar of perverting all laws both divine and 
human: 
Cicero in primo de Officiis tractans locum de injustitia ait facillime adduci 
homines, ut eos justitiae capiat oblivio, cum in imperiorum, honorum, 
gloriae cupiditatem inciderunt: quicquid denique ejusmodi est, in quo non 
possint plures excellere, in eo fieri plerunque tantam contentionem, ut 
difficillimum sit sanctam servare societatem.  Exemplum deinde adfert viri 
maximi virtutibus praediti C. Caesaris, qui omnia jura divina atque 
humana pervertisset propter eum, quem sibi opinionis errore finxerat 
principatum.  Atque hic est Caesar, qui, ut idem narrat Cicero, illos de 
Phoenissis versus, qui in Eteoclis persona sunt positi, & quos hic ne 
ponere quidem volo, adeo & quos hic ponere quidem volo, adeo eos 
detestor, in ore semper habebat.  Accedit ad levandam Eteoclis invidiam, 
quod Polynices non ut apud Statium inducitur per legatos egisse 
antequam exercitum admoverat, sed castris demum ad urbem positis 
venire ad audiendas conditiones. 
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(Cicero in the first book of the De officiis cites that place concerning 
injustice and says that men are easily led to [it], with the result that 
forgetfulness seizes them from justice, because the fall for desire of power, 
respect and glory.  Whatever there is of this type, in which many are not 
able to excel, against it such great strife arises, that it would be difficult to 
preserve a holy society.  He brings forth the example of the greatest man, 
Caesar, full of manliness, who perverted all divine and human laws 
because of himself, whom he has made the principate through the error of 
his opinion.  And here is Caesar, who, as Cicero says, those verses of the 
Phoenissae, that have placed in the persona of Eteocles, and those which I 
do not wish to place here, still those I do wish to place here, yet I detest 
them, in his mouth he always had them.  He approaches mitigating the 
envy of Eteocles, since Polynices, not as among Statius, is led by 
messengers to have acted before he had moved the army, but when the 
camp had been established by the city he came to listen to conditions.)20 
 
While Grotius shows that Cicero understands Euripides’s Phoenissae to be harsh in its 
treatment of Eteocles, he is nevertheless in agreement that it is justified.  Additionally, 
for Grotius, the crux of the Phoenissae is about contract and consent, and how it is 
literally perverted by the pursuit of power – or  in the case of Caesar, the principate. And 
so we arrive at the critical point for each scholar. 
The element which provokes further consideration here is that both Buchanan 
and Grotius note explicitly in their personal copies of the Thebaid the contractual 
obligations upon which the genesis of its story lay and use the Phoenissae for emphasis.  
The interest in contractual obligation, when viewed within their own major lego-
political works, is more clearly expressed as the recognition of contractual consent and 
its limit(s).  Within the framework of the Thebaid, and to a lesser degree the Phoenissae, 
this concept is refined and expressed through the interaction and dissolution of natural 
and positive law under regimes of tyranny.   
 This does not necessarily mean that Buchanan and Grotius hold the same opinion 
of what constitutes the breaking of moral and ethical obligations in the form of codes 
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and contracts that substantiated contemporary governmental authority, especially in 
light of the Thebaid.  For instance, one can easily read Grotius’s under-linings and 
marginalia to suggest that he read Statius through a Stoic lens filtered by Justus Lipsius 
and Michel Montaigne. However, this would only hold to be partly true since Grotius’s 
conception of the Wise Man and Just King does not necessarily align with what any of 
the classical stoics, such as Seneca, Cato, Thrasea Paetus, or Helvidius Priscus, had in 
mind.21  Yet, Statius’s appeal as a moral philosopher is desired by both Buchanan and 
Grotius and substantiated by Cicero’s comments on the Phoenissae and Caesar.  So, while 
a moralistic reading of the Thebaid is necessarily myopic, it is what is considered 
appropriate by our humanists. 
IV 
 There is little doubt that Buchanan and Grotius understood Statius’s decision to 
reflect on civil war through the ancient saga of the sons of Oedipus and the Seven as, like 
Vergil and Lucan before him, the manifestation of what he thought about the civil strife 
which arose over power struggles within contemporary Rome up to and during the 
Flavian dynasty.  It seems very likely that Buchanan and Grotius recognize Statius’s 
Thebaid as a remark on events of the year of the four emperors (Galba, Otho, Vitellius, and 
Vespasian) and their wars of 68-69, a time that was without clear ideological order or 
moral merit. The internecine war between Polynices and Eteocles was symbolic.  
Extrapolating further, for Statius, and so for Buchanan and Grotius, their war did not 
have the pretext of Romulus’s murder of Remus, or the bloodshed like that of Cadmus’s 
slaughter; since out of the former, for better or worse, a new city and a new civilization 
emerged, and the same of Cadmus’s sown men for the founding of Thebes.  What 
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perhaps needs reiterating is that out of each of these acts a republican government 
eventually arises and regresses, falling first back into monarchy and then into tyranny.  
What needs to be shown here is how Statius demonstrates the degeneration of 
monarchical rule.     
If there is one theme expressed throughout the Thebaid it is the unavoidable 
tyranny that evolves under monarchical rule.  Without belaboring the point the reader 
finds Statius’s disgust couched in the form of a rhetorical vituperationes regis – many of 
which are underscored by Grotius in his personal copy.  For now we will focus on the 
first book since it is naturally the place where Statius foregrounds the rest of the epic.   
The first of these instances occurs at 1.164-196 where the picture painted by 
Statius shows the brothers’ lust for nuda potestas (raw power),  and its destructive 
consequences, framing it around the claim of Polynices to the throne and the 
determination of Eteocles to maintain sovereignty over Thebes.22  In his own copy of the 
Thebaid Grotius dutifully underlines portions of this segment of text.  Specifcically he 
highlights 164-173:  
Iam sorte iacebat 
Dilatus Poynicis honos. Quis tunc tibi, saeve, 
Quis fuit ille dies, vacua cum solus in aula 
Respiceres ius omne tuum cunctosque minores, 
Et nusquam par stare caput! Iam murmura serpent 
Plebis Echioniae, tacitumque a principe vulgus 
Dissident, et, qui mos populis, venturus amatur. 
Atque aliquis, cui mens humili laesisse veneno 
Summa nec impositos umquam cervice volenti 
Ferre duces… 
 
(Already Polynices’ royalty lay low, deferred by the lot.  What a day that 
was for you, cruel monarch, when alone in an empty palace you saw 
authority all yours, every man your inferior, nowhere a head standing as 
high!  Already grumbling creeps among the Echionian commons and the 
crowd is at silent odds with the prince.  As is the way of a populace, the 
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man of the future is the favorite.  Thus one of them, whose bent it was to 
harm the highest with lowly venom nor ever to bear with a willing neck 
the rulers placed over him…) 23 
 
And 1.186-192: 
 
Cernis ut erectum torva sub fronte minetur 
Saevior assurgens dempto consorte potestas. 
Quas gerit ore minas, quanto premit omnia fastu! 
Hicne umquam privatus erit? Tamen ille precanti 
Mitis et affatu bonus et patentior aequi. 
Quid mirum? non solus erat. Nos vilis in omnes  
prompta manus casus, domino cuicumque parati… 
 
(See you how power, rising crueler with none to share it, threatens us 
straight of stance and stern of brow?  What menace in his countenance, 
how his pride abases all things! Will he ever be a private citizen?  Ah, but 
the other was gentle to a suppliant, kind of speech and more tolerant of 
justice.  No wonder, he was not alone.  As for us we are cheap company, 
ready to hand for any venture, for any master to use.) 24 
 
Grotius’s notes emphasize the debasement of the brothers, from Polynices’s insatiable 
quest for monarchical power to Eteocles’s abuse of his position and desire to retain the 
throne.25  In a move that aligns the Thebaid with the Phoenissae, Statius presents 
Polynices’s claim to the Theban throne as just, demonstrating throughout the narrative 
the validity of Polynices’s presumption that he has been wronged through the breaking 
of a contract.26  Polynices therefore defends his claim to the throne numerous times 
throughout the poem.27 Grotius presumes Polynices’s is correct, stating in his preface to 
the Phoenissae:  
Videbitur multis Eteoclis persona injustior fingi, quam opus est, quia in 
disputatione cum fratre quasi jus omne contemnere videtur eo ipso, quod 
id non affert, quod pro sua causa maxime videbatur favorabile, jus scilicet 
primi natu, quo utitur apud Papinium.  Nam & Euripides, & Papinius, 
majorem natu faciunt Eteoclem, contra quam Sopholces Oedipode 
Coloneo.  Sed mihi videtur hac in re sapienter egisse Euripides, qui 
sciebat, si eo tempore id jus viguisset, nunquam futurum fuisse, ut pactio 
ea iniretur, quae fundamentum est hujus fabulae. 
 
77 
 
(The character of Eteocles only seems to be painted more unjustly than is 
necessary, since in this dispute with his brother it is as though all law is 
condemned by him. Since he does not announce it, which on behalf of his 
own cause, he used to appear most favorable, as the law of the first-born, 
which is used in Statius.  For both Euripides and Statius make Eteocles 
older by birth, in contrast to Sophocles in Oedipus at Colonus.  I think, 
howeverm that in this instance Euripides has acted wisely, since he knew, 
if at that time the law had been strong, there never would have in the 
future, so the pact itself is devised, which is the foundation of the story.)28 
 
 
Thus Polynices’s claim is just and he clearly has been wronged.29  But justness of cause 
does not equate to a diminished sense of potential tyrannical prowess or behavior; for 
Polynices is no less a tyrant at Argos than Eteocles is at Thebes.  Neither is he superior to 
Eteocles in any moral sense nor is he more deserving of sympathy, as Tydeus believes.30 
Both men, according to Statius, are equally capable of abusing power when ruling alone 
and deserve to be chastised through the use of vituperationes regis for their actions, since 
they are soley concerned for themselves.31 
In a telling correlation, Mary’s desire to have James become the next 
Charlesmagne precisely replicates Polynice’s own obsession with power and egotism.  
Polynices obsesses: 
…iam iamque animis male debita  regna 
Concipit, et longum signis cunctantibus annum 
Stare gemit  
 
(Already his mind envisages the royalty overdue and groans at the long 
year’s halt and the loitering of constellations.) 32 
 
Polynices projects himself into the future much in the way Mary dreams of James’s 
forthcoming glory.  The impatience and lack of political foresight is striking because it 
shows just how vainglorious each ruler is.  Just as Buchanan sets his poem in relief to 
Mary’s wish, Statius uses the relationship between Polynices and Eteocles to alienate the 
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reader’s sympathy for both brothers and to focus attention upon the cost of inherited 
monarchy.  
The formative relationship between Polynices and Eteocles exemplifies the 
consequences of lust for monarchal power such as that displayed by Caesar and Mary as 
well.  The actions of Adrastus and Theseus do not on the surface conform to this pattern 
of tyrannical monarchy, but these monarchs are not immune from destructive influences 
either. “Statius occasionally emphasizes the benevolence, piety, and self-restraint of 
Adrastus as well as the civilizing role of Theseus, but overall this plays a relatively minor 
part in the presentation of institutional monarchy in the poem.  In fact, the poet extends 
his despairing picture of institutional monarchy to include the actions of these seemingly 
just and benevolent regents; for not even they are untainted by the madness that afflicts 
participants in war.” 33   
It is surely significant that the idea of mixed or balanced government is notably 
absent from Statius’s work, as it was a prevalent memory in both Tacitus’s and Lucan’s 
works.  Instead it is made clear from the outset that only monarchy and its debauched 
form, tyranny, are to be considered in its fullest historical sense within the Thebaid.  No 
doubt this is intentional since it allows Statius to comment on current political 
oppression in an indirect fashion – the direct route had killed Lucan.  Buchanan parallels 
this type of indirect approach in the Dialogue where the relative merits of the various 
forms of government, such as monarchy, aristocracy, and constitutional rule and their 
degenerate forms tyranny, oligarchy, and democracy goes completely untouched. Still, 
there is much in Buchanan’s thinking that links him with the developing tradition of 
classical republicanism (i.e. constitutional rule determined by the will of the citizens), 
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not least the high value he attaches to active citizenship and political participation as 
mentioned before.   
V 
Turning to the Dialogue, a brief word would do well for those unacquainted.  By 
design Buchanan’s treatise is a fictionalized dialogue between himself and Thomas 
Maitland, recently arrived in Scotland from France following the death of Lord Darnley.  
Maitland begins the conversation by relating to Buchanan the outraged reaction on the 
continent to the murder of Darnley and the subsequent deposing of Mary Queen of Scots.  
Buchanan, with his personal animosity and assumption of Mary’s complicity in her 
husband’s murder,34 asserts in return that one cannot disapprove of the crime without 
approving the punishment meted out to the criminal, especially if it is a monarch.  
Maitland replies that in Europe things are viewed in a rather different light.  While 
rulers see the deposing of Mary as a slight on monarchical government, the people, 
although generally sympathetic to the humbling of tyrants, are confused over what 
precisely constitutes tyranny.  Thus, in the Dialogue Buchanan’s goal is to set kingship 
and tyranny as opposites so that through these contraries he may reveal the defining 
characteristics of tyrant –all very similar to the Thebaid.35  
 To begin Buchanan discusses human society and the origins of government, both 
of which he sees originating not out of utility or expediency but rather through a natural 
impulse (vis naturae) implanted in all men that makes them shun solitary life and seek 
companionship in society. 36  Pressed by Maitland to clarify his understanding of natural 
force, Buchanan glosses it as “a light divinely shed upon our minds.” Buchanan identifies 
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this light both with the law of nature and with God-given ability to distinguish base 
from noble things, otherwise known as wisdom, stating: 
Nam cum Deus “sanctius hoc animal mentisque capacius altae / …et quod 
dominari in cetera posset.” Formavit, non modo corpori eius oculos dedit 
quibus ducibus adversa quae essent suae condicioni fugeret, quae 
commode sequeretur, sed animo etiam velut lumen quoddam praetulit 
quo turpia ab honesties secerneret.  Hanc vim alii naturam, alii naturae 
legem vocant; ego profecto divinam existimo, planeque illud habeo 
persuasum quod ‘numquam aliud natura, aliud sapientia dicat’...Huius 
legis omnes sacrorum voluminum libri qui ad mores formandos pertinent 
et iurisperitorum et philosophorum commentationes quae modo ad viam 
sunt utiles nihil aliud quam explicationem continent. 
 
(For when God formed ‘this creature which is more holy and more 
capable of nobility of thought… and which could be master of all others,’ 
He not only gave eyes to man’s body as guides to aid him in avoiding what 
was harmful to his condition and in seeking what was advantageous, but 
He also set a kind of light before his soul by which he could distinguish 
base from noble things.  Some call this power nature, others call it the law 
of nature.  For my part, I think it is of divine origin, and I am quite 
convinced that ‘nature never says one thing and wisdom another’… All the 
books of Holy Scripture which are concerned with shaping human 
behavior and the commentaries of lawyers and philosophers which are 
useful to mankind are no more than an exposition of this law.)37 
 
It is clear from this statement that Buchanan develops his theory within a broadly Stoic 
framework that understands God to have created the universe according to rational 
principles and to have endowed man himself with reason sufficient to comprehend those 
laws of nature by which he should govern both his own conduct and that of the society 
in which he is naturally disposed to live.38 Beyond displaying that this passage harkens 
to a normative political allegory, the discussion by antithesis recalls Lactantius’s 
commentary, where he presents the Thebaid’s content as one of opposites.  Lactantius 
states: 
FRATERNAS ACIES ALTERNAQVE REGNA PROFANIS / 
DECERTATA ODIIS quia pacti erant fratres ut mutuis annis regnarent et 
sibi invicem succederent. Hoc dicit: narramus gesta certamina causa 
regnorum… ‘Profanis’ quia per eos violata sunt iura natura, et bene 
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profanis, quia nefas erat germanos odia retinere, ergo exsecrabilibus 
contra naturam sumptis. 
 
(‘Brotherly battle lines and alternate rule fought because of profane 
hatred’ because the brothers had agreed to rule in mutual years and 
succeed each in his own place.  Statius says: I am telling the battles that 
happened on account of the tyranny…   ‘Profanis’ since through them the 
laws of nature were violated, and also profane, since it was against divine 
law (nefas) that the brothers retain hatred, therefore against nature they 
were consumed by rage/by the curse[of Oedipus].)39 
 
The emphasis by Lactantius here is on natural law (iura natura) and divine law (fas) or 
rather anti-divine law (nefas), and significantly how one interferes necessarily with the 
other.  Such an identification of nature and natural law, taken together to function in 
accordance with the divine will, in fact, was a characteristic of the type of Stoicism that 
was filtered through the writings of Cicero. Moreover, for Buchanan, as for Cicero, just as 
wisdom or right reason (reason in accord with nature) is the essence of moral worth in 
the individual, so it is the foundation of law and justice in a commonwealth; without 
which there was none – hence his genethliacon for James.   
With the description of the interruption between divinity, nature, and humanity 
and its corresponding laws, Lactantius indicates that the story of Thebes is one of 
antithesis.  In an illuminating turn, Buchanan himself has taken the time to note 
precisely how this breakdown actually occurs between the brothers, for in the margin he 
has written:  
exethlon exo thsd’ hekon autos cthonos, 
dous toid’ anassein patridos eniautou kyklon 
hosst’ autos arxein authis ana meros labon  
 
(I left this land myself of my own accord, granting this man the right to 
govern the country for a year.  I was to rule again, taking my turn…) 40   
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These are the words of Polynices in the Phoenissae, proclaiming his right to rule since 
Eteocles has broken their contract.  Buchanan, in his copy of the Thebaid, by way of 
Euripides, thus explicitly highlights the contractual obligation as well as the understood 
indication of consent by both parties in the governance of Thebes.  Once broken, 
Lactantius indicates, it is a violation not only of contract and consent but also of natural 
law itself, as he clearly indicates that what is profane is necessarily nefas, and what is nefas 
corrupts nature and natural law.   
 Buchanan, in addition to what he has already said above, that the foundation of 
human society is lex naturae (or natura) and that it is necessarily divine in origin,  proceeds 
to clarify how and why this comes about.  In particular, he reacts to Maitland’s assertion 
that God is auctor:  
Maitland: Igitur humanae societatis non tu oratorem aliquem aut 
iureconsultum qui homines dispersos colligeret sed ipsum Deum 
auctorem putas. 
 
(You think, then, that was not some orator or lawyer who assembled men 
together, but that the author of human society was God himself.) 
 
Buchanan: Ita profecto est, ac iuxta Ciceronis sententiam nihil quidem 
quod in terris fiat principi illi Deo qui qui hunc mundum regit acceptius 
puto quam coetus hominum iure sociatos, quae civitates appellantur.  
Harum civitatum partes similiter inter se iunctas esse volunt atque cuncta 
corporis nostri membra inter se cohaerent, mutuisque constare officiis, et 
in commune elaborare, pericula communiter propellere, utilitates 
prospicere eisque communicandis omnium inter se benevolentiam 
devincere. 
 
(Exactly so; for like Cicero, I think there is nothing on earth more pleasing 
to the supreme God who rules the world than those communities of men 
bound by the law which are called commonwealths.  The various parts of 
these commonwealths want to be linked together in the same way as all 
the limbs of the human body work together, in order to balance reciprocal 
duties, to labor for the common good, to ward off common dangers, to 
provide for mutual benefits, and by sharing these things, to secure the 
goodwill of all towards all.)41 
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On the surface, Maitland’s statement that God is the auctor of the lex natura seems 
innocuous. However, since Buchanan eschews defining precisely what the lex natura (or 
even natura) means, the reality of prescribing God as auctor becomes problematic and 
somewhat complicated.  For Buchanan the definition of auctor inheres an amalgamation 
of knowing that auctor retains three meanings simultaneously when used in conjunction 
with God.  First, auctor as author, that is God is the creator simply through the act of 
uttering (fas); second, that which is uttered literally becomes law (ius or lex) for mankind; 
and, third, since god uttered it, He is the owner of the law, natural or otherwise.  Thus, 
morality and law are always combined in Buchanan’s use of auctor. 
Historically, culturally, and philosophically there are complex and shifting 
meanings and concepts in the use of the lex naturae or jus naturale (natural law, natural 
right). This historical confusion and conflation of word forms brings up a problem of 
logical and semantic discrimination in so far as the use of these words have as much 
variance as, for example, the term res.  In the Neo-Latin culture of Buchanan’s era ius 
becomes a synonym for lex and vice versa. This conflation of terms immediately raises 
philosophical problems for the modern reader, since to determine the boundary between 
ius (right) and lex (law), almost always implies a philosophically difficult choice in the 
application of the abstract concept of morality and the practical reality of jurisprudence.  
For Buchanan lex and ius are interchangeable; see, for instance, his use of “iure sociatos” 
above.  The distinction, then, for Buchanan is not in the terms of lex or ius themselves, but 
rather in the application of, and relationship with, divinity when applying these terms to 
reality.  In other words, as Lactantius suggests, it is the difference between fas and nefas 
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when applied to the fundamental construct of lex naturae that legal results cannot and 
should not be contrary to morality, which is defined by divinity.  Further clarification of 
this point is necessary here, especially with regard to the Thebaid.  
Lactantius offers his understanding of natural law using an example: 
PERIIT IVS F(AS)Q(VE) B(ONVM)Q(VE) / E(T) V(ITAE) 
M(ORTIS)Q(VE) P(VDOR) ius legum est, quia unus foedus laesit; fas 
hominum, quia fratres contra se arma sumpserunt; bonum, quia usque  ad 
interitum pugnaverunt; et vitae mortisque pudor, quod mutuis periere 
vulneribus et cremate sunt rogorum discrepantibus flammis. 
 
(The rule of law is dead [periit=died], since the sole contract is broken; the 
divinity of man, because the brothers raised arms against each other; 
goodness, because they then fought to the death; and the respect for life 
and death, because they killed each other with mutual wounds and they 
were cremated by different fires of cremations.) 42 
 
My translation of fas “as the divinity of man” is made because fas is quite literally divine 
will and command or decree, and when it is broken the link between man and divinity is 
necessarily broken.  The result is that whatever action is taken from then on has no 
approval by divinity, and hence no moral standing.  Again, we see Buchanan having 
already arrived at this point earlier in his Dialogue, determining that Holy Scripture 
“mores formandos pertinent” (intertwine with making mores/morals).   
Finally, Buchanan offers a clinching term for the suggestion that natural law 
inherently involves contracts or agreement, for he has already stated that part of being 
human requires involvement in condiciones.  The word itself is derived from condico, 
naturally; but importantly it retains at all points its definitive inference that there is an 
agreement by two parties to a specific course of action reached by the consent of both 
parties through talking and compromise (it can, in fact, mean promise).  This is always 
achieved in a manner such that has recourse to the limits established by nature, i.e. God.  
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It is important, therefore, to understand that when Buchanan speaks about the nature of 
tyranny and monarchy, it is always with an eye on nature and natural law and the 
obligations due to both.   
Having established the origins of society based on a definition of natural law, 
Buchanan now proceeds to analyze the reasons for the creation of monarchy and its 
devolution into tyranny.  In an argument that Buchanan admits draws heavily from 
Aristotle (primarily from the Politics), he begins by using the commonplace analogy 
between the body politic and the human body, contending that the former is just as 
susceptible to disease and ill-health as the latter and consequently equally in need of the 
services of a doctor.  In a commonwealth, he continues, this task is performed by the 
ruler, whose principal function, as with the doctor, is to maintain harmony among the 
members of the body politic as well as ridding it of any malady, social or otherwise.   
When Maitland objects to Buchanan’s assertion that the task of maintaining 
harmony (temperamentum) should be attributed to justice rather than temperance, 
Buchanan replies that it matters little to which of the precedence is given, for virtues are 
so inter-dependent that “all seem to have a function, that is, restraint of the passions 
(cupiditatum moderatio).”  Justice, it seems, is not so much a matter of administration as it 
is the state of equilibrium achieved when the members of the body politic are acting in 
harmony and right reason.  This can only happen, however, if the ruler’s own ability to 
subject his base appetites to rational control is in effect. So what would happen should 
the ruler become amens and act out of odium, ira, discordia, caedes, scelus: the Thebaid.  Here 
Polynices and Eteocles purge pietas, ius, and fas for overwhelming lust of regnum and 
revenge.  As noted before, Eteocles and Polynices are interested only in nuda potestas, so 
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that they may place themselves “loca dira arcesque nefandae / suffecere odio, furiisque 
immanibus emptum / Oedipodae sedisse loco.”43  Thus to have Oedipus’s crown is to 
participate directly in his doom and in his act of nefas.  
In keeping with Statius, it is the fixation on the latter (the interference of god) 
that proves to be the abiding preoccupation of Buchanan’s Dialogue.  It is at this point 
that Statius has Jupiter declare that he is going to punish the houses of Thebes and Argos 
for their nefarious appetites; and, because of their crimes against the laws of nature 
(terrarum delicta), he will destroy them both.44 In developing his argument as to why he 
must go to such extreme measures, Jupiter clearly shows that divine retribution comes 
forth when the law of nature is broken and threatens harmony of the body politic. For 
Statius, and so for Jupiter, natural law, then, becomes a necessary restraint on a ruler’s 
own destructive appetites, e.g. Cadmus, Oedipus, Tantalus; and when it is transgressed 
god will step in to set things right.  Thus, Jupiter goes out of his way to implicate 
Adrastus’s guilt in altering the harmony of his own polis; in his view he has no reason to 
aid in Polynices’s bid to reclaim the throne of Thebes.   
Jupiter’s significance in the Thebaid is hard to over-estimate.  Where the modern 
interpretation sees a brooding self-centered tyrant, unwilling to be mollified by Juno’s 
considerate and well-argued plea, Lactantius and our scholars see God himself justifiably 
angry with the citizens of Thebes and Argos for enduring such poor leadership, 
especially when they had the opportunity and the means to replace their rulers. Jupiter is 
not, therefore, solely irritated by Eteocles and Polynices but with the alienation of man’s 
dominium via the citizenry, since they traded away not only their possessions but also 
their liberties in order to ensure self-preservation. Their actions led to overbearing 
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autocracy; whereby Statius maintains that the Thebans now groan at their own fate.  
“fraternasque acies fetae telluris hiatus / augurium seros dismisit ad usque 
nepotes?”45asks an anonymous Theban.  Jupiter’s actions sanction the removal of a king 
when he becomes a tyrant (which Statius repeatedly indicates Eteocles is).  Thus, for 
Buchanan the deposing of a king (Eteocles) or a queen (Mary) is warranted by God 
himself in order to maintain nature and natural law once it is apparent that it has been 
transgressed. 
Buchanan further underscores this sentiment as he now turns to a discussion of 
tyranny.  After a brief exchange over the etymology of the word tyrant and an 
explanation of how its pejorative connotations have been acquired, Buchanan refers 
Maitland to Aristotle’s classic distinction between a king who exercises authority over 
willing subjects and a tyrant who rules as a master over slaves.46  This he proceeds to 
elaborate upon by stressing the extent to which, in contrast to a true king, the tyrant 
rules by force and fear for his own self-interested ends.  Men such as this, he concludes, 
“are not joined to us by any bond of civility or common humanity but must be adjudged 
the most deadly enemies of God and man.”47  Buchanan stops short of explicitly 
enunciating a theory of tyrannicide.  Rather he draws the discussion of tyranny to a close 
by dwelling instead on the tortures and torments to which those who rule by fear must 
themselves inevitably be subject.48 
 Though lacking explicit approbation of tyrannicide, the removal of a tyrant is 
nevertheless advocated for by Buchanan, and, in fact, it leads to the Dialogue being singled 
out and condemned, most famously by William Barclay in 1593.  Barclay declares that if 
Buchanan is correct in his assertion, the result would lead straight to chaos and legalize 
rebellion for those who were simply restless.49  His principal point is defined by the role 
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of obedience in government, since he claims that the sovereign’s right to rule is directed 
by God.  Obedience to a sovereign (even Eteocles) is obedience to God.  For Barclay, 
therefore, if Buchanan’s assertion that man created sovereignty is correct, there is no 
strict obedience; furthermore, it is pointless to converse about pacts and promises – 
Eteocles’s very attitude.  But as we have seen Buchanan’s conception of natural law 
prevents this over-simplification.  All law emanates from God, it is a part of nature. 
 In contrast to Barclay, under Buchanan’s theory of natural law citizens of a 
society must consider and uphold the interest of the society itself, doing nothing 
injurious to the general welfare; a lesson that is more than apparent in the Thebaid.  
Buchanan is clear, authority and sovereignty are inherent in the people.  God is the auctor 
of natural law, which at its very heart is contractual when applied to human society.  
Barclay’s sovereign, in contrast, is not bound to any contract, he can do as he pleases, just 
like Eteocles desires to do.  For Buchanan the ruler serves not only as the instrument of 
the people, he is their paragon of morality; this very assertion is expressed in the 
contractual nature of their relationship.  In reading the Thebaid, Buchanan finds a clear 
example of how the law of nature necessarily expresses this type of morality vis-à-vis fas 
and nefas, specifically through Jupiter’s own statements concerning the recklessness of 
the leaders and carelessness of the citizens.  
VI 
 In general, Barclay’s argument reflects the mainstream contemporary theory of 
the divine right of kings, which had progressed from the less specific Protestant and 
Catholic intimation of the origin of authority in whatever guise it occurred (the Defensor 
Pacis, for instance) to a theory that Bodin devises, which declares the monarchy to be the 
89 
 
only natural sovereign institution supported by God.  Rebellion by citizens is, therefore, 
rebellion against God; more importantly citizens are not the authority.  In contrast, 
under Buchanan’s theory of natural law citizens of a society must consider and uphold 
the interest of the society itself, doing nothing injurious to the general welfare.  Each 
citizen is obedient to the magistrate under which he lives; however, for those like Barclay 
and Bodin (though the two are hardly comparable in terms of intellect, influence and 
competence), or even Calvin, a conception of natural law like Buchanan’s promotes a 
fluctuating sense of obedience, one which could promote a sense of rebellion since it 
presents a paradox (which Grotius deftly sidesteps by talking in terms of state and not 
citizen): under natural law no man has the right to command another, and no assembly 
of men can confer on anyone what none of them enjoys; so the minority is never explicitly 
obliged to the majority.  It is a difference of recognizing that the state created under 
Buchanan’s idea of natural law supposes society to be artificial, put together by mankind, 
versus Barclay’s adherence to divine regulation and determination in arranging society. 
The distinction between artificial state and natural state solidifies in Grotius’s De 
iure belli ac pacis; but it is necessary to state that Grotius does not arrive at this conclusion 
via Buchanan’s Dialogue.  In fact, he does his best to hide that he read Buchanan’s work at 
all. Although, he concedes in his correspondence to having read just about everything 
that Buchanan had published – even praising his Psalms and translations of Euripides – 
he, nevertheless, maintains a strident dislike for the Scot, often lumping him together 
with Knox and other critics of sovereignty, even though Knox and Buchanan famously 
differ in their political ideologies.  The reason for Grotius’s consideration seems to result 
from a nuanced combination of strict Calvinism, his position as a diplomat, and most 
importantly a political philosophy that has much in common with Jean Bodin.  The first 
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two are necessarily combined, Grotius’s work as a diplomat for Holland presupposes a 
strict form of Calvinism, which demands non-resistance and tolerance of kings and 
tyrants alike – it is in fact Grotius’s tolerance which will land him in prison at Loevestyn 
following the beheading of Oldenbarnevelt – but the third has rarely been discussed.   
 Bodin is in many ways the link between Buchanan and Grotius because his works 
the Methodus and Republique wrestle with the same problems as do Grotius and Buchanan 
in their works. The works combine, on the one hand, the explicit moral nature inherent 
in government found in Buchanan and, on the other, the artificial nature of human 
society that Grotius articulates demands obedience through obligation in the De jure. 
Where Bodin and Grotius differ from Buchanan is in  the recognition of the State’s 
importance over that of the individual in offering moral authority.50  In my opinion, 
Grotius realizes that Bodin exceeds his predecessors (Aristotle, Plato, More, and 
Machiavelli) in the area of political philosophy, since he considers the state precisely in 
reality contra More and Plato, as a moral vehicle contra Machiavelli, and as broadly as 
possible contra Aristotle.  Of extraordinary importance, then, to Grotius is Bodin’s use of 
history to support his political theorizing; since by providing the remnants of history 
Bodin would help his readers understand the worth and function of the state itself.  
History, then, provides precise conclusions about the laws governing human society.  
Indeed, Grotius agrees with Bodin that the study of history is a study of laws and 
systems of laws, and specifically it is a type of comparative study in constant dialogue 
with natural law. In the Methodus and the Republique, Grotius finds a study of 
formative factors that derive not from man’s will but from nature and are permanent or 
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mutable only with some great determination – in fact, he admits this very same idea in 
the DJBP.   
Returning to ideas of sovereignty, Bodin asserts that sovereignty is independent 
of form; so that when it resides with a single person it is monarchy (his preferred type of 
government), when with “numerical majority” democracy. Since there is some type of 
sovereignty, there is some type of law; and if there is law, there is an implicit mandate, 
and in a mandate an act of will, with the latter then generating a question concerning the 
obligation to obedience.  According to Bodin, however, sovereignty is created by men and 
appropriated by force.  What type of force is uncertain as he does not state it; perhaps 
the vis naturae as postulated by Buchanan, but more likely just vis.  What he does say is 
that sovereignty arises from the nature of man and of human needs and aspirations.  
Hence, Bodin is not willing to go as far as Barclay; or rather Barclay is willing to go much 
farther than Bodin in stating that monarchy was instituted by God and, therefore, its 
sovereignty is impeccable and wholly distinct from man.  Grotius comments on Barclay’s 
view, stating that while it is extreme it is much more correct than Buchanan’s, since the 
sovereignty of a constitutional ruler in a strict Calvinist sense can never be assailed.  
Bodin maintains, however, that sovereignty among men is artificial and that laws are 
created by men so there is no true form of government.  This conflict creates a paradox in 
Bodin’s political theory: even though God approves of monarchy as a proper embodiment 
of sovereignty, obedience ultimately resides with the individual.  As he postulates in the 
Methodus, absolute power has to have a degenerative effect on who ever has it, which 
invariably causes deterioration in contracts, treaties, and rights; it is only exacerbated 
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when there is any transfer of power.  It is here where Grotius’s reading of the Thebaid is 
able to mediate some of Bodin’s and Buchanan’s ideas. 
VII 
Turning to Grotius’s copy of the Thebaid it is not surprising to notice that the 
overarching pattern of his marginalia is directed toward noting Statius’s use of fas and 
nefas.  In fact, Grotius mentions that nefas is clearly a significant part of the Theban story 
(including Statius’s Thebaid) in the preface to his translation of the Phoenissae from the 
beginning.  Grotius states: 
At quanto satius est dicere, nefas visum civibus, comitari hominem 
parricidio & incesto pollutum. Nam & per ignorantiam facta, quae talem 
habent atrocitatem, non evenisse putabantur, nisi in poenam criminis. 
 
(But by how much it is more satisfying to say, nefas was seen by the 
citizens, pollution attended the man by parricide and incest.  For through 
ignorance those things were made which have such atrocity that they are 
thought not to have happened except in punishment of crimes.) 51 
 
Of the nineteen times that Statius uses fas in the Thebaid, Grotius marks at least nine of 
them; and of the forty-two times Statius uses nefas Grotius marks thirty of them.  
Although the mundane application of fas or nefas with esse is found regularly in the 
Thebaid, its poignant use as adjectival “anti-divine” is what Grotius has marked 
repeatedly.  In fact, Grotius marks its first use in the Thebaid at 1.85 where Oedipus begs 
to “see” his evil curse come true.  Irony aside, the statement underscores the reversal of 
pietas by Oedipus in imprecating his own sons, since the act of imprecating is inherently 
one of nefas.  (But what can we expect from Oedipus the tyrant at this point?)  As 
mentioned before it is Oedipus’s imprecation which incites Jupiter to respond by 
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annihilating Thebes and Argos.  Yet, further refinement is necessary to understand how 
Grotius reconciled the concepts of fas and nefas.  
Grotius’s understanding of the Thebaid – much as Buchanan’s – goes part and 
parcel with Euripides’s Phoenissae, for he notes numerous times in the preface to his 
translation that Statius is correct in following Euripides’s interpretation of the myth 
rather than Sophocles, praising precisely the episodic nature of this drama and epic 
because it more closely parallels actions that humans would take versus the actions and 
perceptions they might take.  In other words, according to Grotius, both Euripides and 
Statius supply the reader with a tale that is much more human, if less civil.  He says: 
Itaque & Papinius, scriptor accuratus, ut alias partes ex Phoenissis, ita & 
hanc imitandam sibi duxit: adeo nihil in ea reperit, quod credibile non 
esset.  Inserta, quae Graeci episodia vocant, in hac tragoedia haud multa, 
& satis probabiliter cum argumento cohaerentia, ut differtatio Iocastes & 
Polynicis de exsilij incommodes, quae ipsa graviorem facit videri eam, 
quae secutura est, calamitatem Oedipodis: item colloquium Eteoclis & 
Creontis de belli gerendi rationibus. 
 
(Thus Statius, an accurate author, as other parts of the Phoenissae, thus he 
decides to imitate him.  Finally he discovers nothing in it which is not 
believable.  The things inserted, which the Greeks call episodes, in this 
tragedy are not many, and are probable enough with the argument 
hanging together, that in differing Jocasta concerning the rough exile of 
Polynices, makes herself appear more serious, which should follow, the 
calamity of Oedipus.  The same conference between Eteocles and Creon 
concerning the reasons for waging war.)52 
 
Furthermore, the actions taken by the characters maintain a tangible verisimilitude; so 
that according to Grotius: 
Optimus, non cum vulgo, sed ex arte loquendi magister Aristoteles poesin 
esse dixit imitationem humanarum actionum: quo judice, Heliodori fibula 
poema erit, Lucani Carmen non erit.  Hic enim maxima ex parte narrat, 
ille fingit, quae vero sunt similia… 
 
(The greatest, not with the common, but from the art of speaking the 
teacher Aristotle said that the imitation of human actions is poeisis.  In 
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which judgment, the tale of Heliodorus will be a poem, and the song of 
Lucan shall not be. For here from the greatest part he speaks, that 
fashions, which indeed they are similar…)53 
 
Grotius proceeds to talk about the action of drama being composed of direct discourse; 
light, heavy, and middle actions; and finally he gives the palm of tragic drama to the 
Greeks, “supra Latinos,” since there remains none of Latin contemporaries to the Greeks.  
The highpoint of tragedy for Grotius is found in Sophocles and Euripides: “Inter eos, 
quos dixi, duos acre certamen.” Ultimately, however, he follows Quintilian’s and 
Aristotle’s judgment for Euripides’s supremacy in conveying realistic emotional reaction 
from the audience and action from his characters. 
When Eteocles reneges on his agreement with Polynices, in effect terminating all 
law in Thebes, his one action spawns a generation of destruction and ends the Cadmean 
sovereignty and civilization.  Grotius states: 
…quia in disputatione cum fratre quasi jus omne contemnere videtur eo 
ipso…ut pactio ea iniretur, quae fundamentum est hujus fabulae. 
 
(Since in a disagreement with his brother it is as if every law is despised 
since the agreement itself was the starting point, the foundation of the 
story.)54 
 
While this statement borders on the banal and simplistic, it is actually quite revealing of 
Grotius’s interest in both Statius’s and Euripides’s presentation of Eteocles’s motives and 
results.  For simultaneously to translating the Phoenissae, Grotius is composing the DJBP.  
In the “Prolegomena” he defines what a contract means as it relates to natural and 
positive law:  
Jus civile, sive Romanum, sive quod cuique patria est, aut illustrare 
commentariis, aut contractum ob oculos ponere aggressi sunt multi; at jus 
illud quod inter populos plures aut populorum rectores intercedit, sive ab 
ipsa natura profectum, aut divinis constitutum legibus, sive moribus et 
pacto tacito introductum, attigerunt pauci, universim ac certo ordine 
tractavit hactenus nemo: cum tamen id fieri intersit humani generic. 
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(The civil law, both that of Rome, and that of each nation in particular, 
has been treated of, with a view either to illustrate it or to present it in a 
compendious form, by many. But international law, that which regards 
the mutual relations of several people, or rulers of people, whether it 
proceeds from nature, or was instituted by divine command, or 
introduced by custom and tacit compact, has been treated as a whole in 
an orderly manner by no one.  And yet it is essential for the human race 
that this be done.)55 
 
Within this statement there are echoes of that already covered by Buchanan in his 
Dialogue; namely, pacto, natura, and divinis legibus (which I have identified as fas).  Eteocles’s 
vacating of an agreement (pactio) causes the deterioration of all laws within Thebes and 
hence its society. 
Although ius and lex are synonymous at most points for Grotius, as they are for 
Buchanan, he does take the time here to define ius as something that can only be done 
rationally not thoughtlessly, and without favor for oneself or ones own pleasure.  He 
states: 
Haec vero, quam rudi modo iam expressimus, societatis custodia, humano 
intellectui conveniens, fons est eius iuris, quod proprie tali nomine 
appellatur: quo pertinent alieni abstinentia, et si quid alieni habeamus aut 
lucri inde fecerimus restitution, promissorum implendorum obligatio, 
damni culpa dati reparatio, et poenae inter homines meritum. 
 
(This indeed, which we have already expressed in a rough manner, the 
care of society, comes together in human intellect, there is the fount of 
the, which nearer is called by such a name.  Pertaining to the right of 
property, whatever we may have of another we shall then make 
restitution through money, the obligation of fulfilling promises, 
reparation by guilt of injury, and the punishment deserved among men.)56 
 
What Grotius understands in terms of the Thebaid is that Eteocles’s decision is made via 
his intellect (intellectus). Thus, ius is unequivocally natural law founded on human 
intellect:   
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Ab hac juris significatione fluxit altera largior: quia enim homo supra 
ceteras animantes non tantum vim obtinet socialem, de qua diximus, sed 
et judicium ad aestimanda quae delectant aut nocent, non praesentia 
tantum, sed futuro, et quae in utrumvis possunt ducere; pro humani 
intellectus modo etiam in his judicium recte conformatum sequi, neque 
metu, aut voluptatis praesentis illecebra corrumpi, aut temerario rapi 
impetus, conveniens esse humanae naturae; et quod tali judicio plane 
repugnant, etiam contra jus naturae, humanae scilicet, esse intelligitur. 
 
(From this signification has flowed another larger sense of jus…we may 
understand that it is congruous to human nature to follow, in such 
matters also, [the estimate of future good and ill, and of the consequences 
of actions] a judgment rightly framed; not to be misled by fear or by the 
temptation of present pleasure, nor to be carried away by blind and 
thoughtless impulse…)57 
 
According to Grotius, then, natural law itself stipulates that positive law, even if it has 
laid down a different rule, should be obeyed.58  However, if we examine the four primary 
tenets Grotius proposes as the substance of natural law, not one that necessarily 
demands  civil obedience.  Thus, Grotius postulates natural  as:  
quo pertinent [1] alieni abstinentia, et si quid alieni habeamus aut lucri 
inde fecerimus restitutio, [2]promissorum implendorum obligatio, [3] 
damni culpa dati reparatio, et [4] poenae inter homines meritum.59 
 
1) Refraining from that which is another’s and to restore to another of 
anything of his which we may have 
2) To fulfill promises. 
3) To make good of a loss incurred through fault 
4) To impose penalties upon men as they deserve 
 
So natural law does not tell us to comply with positive law.  The only way in which 
natural law can be understood as commanding us to obey positive law is to construe this 
obedience as the implementation of a promise.  In fact, this is what Grotius had in mind:  
Deinde vero, cum juris naturae sit stare pactis, (necesse enim erat inter 
homines aliquis se obligandi modus, neque vero alius modus naturalis 
fingi potest,) ab hoc ipso fonte jura civilia fluxereunt.  Nam qui se coetui 
alicui aggregaverant, aut homini hominibusque subjecerant, hi aut 
expresse promiserant, aut ex negotii natura tacite promisisse debebant 
intelligi, secuturos se id quod aut coetus pars major, aut hi, quibus delata 
potestas erat, constituissent. 
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(In the next place, since it is conformable to natural law to observe 
compacts, (for some mode of obliging themselves was necessary among 
men, and no other type of nature can be imagined)…those who had joined 
any community, or put themselves in subjection to any man or men, those 
either expressly promised, or from the nature of the case must have 
understood to promise tacitly, that they would conform to that which 
either the majority of the community, or those whom the power was 
assigned, decided.)60 
 
These agreements form the link connecting positive law to natural law.  Hence, the 
stories told by Statius and Euripides, as already attested to earlier by Buchanan, play out 
similarly here.  That is, a broken promise, when broken in terms of government, is 
irreconcilable with natural law. The precept that we should fulfill promises can only 
become effective after we have consented. It is only by means of this link of consent that 
positive law is related to natural law, consisting of four elements: human nature, natural 
law (which is the obligation to keep promises), consent, such as a promise, and positive 
law.  This assertion appears modest, but it has important implications since the result 
seems to be that it is only by the notion of promissorum obligatio (the very same type of 
accord struck by Eteocles and Polynices) that positive law can ultimately be justified by 
natural law.   
A closer look at the other three tenets clarifies that they can operate, at best, only 
as a marginal justification of positive law.  Tenet one, to abstain from another’s property, 
can only proceed after public authority has decided how to organize property.  The same 
goes for tenet two, since the precept regarding compensation can only come into being 
when a “loss” has been decided by positive law – it cannot serve as a standard according 
to which positive law itself can be evaluated.  Tenet four, that penalties may be inflicted 
on transgressors, merely points out that one has a right to punish.  But if one has 
consented to the establishment of society, it only informs us that states have a right to 
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punish not individuals against the state – something Buchanan would surely dispute.  
Moreover, this tenet is able to serve only as a global justification of penal law, not inform 
on how the right to punish should be carried out.  This is bared out both in the Thebaid 
and the Phoenissae.   
To confine ourselves to Grotius’s translation of the Phoenissae for a moment, we 
see that he understands ius has a moral obligation that only exists if natural law is 
maintained.  In a series of examples, his translation shows that Polynices has a correct 
understanding of both positive and natural law.  In the first example Antigone’s servant 
recognizes this, she states to her that: 
Haec mitte: freti iure in hos fines eunt: 
Eo faventes metuo ne inveniant Deos. 
 
(Send this: Those relying on the law run among these limits: / I fear lest 
the Gods favor him.)61 
 
In other words, Polynices has the assent of the gods because he has the right according to 
law to pursue his chance at ruling Thebes.  When Polynices arrives at his clandestine 
meeting with Eteocles and Jocasta, he himself points this out: 
…inque hoc advoco testes Deos, 
Cum ius petam praestemque, me patriot amen 
Eliminari fine, ius contra ac fidem. 
 
(I call the Gods as witnesses to this / Since I shall seek the law and honor 
it, I allow myself like a madman / to be eliminiated withing the my own 
country – a though law is against loyalty.)62 
 
Not only does Polynices recognize that he is in the right, he demands that the gods 
become witnesses to him seeking out the law, since they prefer that the law remain 
intact.  Instead he is prevented by Eteocles whose actions are both contrary to law and to 
that which which makes promise keeping possible. 
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 Eteocles sees it differently.  He ridicules the very idea of law and morality: 
Si ius bonumque ducerent omnes idem, 
Dissidia generi nulla mortali forent. 
Nunc aequitas nihil ipsa, nisi Concordia, 
Nisi vox inanis: facta discedunt procul. 
 
(If everyman believed in the same law and the same good / there would be 
no dissent of the race of mortals./ Now there is no justice, unless Concord 
/ Unless the empty voice: these deeds teach from afar.)63 
 
In fact, he quips there is no such thing as justice except in empty words and agreement.  
His lust for power has deprived him from acting according to his intellect.  Ultimately, 
he states that he has use for only one law: 
Una lex est pactionis quae satis est semel, 
Ut mihi Thebana tota pareant regni sola. 
 
(There is a single law of pact which is enough, once upon a time / that for 
me all Thebes should obey the rule alone.)64 
 
Eteocles has become the very tyrant that Buchanan feared most, and the one portrayed 
most convincingly by Statius.  His lack of respect for law means for Grotius that he has 
lost the ability to act morally, and in a normative sense to act according to what is right.  
Therefore, the conclusion drawn by Grotius in the DJBP seems to be correct.  On the 
basis of tenets one, three, and four, natural law only comes into play in assessing the 
moral quality of actions within the framework of these human institutions.  Whether the 
institutions themselves are justified or not according to the law of nature can only be 
decided by the question of whether someone consents to positive law.  It is here, namely 
through the role played by Jupiter, that Grotius makes a remarkable statement about 
natural law, and comes full circle with Statius’s Thebaid. 
 Statius has Jupiter play his role as closely to the ideal monarch as possible, an 
anti-Eteocles of sorts, using right reason and acting in accordance with fas and aequitas – 
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more or less because he has to – so that he can punish transgressors.  To be sure, Jupiter 
is a brooding monarch, but, according to Statius, he is not often prone to judgments 
informed by his emotions.  Furthermore, it should be noted that it has taken quite a long 
time for him to arrive at his current decision during the action of the Thebaid, giving 
ample time to Theban citizens to correct their behavior.  Thus, Jupiter makes decisions 
thoughfully and rationally, maintaining harmony and morality, something Eteocles 
specifically revokes in the Phoenissae.   
These assertions are further underscored if Grotius’s understading of how ius 
should be derived are looked at. For Grotius, Jupiter is the root of the word (and 
concept) ius, as well as man’s ability be moral.  He states:  
Et haec jam alia iuris origo est praeter illam naturalem, veniens scilicet ex 
libera Dei voluntate, cui nos subjici debere intellectus ipse noster nobis 
irrefragabiliter dictat.  Sed et illud ipsum de quo egimus naturale ius, sive 
illud sociale, sive quod laxius ita dicitur, quamquam ex principiis homini 
internis profluit, Deo tamen adscribi merito potest, quia ut talia principia 
in nobis existerent ipse voluit: quo sensu Chrysippus et Stoici dicebant, 
juris originem non aliunde petendam quam ab ipso Jove, a quo Jovis 
nomine jus Latinis dictum probabiliter dici potest. 
 
(And here we are brought to another origin of jus, besides that natural 
source; namely, the free will of God, to which, as our reason irrerrefutably 
tells us, we are bound to submit ourselves.  But even that Natural Law of 
which we have spoken, whether it be that which binds together 
communities, or that looser kind [which enjoins duties,] although it 
proceeds from the internal principles of man, may yet be rightly ascribed 
to God; because it was by His will that such principles came to exist in us.  
And in this sense, Chryssipus and the Stoics said that the origin of jus or 
natural law was not to be sought in anywhere else than in Jove himself; 
and it may be probably conjectures that the Latins took the word jus from 
the name Jove.)65 
 
Grotius’s proto-linguistic theorizing aside, he confirms in the above passage that there is 
a direct link between ius (ius naturale) and ex principiis homini internis (or what I have 
suggested to be Jupiter’s decree, or fas).  In the Thebaid, therefore, Grotius recognizes a 
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shift from the question of whether positive law is congruent with natural law via the 
juxtaposition of monarchy and tyranny to whether society as such is congruent with 
natural law and ultimately with human nature.   
Eteocles’s inability to understand the moral implications of forsaking his 
agreement with Polynices directly usurps Jupiter’s role as the owner of all law – as 
already demonstrated by Buchanan.  For Grotius, then, it is a revelation of sorts: 
Eteocles’s actions allow him to view society no longer as a natural association, but as an 
artificial one.  And, although these artificial bodies may resemble natural ones, the fact 
that they are essentially man-made makes it necessary to justify them as an artifice that 
is congruent with human nature.  Once it has been established that these artificial 
unions and their primary institutions are in harmony with natural law, and consequently 
with human nature, there is no longer any need to justify the positive laws of society; all 
of which is strikingly similar to Eteocles’s argument in the the Phoenissae. 
 In itself this shift could have implied an enhancement of the critical potentialities 
of natural law, since moral evaluation no longer confines itself to the legal system alone. 
The result would be that from now on society as a whole could be critically examined on 
the basis of natural law.  Grotius’s turn could have paved the way for systematic social 
criticism. But it did not, and there are two reasons for this.  The first reason was already 
mentioned above: consent itself cannot be evaluated according to the four primary tenets 
of nature.  The second reason is that Grotius, like Statius (and Bodin for that matter), 
notices the alienability of man’s dominium.  That is people can trade away not only their 
possessions but also their liberties in order to ensure self-preservation.  This is precisely 
why Jupiter is so angry with the Thebans and Argives: these cities traded in their human 
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abilities to make reasonable treatises for tyrannical rule.  Thus, their own morality lies 
with that of their respective leaders.  Grotius offers this: 
Nam naturalis juris mater est ipsa humana natura, quae nos, etiamsi re 
nulla indigeremus, ad societatem mutuam appetendam ferret: civilis vero 
juris mater est ipsa ex consensus obligatio... 
 
(For the mother of natural law is human nature itself, which we, even if 
we required nothing, would bring about the act of seeking out mutual 
society: The mother of civil law is the obligation of consensus ...)66  
 
According to Westermann, “This reduction of natural law to the precept concerning 
promises has important implications.  Since the other three laws of nature can only be 
put into operation within the framework of municipal law, they only marginally inform 
one” about whether he ought to consent to a system of law in which no system of 
property is introduced – remember Polynices is an exile, without property or legal 
recourse.67  We are not provided with “a standard according to which we can decide 
which kind of government we ought to consent to,” these are furnished through intellectus 
and concepts like fas and nefas.68  In this regard, fas only tells us that because we have 
consented, we are bound to the natural obligation to keep promises, just as Polynices’s 
argued.   
 For Grotius, then, the primary question which the Thebaid helps to resolve is no 
longer whether positive law is congruent with natural law, but whether society as such 
is congruent with natural law, and ultimately with human nature vis-à-vis Polynices and 
Eteolces.  This question arises because he no longer views society as a natural 
association, but as an artificial one.  Artificial bodies may resemble natural ones, but the 
fact that they are essentially man-made makes it necessary to justify them as an artifice 
that is congruent with human nature.  As such, in reality positive law trumps natural 
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law.  Within the confines of the Thebaid and Phoenissae this holds especially true.  
Eteocles’s ability to modify any contract he sees fit would be legitimate since he is the 
ruler and Polynices is not.  Grotius, in fact, recognizes this as one of the reasons that 
alternate rule did not work in Thebes as it had elsewhere: 
Et sane dubitari non debet, quin pleraque eo tempore Graecorum regna 
communia interplures, aut dividua fuerint. Nam & in ipsa hac Boeotia 
ante Thebas conditas regnaverant Zethus & Amphion; & Mycenis Atreus 
ac Thyestes; & posteriori aetate Lacedaemone, Castor & Pollux. 
  
(It surely should not be doubted, that at that time many kingdoms of the 
Greeks were shared among many men, or they were divided.  For in 
Boeotia itself before the founding of Thebes Zethus and Amphion ruled; 
and at Mycenae Atreus and Thyestes; and further back in time in Sparta 
there was Castor and Pollux.)69 
 
He also gives the example of Romulus and Tatius for the Romans. Then he says: 
 
Sed & apud alias gentes idem diu usurpatum est, donec expertum 
discordiis remedium ab unius potestate quaesitum. Prudenter igitur hoc 
praeteriit: at caeterorum, quae ad culpam minuendam faciebant, praeteriit 
nihil.  Nam injustitiam non defendit universim; sed excusandam putat 
excellendi cupiditate, quae in magnis animis maxima est. 
  
(But among other races for a long time it was usurped, until a remedy of 
the known discord from the power of one was sought.  Thus wisely he 
passed it by. But of the rest, which they made in order to blame to be 
diminished; he passed over nothing.  For he does not generally defend 
justice; but thinks it must be excused due to its ability to excellerate 
desire of power, which in the greatest minds it is greatest.)70 
 
The lack of respect for obligations is the most important factor for maintaining any sort 
of governmental authority both in terms of state-to-state relationship and ruler-to-ruled.  
If the bonds of promise are broken the pretext of natural and positive law are broken 
with them and man-kind reverts back to a kind of primitivism that results in tyranny, 
since at their core tyrants are ruled by cupiditas not ratio or intellectus. 
To a great degree Grotius relies on the reader’s knowledge of Cicero’s De officiis to 
shed light on thes observation; specifically that the sole aim of life to the type of Stoic 
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Cicero was was right action, not because of what it produces – wealth, pleasure, ease – 
but because it is good.  According to Zeno of Citium (335-263 B.C.), the father of 
Stoicism, along with Cleanthes and Chrysippus, the pursuit of virtue would lead one to 
right action and the perfect good.  Since man alone has reason, the natural outcome his 
own nature would lead him to virtue.  As a result Diogenes Laertius postulated that 
pursuing virtue means living according to natural law.  Of course one can find concepts 
of natural law in Greek thought long before Zeno.  Heraclitus and Plato both consider 
divinity a part of natural law.  Cicero more than likely has these in mind when he make 
the claim that law is “that supreme reason, embedded in nature, which orders what must 
be done and forbids the reverse.” 
 Cicero’s assertion that to keep one’s violent emotions and appetites, like cupiditas, 
in check contributes to his understanding of natural law.  Restraint for him, as well as 
Diogenes and even Grotius, was an act of self-preservation, so that to preserve oneself is 
natural but so to family since they are considered an extension of oneself – an 
observation which is amplified by Marcus Aurelius and Epictetus.  This expansion of 
oikeiosis at the end of Book I of De officiis applies then to all of human society and is thus 
natural, not artificial.  The result is that each man is dependent upon those around him 
and so he must be aware of this dependence and respond accordingly.  This is especially 
true in light of things produced by nature which enhance the general good.  Since 
positive law is reached through natural law it is something that enhances the general.  
 Since neither Beuchanan nor Grotius admitted the “Stoic paradox,” each relied on 
a type of officium medium to refine their interpreations of obligation.  In both cases Cicero’s 
via media approach is understood.  In Book III of De officiis he observes the distinction 
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that the execution of a promise is usually obligatory, but not invariably.  In some cases, 
such as when the fulfilment of a promise is to the detriment of the promiser or the 
promisee it may be broken.  Since Polynices’s triumph over Eteocles lasts not even a 
single day, only a matter of seconds, and the control of Oedipus’s house will pass from 
Creon to a foreign king, Theseus, in a matter of days, destroying all of Thebes a 
generation later; the story within the Thebaid and its primary source Euripides’s Phoenissae 
offer highly pessimistic evaluations of the conditions for civilized life when broken 
promises rule.  In fact, the story of the Thebaid and Phoenissae, as Grotius and Buchanan 
surely recognizes, deliberately reverses the thematic movement of Aeschylus’s Oresteia 
(Agamemnon, Choephoroi, and Eumenides).  Specifically, the curse of the house of Atreus, 
beginning with Tantalus, grows gradually to embrace the entire city, but in the end 
proves progressive and civilizing.  In other words, the down fall of one household leads 
to the advancement of the polis and society itself.  Orestes’s vindication by jury in the 
murder of his mother, Clytemnestra, symbolically affects political life in Argos as a whole 
by presenting the polis self-governed by consent through lawful institutions, as opposed 
to tribalism and superstition.  In the Phoenissae and Thebaid, by contrast, the curse is 
originally attached to the city’s founder, Cadmus, and therefore to the city as a whole.  
The civilizing effort is consequently tainted from its inception and can only be undone by 
god himself. 
Statius’s retention of Jupiter is the lynch-pin which binds not Buchanan and 
Grotius to him, but also to themselves. Unlike Lucan, a poet much beloved by both 
Buchanan and Grotius, Statius maintains a divine apparatus which ultimately informs 
how Buchanan and Grotius respond to contemporary legal and moral predicaments. The 
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intellectual pressures faced by them during their lives prompted a reading of the Thebaid 
that altered the intense legal debates over sovereignty and tyranny put forth by the 
Houses of Stuart and Orange, respectively.  Buchanan’s and Grotius’s attempts to nullify 
purely religious influence over the critical debates about authority allowed them to 
develop and transform the Thebaid’s antithetical examples of natural law and absolutism 
into mandates for returning to republican government and the establishment of 
international law and rights.   
To mention Statius's Thebaid as an essential or even noteworthy text in early 
modern discussions on natural and positive law is certainly unique.  Highlighting the 
degeneration of natural law and nature through terms such as fas and ius Grotius and 
Buchanan rewrite the Thebaid as a treatise as much interested in moral philosophy as it is 
with tyranny and law.  Through their marginalia in Lactantius’s commentary, the 
underlying moral and ethical concepts of fas / nefas and ius / lex to be uniquely employed 
and corrupted within the Thebaid, something that carefully contradicts the religious 
motifs such as mores, pietas, and fas / fatum in Vergil’s Aeneid.  
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Notes 
 
1 It is not important at this point to discuss who liked or disliked Poliziano’s Latin prose 
style; it is much more important to understand just how viciously the labels of 
Ciceronian and non-Ciceronian were applied and how many ridiculous academic 
skirmishes took place because of its application.  In many instances, these were more 
than childish in nature; however, it is important not to diminish what took place either, 
since in a very real sense what was at stake for the participants in these battles of words 
was a deliberate and considerate way of perceiving not only the ancient world but also 
their own. 
 
2 Before moving too far along on, it should be noted that the evidence of Statius in 
Cinquecento- Italy is substantial.  An exploration of the relationship between Tasso and 
Statius; or Signorelli and Statius; or the influence of Statius in Mantua, Venice, and 
Ferrara would be a remarkable and significant contribution for many reasons, not the 
least is to the study of the broad intersection of art and literature during this period.  
Additionally, expanding the reception of Statius to the humanist efforts of sixteenth-
century Spain would do well, too.  Analyzing the momentum created and sustained by 
Statius and Poliziano on behalf of the silva genre shows that it is the Spaniards who 
show the greatest facility in understanding both the change initiated by Poliziano and 
the antecedent laid down by Statius.  See in particular, Francisco de Quevedo, Cinco 
Silvas, ed. Maria del Carmen Rocha del Sigler (Salamanca: Universidad de Salamanca, 
1994); and Craig Kallendorf, “Converstations with the Dead: Quevedo and Statius, 
Annotation and Imitation,” Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes, 63 (2000): 131-168. 
 
3 In an effort to be efficient with time and space, I must generalize. 
 
4 Nor is it the case that Virgil and Cicero are the predominant political and poetic figures 
during the sixteenth century.  While it is frankly indisputable that each of them reigned 
supreme over classical studies, they were not regarded, in the least, as the end point for 
these studies. 
 
5 I have drawn on the works by I.D. McFarlane, Buchanan (London: Duckworth, 1983); 
Philip Ford, George Buchanan, Prince of Poets, (Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 1982); 
George Buchanan, A dialogue on the law of kingship among the Scots : a critical edition and 
translation of George Buchanan's De iure regni apud Scotos dialogus, ed. and trans. Roger A. 
Mason and Martin S. Smith (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2004); and George Buchanan, 
George Buchanan: The Political Poetry, ed. Paul J. McGinnis and Arthur H. Williamson 
(Edinburgh : Printed for the Scottish History Society by Lothian Print, 1995). 
 
6 These works were never considered by their authors to be their most important.  
Indeed, each thought of their own efforts in historiography (the Historia rerum Scottorum 
and Annales et historiae, respectively) to be their gifts to posterity.  Yet, history has shown 
the opposite; the DJAS and the DJBP became indisputably significant to legal and 
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political evolution, with the DJBP becoming the legal text of the seventeenth century and 
the DJAS being continually referenced following the Restoration. 
 
7 In a letter dated 12 September 1621 G.J. Vossius commended Grotius on his Sylvae, 
“Quod amoenissimo Sylvae tuae vireto animum oculosque meos pascere suaviter volueris, 
quantas possum gratias ago.  Equidem multum in ea me delectavit. Cuiusmodi so  
primum calorem atque impetum secutus facis, quod Sylvae nomen ostendit: quid fuisset, 
si lenta Maronis cura placuisset? Neque enim quid nunc desiderari posit, video.  Statium 
sane longe post te relinquere mihi videris. Itaque toties me legere iuvit, ut bonam iam 
partem memoria teneam.”   
 
8 Buchanan, George Buchanan Tragedies, ed. Peter Sharrat and Patrick Walsh (Edinburgh: 
Scottish Academic Press, 1983), 6-7. 
 
9 Cicero, De officiis, 3.21.   
 
10 Cicero, On Moral Obligation, trans. John Higginbotham (Berkeley: UC Press, 1967), 166. 
 
11 For all of Grotius’s Latin for the DJBP I have used Hugonis Grotii De jure belli ac pacis, ed. 
and trans. William Whewell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1853) 3: 3.5.  
 
12 This translation is provided in Hugo Grotius The Rights of War and Peace, ed. Richard Tuck 
trans. Jean Barbeyrac 3: 3.5. 
 
13 Buchanan’s concept of pietas comprises all definitions of pietas simultaneously: namely, 
maintain a connenction between duty to God and parents, justice (ius), and gentleness 
(humanitas). 
 
14 Buchanan, Political Poetry, 28 
 
15 Buchanan, Political Poetry, 14. 
 
16 Buchanan, Political Poetry,  14. 
 
17 Buchanan, Political Poetry, 154-155. 
 
18 Buchanan, Political Poetry, 158-161. 
 
19 Buchanan, Political Poetry,  30. 
 
20 Euripides, Eurpidis Tragoedia Phoenissae; Interpretationem addidit H. Grotii ed. Valckenaer 
(Leiden: 1802) XIII. 
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21 Frankly, this task becomes increasingly tangled when trying to figure out whether 
Theseus or Adrastus becomes the Just King, and thus the moral hero. 
 
22 Statius, Thebaid, 1.150. 
 
23 The edition being cited here and throughout unless otherwise noted for both Latin and 
English translation is Statius, Thebaid, ed. and trans. D.R. Shackleton Bailey (Cambridge, 
MA: Loeb Classical Library, 2003) 52-53. 
 
24 Statius, Thebaid, 1.54-55. 
 
25 William J. Dominik, The mythic voice of Statius : power and politics in the Thebaid (Leiden: 
Brill, 1994) 76. 
 
26 In addition, the etymology of Eteocles’s name suggests that he is in fact in the right for 
his decision to remain in control of Thebes. According to Dominik, direct or oblique 
references to the justice and justness of his cause occur in the speeches of Argia, 
Adrastus, the queen of the Bacchanals, Jocasta, and Antigone: 3.342; 4.79f.; 8.615; 11.540-
42.   
 
27 For instance, Statius, Thebiad, 2.358-62. 
 
28 Eurpides, Phoenissae, XIII. 
 
29 Dominik 79 
 
30 Statius, Thebaid, 2.462-66 
 
31 Dominik 80. 
 
32 Statius, Thebaid, 1.64-65.  
 
33 Dominik 77. 
 
34Buchanan’s falling out with Mary is substantially documented elsewhere by McFarlane 
and Mason. 
 
35 Buchanan, Dialogue, li. 
 
36 It is interesting to note that Lactantius relies primarily on Vergil and Cicero (and 
Lucan to a lesser degree) to make some of the same points concerning government and 
right rule as Buchanan does in his dialogue. 
 
37 Buchanan, Dialogue, 18-19. 
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38 See, too, “Primum igitur convenit internos homines a natura ad societatem et vitae 
communione esse factos.” (First of all, then, we agreed that men were made by nature for 
living together in society. And “Recte iudicas, et quod tu magis fortasse mireris, aliquot 
ante Paulum saeculis hoc ipsum viderat Arstoteles, naturam secutus ducem.  Quod ideo 
dico ut quod ante probatum fuerat manifestius videas, eandem scilicet Dei et naturae 
vocem esse.” (You are right, and what may surprise you more, under nature’s guidance, 
Aristotle had seen this very point some centuries before Paul.  I mention this to let you 
see more clearly what was proved earlier, namely, that then voice God and of nature is 
the same.) Buchanan, Dialogue, 40. 
 
39 Lactantius Placidus, Lactantii Placidi in Statii Thebaida commentum. Anonymi in Statii 
Achilleida commentum. Fulgentii ut fingitur Planciadis super Thebaiden commentariolum, ed. 
Robertus Dale Sweeney. (Stuttgart: Teubner, 1997) 1.1-2. 
 
40 Euripides Phoenissae, trans. David Kovacs. Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, MA, 
1994) 476-78. A word about Buchanan’s interaction with Statius is due here.  As 
previously stated before, Buchanan’s interest in Statius seems to stem from his interest in 
Statius’s narrative on tyranny.  While he never explicitly states such a notion, his 
marginalia in his copy of Statius shows a deliberate interest in the writings of Statius and 
Euripides together. However, his copy, the 1510 edition, residing in the special 
collections at St Andrews, displays a range of marginalia in Buchanan’s hand from both 
earlier and later periods in his life.  The discrepancy in years presents somewhat of a 
challenge as it is difficult to know precisely at what date Buchanan was annotating his 
copy of Statius.  However, there are clues that the earliest he would have read Statius in 
the lone volume which remains – it is of course possible he owned multiple copies – is 
during his first years at the College of Guyenne in Bordeaux, 1539-1545, where he was 
required to write and produce a series of dramas, namely his plays, Jephthes and Baptistes, 
and his translations, Medea and Alcestis, for the college – a few of which Montaigne claims 
to have been part of.  Buchanan’s marginalia, in many instances, in the Thebaid read as 
sourcing notes on the history and volatility of Thebes as well as a particular interest in 
Lactantius’s notes on Medea.  Overall, he heavily annotates in Latin the first four books of 
the Thebaid with two notes in Greek, both excerpts from Euripides’s Phoenissae.  In 
addition, Buchanan scratches through the text in some instances to make an emendation 
or adds specific loci identifying a particular point in the commentary.  Buchanan’s 
annotations to his copy of Statius, nevertheless, show him to be an avid reader of the 
Thebaid and Silvae; and as will be shown in the following pages in at least one instance 
Statius serves to hone and mediate Buchanan’s conceptions of law and government. 
 
41 Buchanan, Dialogue, 20-21. 
 
42 Lactantius, Commentum, 1.154-55. 
 
43 Statius, Thebaid, 1.162-4.  In fact immediately (1.184-5) after this recognition an 
anonymous Theban asks the gods whether Cadmus’s sowing of the dragon’s teeth must 
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be an omen of internecine strife forever: “fraternasque acies fetae telluris hiatus / 
augurium seros dismisit as usque nepotes?”   
 
44 Statius, Thebaid, 1.214ff. 
 
45 Statius, Thebaid, 1.184-5. 
 
46 Statius, Thebaid, 1.50-3. 
 
47 Statius, Thebaid, 1.54. 
 
48 Buchanan, Dialogue, 57 and lvi. 
 
49 For a more detailed understanding of Barclay’s arguments see, J.W. Allen, A History of 
Political Thought in the Sixteenth Century, (New York: University Paperbacks, 1960), 386-393. 
 
50 See Allen, History, 394-444, for a very considerate and insightful understanding of 
Bodin’s thoughts.  See, too, Donald Kelley, “The Development and Context of Bodin’s 
Method”; J.H.M Salmon, “Bodin and the Monarchomachs,”; and R.J. Schoeck, “Bodin’s 
Opposition to the Mixed State and to Tohomas More,” in Jean Bodin International 
Conference on Bodin (Munich: Beck, 1970) 123-150; 359-378; 399-414, respectively. 
 
51 Euripides, Phoenissae, XII. 
 
52 Euripides, Phoenissae, XII. 
 
53 Euripides, Phoenissae, IX. 
 
54 Euripides, Phoenissae, XIII. 
 
55 Grotius, DJBP, “Prolegomena,” 1. 
 
56 Grotius, DJBP, “Prolegomena,” 8. 
 
57 Grotius, DJBP, 9. 
 
58 Pauline Westerman, The disintegration of natural law theory : Aquinas to Finnis, (Leiden: 
Brill, 1998) 161.  Westermann’s reading of Grotius is the most accurate to date concerning 
natural and positive law.  Additionally, she provides the connections that are contiuously 
attenuated and unnoticed by other scholars about Grotius’s interaction with such 
predecessors as Aquinas and Suarez. I am following her argument closely in order to 
show how Grotius’s thoughts are affected by Statius in terms usually reserved for legal 
interpreters. 
 
113 
 
 
59 Grotius, DJBP, “Prolegomena,” 8. I am retaining Westermann’s delineation of this 
passage in the Prolegomena; however, I have enumerated where she has used letters to 
spearate each thought. 
 
60 Grotius, DJBP, “Prolegomena,” 16. Translation provided by Whewell. 
 
61 Euripides, Phoenissae. 154-155. 
 
62 Euripides, Phoenissae, 494-496. 
 
63 Euripides, Phoenissae, 501-505. 
 
64 Euripides, Phoenissae, 593-594. 
 
65 Grotius, DJBP, “Prolegomena,” 12. 
 
66 Grotius, DJBP, “Prolegomena,”17. 
 
67 Westermann 162. 
 
68 Westermann 162. 
 
69 Euripides, Phoenissae, XIII. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
Commonplace-books and Commentary: Lipsius’s Politica and Statius’s 
Thebaid1 
 
In 1595 the printing house of Plantin-Moretus in Antwerp published the first new 
commentary on Statius’s Thebaid in nearly eleven hundred years.2  Prompting this edition 
during the 1570s, Justus Lipsius sets out for himself the task of recruiting his friends and 
colleagues for the purpose of composing new commentaries on each of Statius’s works, 
not just the Thebaid.  At one point, he even goes so far as to offer his own notes and the 
different editions he has acquired to his friend and colleague Janus Lernutius, if only 
Lernutius would undertake such a project.  But it was to no avail; Lernutius had other 
priorities, and, besides, he did not even like Statius.  Undaunted, Lipsius now at Leiden 
University (1579-1590) continued to think critically about Statius during the 1580s, 
exhibiting his enthusiasm for Statius to his pupils and colleagues alike.  At last, near the 
end of the decade an up-and-coming lawyer and scholar from Mechelen (in what is now 
Belgium), Jan Bernaerts, eagerly takes up the project.  As it turns out, Bernaerts would 
focus his efforts primarily on the Thebaid, but at long last there would be a new edition of 
Statius’s works.  
At this point in time Bernaerts’s enthusiasm for Statius is, in an academic sense, 
popular.  Lipsius’s efforts pay off substantially as interest in Statius among Dutch 
scholars of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries rises dramatically.  In truth, 
there is a zeal for Statius that swells to its greatest heights during this period, a veritable 
Papinian renaissance.  Besides Bernaerts and Lipsius, other Dutch scholars, such as 
Daniel Heinsius, Gaspar Gevartius, Petrus Scriverius, Johannes Meursius, Hugo Grotius, 
Johannes Woverius, Federicus Lindenbrogius, Johannes Gronovius, and Joseph Scaliger 
are now all working on Statius’s Thebaid, Silvae, and, even, Achilleid.3  Just as significant, 
they are in constant communication with each other about their discoveries and 
conjectures.4 Eventually, their efforts produce eight editions of Statius’s works during 
the period from 1595 to 1618, totaling at least thirty-six different printings. (Though this 
number is not even a third of the approximately one hundred and thirty-three printings 
of Statius’s works from 1595 to 1700.)5  With so much activity centered on Statius, 
especially by the two most influential scholars of the period, Lipsius and Scaliger, who 
are diligently reading and promoting Statius, the obvious questions beg being asked: 
What is it that intrigues these scholars about Statius, and how does this interest arise 
and differ among them?6 
 For the most part, these questions have fairly stale and unexceptional answers.  
For Scaliger, Meursius, Woverius, Lindenbrogius, Gevartius, Scriverius, and Gronovius, 
Statius’s works are of a purely philological interest.7  Statius’s Thebaid simply has not 
been annotated adequately since Lactantius Placidus; and Calderini’s commentary on the 
Silvae had long been chastised in print by the likes of Poliziano – among others – for its 
incompetence both in terms of annotation and emendation.8  With specific reference to 
the Thebaid, there had never been a significant effort to collate manuscripts in order to 
produce a critical edition, so that new conjectures and emendations might be had.  This 
does not mean, however, that Statius’s works are neglected by publishers in the interim.  
Rather, from Calderini’s edition in 1475 to that of Bernaerts in 1595, there are fifty-five 
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printings of Statius’s works with commentary.9  Still, the introduction of new 
commentaries is both timely and welcome, and the efforts of those scholars mentioned 
above in emending Statius’s texts are critical to understanding his transmission from the 
classical period through the Middle Ages. 
As was shown in the previous chapter, not all Dutch humanists are interested in 
Statius’s works for purely philological reasons.  Grotius, for instance, is far from 
considering Statius’s works solely as emendatory exercises – though his notes are highly 
prized and sought after by Gronovius and Gevartius when each composes his own 
commentary.10  Grotius’s readings of the Thebaid open an entirely new avenue of insight 
into the use of classical authors for Dutch readers.  It seems as well that his interest in 
mixing the vita activa through diplomacy and politics with the vita contemplativa through 
legal and theological exegesis reflect a specifically non-academic interaction with 
popular thought and culture, one which sets him distinctly apart from the other 
aforementioned Dutch scholars. 
We do well to remember that Grotius by trade was a diplomat and lawyer not a 
scholar; but when he thought of himself as a scholar it was as an antiquarian, historian 
and moral philosopher in the vein of Justus Lipsius.  Lipsius’s influence on early 
seventeenth-century intellectual activity is difficult to over-estimate, and as has already 
been alluded to, his determination to have the best and brightest scholars work on 
Statius pays dividends.  What needs to be illuminated here is just how much Statius’s 
reception in the Lowlands relies on Lipsius’s belief in the utility of ancient texts and 
commentaries for understanding and ameliorating contemporary social ills. Lipsius 
believes profoundly in the scholar’s ability to cultivate morals and ethics from the 
ancient stories he comments on and edits. So it should come as little surprise that his 
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own works and the ways in which they are composed affect the composition of 
Bernaerts’s commentary on the Thebaid.  In fact, it is perhaps best to begin this chapter by 
recognizing what Bernaerts’s contemporaries understand about his commentary: namely, 
that it is as much his as Lipsius’s.11  Intriguingly, Bernaerts puts it this way: “facem 
interpretationis ita praetuli” (I have brought forth the light of interpretation [to 
Statius]).  As pedestrian as this quotation seems, it is in fact one of those paratextual 
moments that scholars today enjoy discovering, since this particular line Bernaerts steals 
from Lipsius himself, and it is the first indication of how he intends to interpret Statius.  
The context from which Bernaerts takes Lipsius’s words have nothing to do with Statius; 
yet he thinks they are appropriate enough to reflect his own sentiments – there is 
something of flattery in them, too.  If one were to look at Bernaerts as he sees himself, we 
might recall that now-infamous bromide attributed variously to Picasso, Eliot or 
Stravinsky, among others: “Good artists imitate, great artists steal.”  And so it goes, 
Bernaerts’s pastiche of thoughts on the Thebaid produces the most unique, intriguing and 
wide-ranging commentary on epic poetry during the Renaissance. 
I 
. Lactantius Placidus, Bernaerts’s predecessor wrote his commentary during the 
fifth century AD.  12  It was (and still is) quite useful, since  its structure is basic, one of 
explication of grammar and vocabulary with a primary focus on how Statius imitates 
Vergil’s Aeneid.  The nature of Lactantius’s work, therefore, left Bernaerts with a wide 
berth for composing his own commentary.  Bernaerts recognizes this leeway and does his 
best to tell the reader what his intentions are and how the reader ought to read his text. 
It may seem a bit simplistic and even lacking in nuance to observe that Bernaerts 
offers a great deal of information about how he desires his text to be read in both the “Ad 
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Lectorem” and the commentary itself.13 But when the first edition of Bernaerts’s 
commentary comes out it is very rare for a commentator and editor of classical poetry to 
mention his intentions for his newly printed edition.  Of the examples (both ancient and 
contemporary) that Bernaerts has available to him only a few may have served him as  
models.14  Beginning with the most evident and readily available ancient commentators 
and their texts there is Lactantius (Thebaid), Servius (Aeneid), and Eustasthius (Iliad and 
Odyssey) – though Bernaerts does not distinguish between him and Aristarchus.  None is 
explicit in what he intends the reader to get from his commentary, and Bernaerts derides 
each one in-turn in his edition – though not necessarily for their lack of guidance.15  
Whether these ancient scholars did at one time or another mention their intentions 
matters little to Bernaerts; the fact is that those portions of the text which might have 
had instructions for the reader are no longer extant – and still are not.   
As for contemporary editor-commentators, they number just as few. Joseph 
Scaliger, Henri Estienne, Adrien Turnebe and Marc-Antoine Muret are those most likely 
to have interested Bernaerts, since their editions are readily accessible and popular 
among scholars and critics of the period.  Taking a closer look shows the differences 
between these scholars’ editorial and commentary outputs.  Adriene Turnebe in his 
commentary on Varro (1573) and Marc-Antoine Muret in his commentaries on Catullus 
and Horace (1555 and 1558, respectively) do not offer a preface and never directly say a 
word about what they intend the reader to get from their commentaries.16  Estienne and 
Scaliger, however, are different.   
In their editions both Scaliger and Estienne state, in one way or another, that 
their primary goal is to clean up the textual miseries left behind by printers, 
commentators and manuscript scribes.  Bernaerts himself follows the both of them in 
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citing the ineptitude of the publishers, blaming them for a lack of sophistication in those 
poetical commentaries which precede his.  He determines the culprit to be the printing 
press, the corruptor of books and arts as he puts it, since this device allows for mistakes 
to be made and repeated by hasty and ignorant printers – even though it is clear that the 
printing press was a boon for him: 
Aevo avorum Barbaries vixit.  Nostro nata Typographia.  Illa corruptrix 
librorum … ut ministrorum imperitia, calida excudentium festinatione, 
turbari saepissime, imo obstrui, purissimos illos veterum fontes docti 
omnes ingemiscant… Fidem vel unus fecerit elegantissimus noster 
Papinius, qui in vulgus eo usque deformatus circumfertur, ut plus 
vulnerum unus ex eo liber, quam Scaevae apud Caesarem clypeus, tela 
praeferret.  Plures sordes contraxerit, quam si aetatem in Camarina palude 
iacuisset. Vulnera haec, omnibus artis ingeniique ascitis subsidiis, sanare, 
maculas iudicii (ut sic loquar) spongia eluere, princeps mihi cura, modeste 
tamen. Ut decet hanc aetatem.17 
 
(In the age of our grandfathers rudeness lived.  In our age the printing 
press was born.  That corruptor of books … through the ignorance of her 
helpers, through the hot hastiness of the press, the ancient founts of 
knowledge are very often confused and obstructed so that all learned men 
now groan…Our most eloquent Statius alone shall have preserved his 
trustworthiness, he who is now published deformed so that his book 
bares forth more than one wound from it, as thought it beared forth 
arrows like the shield of Scaeva upon Caesar.  He contracted more filth 
than if he had lain an eternity in the Camarine swamp.  These wounds, 
with all art and auxilary genius, I carefully cleansed and washed the stains 
aways with the sponge of judgment.) 
 
 
Because of these printers Bernaerts claims that Statius, most unfortunate of all, has 
suffered more wounds than Scaeva’s shield and accrued more filth than if he had lain in 
the Camarine swamp for a lifetime, leaving him “to cleanse the blemishes with the 
sponge of judgment.”18   
Bernaerts’s comments echo those of Estienne in the preface to his edition of 
Horace (1575), where he too laments the faultiness of modern printers:  
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Plane enim de arte typographica fateor dici posse quod poeta noster de 
natura humana dixit, paucis mutatis. Ut enim ille de hac scripsit, 
Nam vitiis nemo sine nascitur: optimus ille est 
Qui minimis urgetur, 
Ita de arte typographica vere hoc dicere possim, 
Haud vacuus mendis liber editor: optimus ille est 
Qui minimis urgetur. 
Qui autem plura de hac nostrorum temporum misera, vel potius de hac 
veterum scriptorum misera hoc seculo ob depravatores conditione scire 
volet … eum libellum legat quem inscripsi ... 
 
(Certainly, I have to confess that what our poet said concerning human 
nature can be said without much change about the art of printing. For 
about it he has written: “For no one is born without vice, he is the best 
who is provoked less.” Thus I can say this about the art of printing: The 
book publisher least devoid of fault is he who is rushed the least. 
Nevertheless, he who wishes to know the wretched state of this 
enterprise during our time, or rather the many wretched errors of ancient 
scribes – those men depraved by circumstance – … let him read that little 
book which I have written…)19 
 
When either of Estienne’s editions are read against Bernaerts’s edition of Statius one 
notices a completely different tenor.  Besides the physical difference of Estienne’s 
incorporation of the scholia into the text itself, his notes are decidedly less wide-ranging 
than Bernaerts’s.  Additionally, Estienne is clear in his Vergil that his edition is a 
response to Servius specifically and no one else.20 The same holds for his Horace where 
he is even more speficic about how it is structured and carried out. 21 Estienne makes 
both of these statements in order that his reader not be misled into thinking that his 
edition attempts something more wide-ranging than he wishes.  It is these attempts at 
being direct that Bernaerts adopts from Estienne.   
In more ways than one, the model for Bernaerts’s annotation is Scaliger’s Catullus 
of 1577.22 In it he reads notes and references that clearly prize erudition above all else.  
Scaliger’s profound knowledge of Latin and Greek makes him a master of conjectural 
emendation and his notes are studied diligently by his own generation of textual 
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scholars.   Nevertheless, it is apparent that in his early career Scaliger chose to follow 
Estienne’s sentiments in protesting the lack of skilled philologists and commentators 
who had preceded him in working on Catullus.  Scaliger states:  
Multa enim quae ignoratione priscae lectionis Grammatistae 
contaminaverant, restituimus: non pauca, quae aliquot ab hinc saeculis 
vitio potius aetatis suae, quam suo imperiti homines illi praetermiserant, e 
penetralibus vetustatis in lucem protulimus.  Quid multa? Nolui 
simplicem insaniam insanire... 
 
(I have restored many things which the grammarians through their 
ignorance of the original text have damaged.  I have brought forth many 
things into the light from the ancient recesses, which just a few things 
from this corruption of this era more of his own era that those unskilled 
men passed over before in their own time.  How many more? I do not 
want to rave incoherently...)23 
 
This excerpt is remarkable in two ways: first, it is as specific as Scaliger gets in 
attempting to relate what he has done in the commentary –  his later commentaries are 
completely devoid of this specificity. Second, it is nowhere near as direct as that of 
Estienne. This is due in large part to the breadth of the findings Scaliger imparts to his 
readers through the commentary.  At two hundred and fifty-two pages Scaliger has the 
room to elaborate on things that Estienne never does.  As a result, it seems that Bernaerts 
at points attempts to one-up Scaliger’s erudition, sinces he creates a commentary which 
reaches a length of two hundred and seven pages in length,.  This is not to say that he 
does not discount other poetic commentaries such as Estienne’s editions of Vergil and 
Horace.  He certainly does not.  Rather he relies on Scaliger to provide the framework 
which he would then use to complete his own commentary, but only to a degree.  
Certainly, as seen above there is a fair amount of braggadocio in telling the reader to 
what extent the commentator has triumphed in his current edition by recreating, and 
thus re-establishing, an ancient poet’s glory.  However, how Bernaerts explains what his 
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methods actually are when creating his commentary sets him distinctly apart from the 
precedent established by Estienne and Scaliger as commentators of poetry.  Working 
within their structure Bernaerts manages to remain singularly peculiar.  Bernaerts’s 
commentary is so peculiar, in fact, it presses one to question whether Bernaerts came up 
with method himself or took it from another text and commentator? And if the latter, 
from where did he get it? As it turns out it is Lipsius who provides the kind of 
asymmetrical approach and openendedness of Bernaerts’s work.  In particular, Bernaerts 
draws on Lipsius’s Politica, a commonplace book.  
II 
During the sixteenth century, across Western Europe, humanists recognized the 
commonplace-book as a critical tool for understanding the books they read, for 
“assimilating the written culture transmitted to them,” and for reappropriating them for 
employing them in turn.  Recently, scholars such as Ann Moss have shown how 
important these texts were as mechanisms for archiving information rather than “mere 
banalities.”  Commonplace books are lenses through which we may peer into 
“procedures of investigation and debate and into the dialectical and rhetorical modes of 
articulating thought which were agreed to have persuasive force,” demonstrating 
“commonality of expectations, the common places, which ensured common route into a 
shared communication when cultural consensus of Western Europe was strained to the 
breaking point.” 24 
 Interestingly, Moss herself has attempted to test how loosely constructed the 
notion of commonplace-books was conceived; or as she puts it: “texts which fit badly 
into interpretative frames familiar to the modern reader.”25  In particular Moss is 
interested in redeeming Justus Lipsius’s Politica, a work that he thought among his most 
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important.  For Moss it is most important to uncover the “historically probable reading 
strategy” so that she may “fully recuperate the text for the modern reader.”26 Still, 
Lipsius, as Moss acknowledges, tells the reader what his work is: “For what is it but a 
well-arranged register of accounts of COMMONPLACES?”  By the time Lipsius wrote 
the Politica, commonplace books had evolved from Erasmus’s suggested guidelines in the 
De Copia to schoolchildren and scholars underlining texts as they read, “either under the 
schoolmaster’s instructions or at their discretion.”27  Their efforts became “a probe and 
an instrument for redistributing a text so as to ensure maximal retrievablity and 
optimum application.” But what of the texts that are not as clear as Lipsius’s?  What 
about the texts that do not proclaim themselves to be commonplace-books, but indeed 
books that should be common to all, those inspired by Lipsius’s example:  What of them? 
 Lipsius, according to Moss, continuously promotes the use of the common-place 
book and the practice of excerpting while reading.28  In his edition of Tacitus, Lipsius 
insists that his readers create tituli which are divided into moralia, passages which shape a 
young man’s life in terms of virtues and vices, and civilia, political topics, both tituli 
correspond to Ethics and Politics which are taught in school.  Through the compiling 
and organizing this information, Lipsius intimates that a citizen may “recyle, reproduce, 
and recombine in compositions where authorial control is most evident in the choice and 
development of quotation.”29  This is not to say, however, that common-place books are 
for scholars or discipuli alone, far from it.  Lipsius advocates for a lifelong imitatio virilis, in 
which the commonplace-book “at its most eclectic” expresses “the communication of the 
soul.”30  Indeed, the Politica is not meant for school boys, but rather experts both in Latin 
and things (rerum).31  It is a manual that is meant as both a model to follow and a display 
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of intellectual connection with the past and present that Lipsius expects and desires to 
be imitated.  It is only fitting that one of his pupils should follow suit. 
Lipsius serves as Bernaerts’s model not only in life but also in scholarship and 
politics.  For Lipsius the idea that academic scholarship was outside the political, 
everyday realm of influence does not exist; everything he does has a political and 
pedagogical motive.  This belief carries over into both his studies and publications (on 
stoicism, Tacitus, Seneca, etc.) as well as into his students and admirers, or even his 
familial relations, as Bernaerts liked to style himself.32  The result of Lipsius’s dedication 
to maintaining the scholar’s importance to and in civil society is that Bernaerts could and 
does treat his commentary on Statius as both a treatise pertaining to the pedagogical and 
scholarly as well as the political and cultural.   
Bernaerts begins his preface by side-stepping the convention of ancient 
testimonia; instead he opts for quotations by men of his own age.  He cites Lipsius, 
“optime doctissimeque virorum,” and Julius Caesar Scaliger, “bellisime flos tui aevi,” both 
of whom think Statius is a sublime and lofty poet, not bombastic in the least.”33 These 
early references to Scaliger and Lipsius prove an important feature of Bernaerts’s preface 
and are useful to explore at some length. 
In fact, as already alluded to he explicitly expresses this sentiment: 
P. Statium volenter accipe, mi Lector, utilem (Deus bone!) magnumque 
Poetam. & quem non solum in manibus iuventutis esse expediat, sed 
etiam eorum, quibus in litteraria nostra Republica ius spectandi in 
Quatuordecim; imo in ipsa Orchestra. 
 
(Take willingly Statius, my dear Reader, a useful and (Good God!) great 
Poet, who not only should find his way into the hands of our youths, but 
even of those for who have the right of being seated in the fourteen front 
rows of the theater in republic of letters, nay even in the Orchestra 
itself.)34   
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Bernaerts’s intent is clear, the wisdom found in Statius is for both students and princes.  
This statement, while seemingly mundane, is in fact fairly politically charged.  Lipsius 
and Scaliger are often referred to as “consules” by their contemporaries, who in turn 
consider them part of the “Quatuordecim” of the respublica litterarum.35  So when 
Bernaerts declares that the same sense of approval for Statius should hold for those of the 
“Orchestra,” he is openly attempting to persuade the leaders of the body politic to realize 
that the utility of Statius is not purely academic, it has broad application – a sentiment 
that Joseph, his son, never shares and in fact abhors.  This heavily laden sentence, which 
Bernaerts actually pilfers from Suetonius, becomes a manifestation of scholarship for 
public benefit.36 
Lipsius himself could not agree more with Bernaerts’s assertion, for his 
dedicatory poem in Bernaerts edition reiterates these same sentiments: 
Eccum Papinium, benigne Lector. 
Quis hic Papinius? poeta magnus, 
Vel dicam potius Poeta summus;  
Certe proximus est Poeta summo, 
Quod fateatur ipse Livor… 
Quas grates tibi posteri et iuventus 
Praesens est habitura? Credo magnas; 
Debebunt equidem. Tuam ipse quercu 
Frontem Papinius libens coronat, 
Hac quam Caesar ei negavit olim. 
 
(Behold Papinius, kind reader! 
Who is this Papinius, you may ask? A very great poet. 
Nay, I should say the best poet; 
Or certainly a poet nearest the best, 
As Envy him would admit… 
What thanks will the youth of the future 
Have for you? Great thanks I believe they  
Will owe.  Papinius himself  
Gladly crowns your brow with the oak, 
With that which Caesar once denied to him.)37 
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Besides this poetic extolling, Lipsius shares his enthusiasm for Statius in a letter 
addressed to Bernaerts from 09 March 1594.  Instead of merely asking about his progress, 
Lipsius conveys interest in its use for the public good:  
Statius autem tuus ubi est? Puto Antverpiae et ego ad Moretum scripsi.  
Quod rerum aliquid publicarum litteris inspergis, gratum est et saepe 
facito.  Stilum et iudicia haec scriptiuncula exercet et nos delectat, qui 
fautores bonae caussae sumus, etsi non auctores.  Augusta ista stirps, nisi 
bona nostra auget, mala minuit, in exsilium licet ire omnibus bonis.  In 
Gallia novae turbae, ut audimus, et noster illuc miles... 
 
(Where is your Statius? I think at Antwerp and I have written to 
Moretus.  Since you sprinkle on only a limited amount in your letter of 
public affairs, it is welcome and do it often.  Your style and judgment both 
exercise these minor writings and pleases us, who are promoters of the 
good cause, if not the authors.  The root, the venreable stock, unless it 
increases the good, diminishes the evil; it is allowed to go into exile for the 
common good.  In France there are new disturbances, as I hear, and our 
troops are there.  ...)38   
 
The world in which Bernaerts writes his commentary nearly mirrors that of the time 
Lipisus wrote the Politica, 1589.  It is a world torn by political and religious dissension 
and active warfare in more than one European country.  Ideological divisions are 
fragmening the humanist cultural consensus, and universally accepted typologies of 
discourse are losing their cohesive power.  During the 1580s, Lipsius himself was in a 
very precarious state of equilibrium since his emigration from Leiden to Leuven and 
Protestantism to Catholocism was imminent.  As Moss correctly asserts, “the Politica 
appears to be an attempt to perform fragmentation and division into a nexus which its 
readers would immediately recognize as that which structured their universe of thought 
and culture.”39 Still, Lipsius’s easy and direct assertion that the act of producing a 
commentary on the Thebaid makes him and Bernaerts “fautores et actores bonae causae” 
is indicative of his view of classical culture and literature being entirely relevant to 
contemporary ills, a salve which “mala minuit” – there is also an overt play on “stirps” 
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and “stirpe” from Thebaid 1.242.  As a result, Bernaerts is to understand that whatever he 
produces can and will contribute to ending the current political strife engulfing France, 
the Netherlands, and Europe more generally.  In essence, literary studies are relevant, 
warranted, and necessary.  Additionally, in an even earlier letter addressed to Bernaerts, 
Lipsius will make his position very clear, if not personal: “In your commentary whatever 
it may, whatever new spark of life should please [you to tell], I wish to know.  You are 
not able to deposit anything more freely or safely in a mother’s lap, than in mine.”40  It is 
a statement of genuine humanitas to be sure, but more importantly it is also a kind of goad 
that compels Bernaerts to pursue the type of scholarship that Lipsius himself pursues: 
explication of texts without political or historical boundaries.   
III 
As noted before, Bernaerts begins his commentary by defending Statius from both 
ancient and modern accretive criticisms: namely, that he is puffed-up and swollen 
(“inflatus & tumidus”).  He dismisses these critiques by noting that Cicero was accused 
of the same and then by letting Lipsius and Scaliger further substantiate his opinion.41  
While Lipsius maintains a slightly understated and dipliomatic tone, J. C. Scaliger is, 
expectedly, more blunt: 
Graeculi quidam Statium tanquam tumidum damnarunt, sane quem 
tumorem dicant nescio, nam neque metaphoris fere is utitur e Pindaro, 
quem illi gentilem suum non audent indicare, et sonum si spectes in 
carmine, id vero tumidum non est, alioqui tumidus etiam fuerit Maro.  Sed 
neque vividam orationem tumidum voces, hoc enim de Salustio dixeris ... 
 
(Certain little greeklings condemn Statius for being so to speak swollen, 
what swolleness the speak of I certainly don’t know. For he scarcely 
borrows metaphors from Pindar, whom those critics do not dare to point 
out is his own kinsman; and if you look at the sound in his poetry, it is 
indeed not swollen, since then Vergil was puffed up.  But nor can you say 
that lively oratory is swollen, for then you shall have indicted Sallust…)42   
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Still, both of these passages strike the reader as lacking imagination or innovation on the 
part of Bernaerts. Of course, he should offer these assertions; contemporary testimonia 
about Statius is valid, especially by Lipsius and the elder Scaliger.  But these quotations 
lack subtlety and nuance. 
Where Bernaerts provides his reader with a singular moment, a truly 
sophisticated allusion, is in the statement following these quotations.  According to 
Bernaerts, wherever one goes in Statius, he will run into a flower that delights or a 
thought that educates: “Quacumque incederitis, vestigium ponetis vel in flore qui 
delectat, vel in sententia quae informat.”43    Bernaerts’s words play with an analogy only 
to be found in the Politica, where Lipsius states that his efforts in constructing the Politica 
are similar to that of a spider’s web in that it is no whit the better because it spins it from 
its own entrails; nor is his text the worse because, as does the bee, he gathers its 
components from other authors’ flowers:  “Nec aranearum sane textus ideo melior, quia 
ex se filia gignunt: nec noster vilior, quia ex alienis libamus, ut apes.”44 Naturally, the bee 
is a familiar symbol for writers and readers of commonplace-books.  Its use immediately 
notifies the reader of what he will find in Lipsius’s work: a collection of the best passages 
from a variety of authors.45   Still, Lipsius’s allusion to other authors’ flowers is obscured 
and compressed by the use of “alienis.” Lipsius demands careful inference on the part of 
his reader, since flower is never mentioned, only implied.  The same degree of 
imagination holds true for his use of the spider’s web, “textus,” with “gignunt.”  Each 
insect action is one of forming and output.  Whether the reader chooses to consider his 
production as honey or a web, the process of collection and formation is inherent. So 
Bernaerts’s implication is that Statius is one of those flowers a bee like Lipsius can draw 
from (“libamus”), or that he is an author who literally helps form Lipsius, and by 
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extention his own, web of thought.  As a result, what Bernaerts tells the reader is that his 
commentary is not traditional in the sense of emendation and annotation; but rather it is 
a commentary that is primarily concerned with annotation and connection.   
As Moss notes, in the Politica Lipsius makes it clear that he expects his reader to 
recognize his work as a commonplace-book and treat it as one.  He says, “These are 
COMMONPLACES, under which you should duly register extracts from what you have 
read or will read on the same subject.  Look and imitate.”  The reader Lipsius imagines is 
one who is able to obey and innovate; one who understands that the editor’s control is 
merely in directing one’s attention to various over-lapping ideas which become 
entrapped in the editor’s mind.  Lipsius’s ideal reader is Bernaerts, someone who would 
rather produce a commentary less concerned with textual emendation than produce one 
that lacks rich annotations which both entrap and release the reader. In other words, at 
any time Bernaerts’s notes may take a verse of Statius’s Thebaid and use it as a launching 
point, a titulus, which empties the present expectations and  fills it with new quotations,  
which often are turned to other purposes.  References to the original locations of the 
quotations send his reader away to their original contexts, where he picks up meanings 
which sometimes supplement and frequently complicate the sense that Statius probably 
intended. 46 
For Bernaerts the process of creating a commentary does not rely on reading 
every variant of Statius he could find.  Far from it.  In fact, “he considers that kind of 
labor vain and ridiculous.”47  For Bernaerts the principle idea underlying his commentary 
is that “Statius advances cleansed of defects, and advances newly.”48  “Noviter” is a 
peculiar word, indicating both newness and something that is extraordinary; so which 
one does Bernaerts want his reader to understand?.  
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On the one hand, Bernaerts offers the reader this statement as an answer:   
Hic trames quem calcavi. fulcrum quo  superavi clivos, libri veteres, quo 
studiose conquisitos varios cum cura ipse vidi. Duos signate vere veteres.  
Elegantissimi Lipsii unus erat, qui admirabile dictum quas notas, sinceri 
codicis saepe praetulerit. Alter, in Lovaniensi hoc Athenaeo Buslidiani 
Collegi Trilinguis, optimae itidem notae.  Laudo etiam interdum codices 
duos vetustissimos bibliothecae S. Laurentii Leodiensis: & unum nihilo 
deteriorem, optimi Belgarum Caroli Langii.  Sed, ut unicuique sum 
tribuam, eiusdem Langii industria.  Is enim tres illos codices, studiose 
composuerat, & suapte manu variantem lectionem adnotarat libro, quem 
comunicavit mihi Antuerpiensium Antistes, clarissimus Torrentius, 
sicubi, discreparent, in Scholiis signate  expressi, ad marginem libri, 
initiali littera, discriminavi.  Excusos quinque composui, apud Aldum 
duos, anno MD .II, MD .XIX. alios Parisiis, Lugduni, Basilaeae. Accessit 
his editio Veneta vetus, anni ~ CCCC. XC. Quam suo merito, (bonitate 
enim cum MSS. certabat) indigitavi Editionem principem. Locum 
manifestarie mendosum sicubi non libri scripti solum, sed & ex editis 
unus aut alter argueret, medicinam indicaret, admisi: etiam nulla in 
Scholiis facta mentione.  Nonnulli in Critico isto grege aliter scio, et ego 
non MSS. modo, sed & excusorum variantes lectiones congerere, vastum 
duco, imo vanum & ridiculum laborem 
 
(I looked with care at various old books (two assuredly old) which were 
diligently collected.  One belonging to the most elegant Lipsius, and it is 
admirable to say what notes of the unadulterated codex he often brought 
to light; the other was at the trilingual Buslidian College in the University 
of Leuven; likewise there were very good notes.  I also quote at times two 
very old codices of the library of St. Lawrence in Liege and one just as 
good belonging to Carolus Langius, best of men in the low Countries, and 
give to each one his due, corrected through the industry of the same 
Langius for he had diligently compared those three codices and in his own 
hand had annotated the variant readings in the book which the bishop of 
Antwerp, the famous Torrentius, shared with me.  If they disagreed 
anywhere I assuredly represented it in the scholia.  I marked them off at 
the margin of the book with an initial letter.  I compared five printed 
editions—two printed at the Aldine Press, in 1502 and in 1519, others at 
Paris, Lyon, and Basel.  There is added to these the old Venetian edition of 
1490, which on its own merit (for it rivaled the manuscripts in quality) I 
have designated as Editio princeps. I have admitted a plainly incorrect 
place passage wheresoever not only manuscripts but one or another of the 
printed editions supported it, or indicated a remedy, even with no 
mention made in the scholia.)49 
 
On the other hand, it is a bit of a red herring, since Bernaerts does not come close to 
relying on any of these sources.  A quick glance through Bernaerts’s commentary shows 
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even a casual reader that he has no sustained interest in textual emendation through 
traditional conceptions of collation, that is where one text is read against another in 
order to denote discrepancies and correct them.  There are, to be sure, points where he 
attempts to make conjectures, but his method is sloppy and disingenuous. For example, 
he mentions the Venetian edition of 1490 (printed by Jacobus de Pagininis) is his editio 
princeps; but he never mentions that “famous edition contains the commentaries by 
Maturantius on the Achilleid, Calderini on the Silvae, and Lactantius Placidus on the 
Thebaid.”50  So the reader is left thinking, wrongly, that Bernaerts has an authoratative 
text from which he can make emendations and suggestions.  Additionally, he advises his 
reader that because in correcting Statius he has no predecessor to follow the reader: 
quo aequior sis industriae meae, neque tam reprehensione sicubi defecero, 
quam ubi perduxero, laude dignum iudices. 
 
(So that you may be more favorable to my industry and judge me not so 
much worthy of blame if I shall have fallen short somewhere as worthy of 
praise where I shall have carried it off.)51   
 
There is an air of desperation in both of these actions, and rightly so; since when 
Bernaerts attempts to play the philologist he knows he is at his weakest. 
 Of the many reasons that classicists find Bernaerts’s edition so feeble and 
embarassing today it is his lack of skill in conjecture that causes it to be slighted most – 
something that can also be said of his mentor’s, Lipsius’s, conjectures in his editions of 
Tacitus. This is in stark contrast with Joseph Scaliger, whose edition of Catullus is a 
watershed moment for nothern European philological procedure, and as we have seen so 
far a source for Bernaerts’s commentary as well. In brief, Scaliger reconstructs through 
conjecture the textual transmission and history of Catullus’s poetry, specifically 
speculating that errors were made by scribes transcribing a and u, tall i  and l, c  and g, of 
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the “Lombardic” script.52  Still, the initial reaction to Scaliger’s edition is one of disbelief 
and uncertainty.  Scaliger’s flaw, which was well understood even then, was that he was 
too hasty in the use of his sole source for making conjectures.  As Grafton and others 
rightly observe, Scaliger’s impatience is his real detriment.  Not collating sources with 
absolute precision and care makes his work sloppy at points, and unforgivable for 
someone with such genius.  But for these flaws Scaliger’s edition is without doubt a 
monument in textual criticism, since it reveals a systematic process of emendation, one 
that will not be replicated until Lachmann.   If one were to compare Bernaerts and 
Scaliger in terms of emendation, Scaliger would prove his Catullus to emerge “noviter,” 
while Bernaerts would not prove the same for his Statius; in fact, he would come up quite 
short.  Scaliger’s Catullus emerges cleansed and new-ish from the midst of Muret’s 
mostly wretched edition – something Scaliger dearly desires.53  Moreover, Scaliger’s 
edition shows what is possible through brilliant conjecture.   So it is clear that if 
Bernaerts’s Statius does not “noviter prodiret” through collation, emendation and 
conjecture, it is fair to wonder how Bernaerts desires to show his Statius in this manner? 
IV 
To understand Bernaerts’s message the reader must attend to his medium.  Since 
Bernaerts chooses to make his commentary read as a commonplace-book, he necessarily 
descends to a level below that of Scaliger’s finished work.  Bernaerts’s readings of Statius 
expose his readers to the “stratum of reading and writing habits” which they all know 
and which underpin all their own surface differences.54  In doing so he returns “his 
readers to the original matrix common to all humanist methods of conceiving, 
generating, and organizing knowledge: the commonplace-book.”  Above all, perhaps, he 
deliberately reminds his readers that the commentary, like the commonplace-book, is the 
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source and emblem of their most productive intellectual habits, since both, for Bernaerts, 
have peculiar properties which balance unity and multiplicity.  In the world outside of 
the commentary, multiplicity may indeed tend to disorder, unity to tyranny.  But to 
minds, like Bernaerts’s, schooled by commonplace-books, “a cultural model in which 
fragmentation and contradiction are contained new material is connected to the pre-
existing and extendible body of the book without internal danger to it.”55 Statius, 
therefore, “noviter prodiret” precisely because Bernaerts’s annotations take advantage of 
his historical moment, when it is finally possible to rid him of Camarine filth while 
augmenting his cultural significance and connection.   
For Bernaerts annotations fall into two over-lapping classifications: “euphonia” 
and “energia.”  He claims:  
In contextu ipso nihil mutavi…minutula quaedam, in quis etsi vix ulla 
discrepantia saepe a sensu vulgato; euphonia tamen, interdum & occulta 
quaedam energia, ad oram libri reieci.  
 
(I have changed nothing in the context itself except… a few small things in 
which scarcely there is any discrepancy from the original text;  I have, 
however, referred [the reader] to points of euphony, and sometimes 
certain hidden energy in the margins of my book.)56 
 
An initial reading presents these terms as completely innocuous, as though they are 
almost throwaway terms. On closer scrutiny, however, these terms are completely 
befuddling and overly ambiguous.  “[E]uphonia” and “energia” do not share any inherent 
characteristics, nor are they particularly common words among classical Latin authors to 
whom Bernaerts would have had easy access. Euphonia is used only once by Quintilian, 
Aulus Gellius and Isidore; while energia shows itself primarily inGreek texts and once in 
Quintilian.57   
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For both Quintilian and Gellius euphonia has a direct, physical appeal to the aural 
nature of orations and orators.  It is a telling feature of whether or not an orator has the 
potential to win over the crowd; while Isidore defines it simply as: “euphonia est suavitas 
vocis.” 58  Bernaerts complicates these definitions. By conflating them euphonia indicates a 
place where Statius provides an especially sonorous verse, one that is eminently 
reminiscient (or even an interpretation) of a prior poet’s work.59  Poetically, this means 
that Bernaerts must leap with Statius from one genre and poet to the next.  More often 
than not in the commentary these points of euphonia provoke specific memories of Vergil 
and Propertius in Bernaerts’s mind.  In some sense this is expected, since Scaliger and 
Estienne provide the commentaries that Bernaerts uses to read these poets, as already 
mentioned. Estienne, interestingly, comments directly on the intellectual-aural 
phenomenon and offers a particularly revealing critical perspective. 
In his treatise entitled De criticis, Estienne asks himself what the instrument and 
criteria are for judging poetry: “Quomodo autem iudicandi instrumentum illi esse dicetur 
qui mente carere dici potest?” In his opinion there is one sense which is most important 
to the critic: sound.60 Citing Cicero’s De natura deorum (2.146 inter alia), Estienne explains 
how the ancient and well-accepted notion of sonority works:  
The ears are likewise marvelously skilful organs of discrimination; they 
judge differences of tone, of pitch and of key in the music of the voice, 
sonorous and dull, smooth and rough, bass and treble, flexible and hard, 
distinctions discriminated by the human ear alone.61  
 
To contrast this he adds that vision is less faithful than hearing: “Quo igitur poetam 
respicere dicemus? Nimirum ad oculos minime […] hi enim, fideles dici non possunt: 
nihilo certe magis quam aures.” But to clinch his argument he offers this final anecdote 
from Horace, from the words of Quintilius in the Ars (438-444):  
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Quintilio siquid recitares: Corrige, sodes, 
hoc" aiebat "et hoc"; melius te posse negares, 
bis terque expertum frustra; delere iubebat                
et male tornatos incudi reddere uersus. 
Si defendere delictum quam uertere malles, 
nullum ultra uerbum aut operam insumebat inanem, 
quin sine riuali teque et tua solus amares. 
Vir bonus et prudens uersus reprehendet inertis… 
 
(When someone was reading his poetry to Quintilius Varus, “Correct this 
line, my friend,” Quintilius used to say, “and that one.”  If you’d say that 
you couldn’t do better, that you’d corrected twice or three times already, 
he’d tell you to scrap the whole lot and start afresh.  If you preferred to 
defend yourself rather than correct, he’d say nothing, give up his 
insistence and let you be alone without rivals.  The good and wise man 
will criticize poetry done without art…)62  
 
The point of Horace’s anecdote is that a critic’s best tool is his ear, it is the guide which a 
poet must follow when composing.  Estienne relates the story for the same purpose, only 
in terms that apply to one judging poetry, since he is himself not considered a poet so 
much as scholar.  For Bernaerts euphonia carries the weight of both Estienne and Horace.  
In Statius, he hears the echoes of other poets, poetic traditions, history, philosophy, 
religion; the topics are endless, though all are unified by Statius’s poetry. 
 Directing Bernaerts in how he applies the principles of euphony is its interaction 
with energeia.   For Bernaerts the easiest definition would have been that given by 
Quintilian, who in the Institutio oratoria defines it as something necessary to descriptive 
oration, especially, pertaining to force:  
Virium non unum genus: nam quidquid in suo genere satis effectum est, 
valet.  Praecipua tamen eius opera deinosis in exaggeranda indignitate et 
in certeris altitude quaedam, phantasia in concipiendis visionibus, 
exergasia in efficiendo velut opera proposito, cui adicitur epexergasia, 
repititio probationis eiusdem et cumulus ex abundanti, energeia confinis 
his (est enim ab agendo ducta) et cuius propria sit virtus non esse quae 
dicuntur otiose. 
 
(Force also is of more than one sort, for whatever is properly executed in 
its own kind possesses its own strength.  Its most important products 
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however are: (1) deinosis, which is a kind of elevation displayed in 
enhancing indignation and other feelings; (2) phantasia in conceiving 
imaginative visions; (3) exergasia in bringing a plan (as it were) to 
completion; with the addition of (4) epexergasia, a repetition of the same 
Proof and an abundant accumulation of arguments; (5) the closely related 
energeia (the name implies “action”), whose peculiar virtue is that nothing 
that we say is otiose.)63 
 
Again, Bernaerts turns to oratory to orient his commentary – which is not unexpected 
either since he would have been trained in rhetoric and oratory during his grammar 
school years.  Nevertheless, Quintilian’s main point is that energeia contributes to the 
overall impact of the narrative by supplying some type of action.  Just what this action is 
for Bernaerts is now to be determined. 
V 
The difficulty for many surrounding the term energeia currently rests on its use by 
Aristotle in the Metaphysics, where the term comes to mean actuality, or potentiality come 
to life.  (Hence, Quintilian’s more diluted form of the term comes to mean energy or 
action (actio)).64  In the context of his commentary Bernaerts thrusts the focus of this 
term on a recurrent dilemma in the poetics of the Renaissance; namely, that is how to 
deal with paratactic and hypotactic claims of language.   In other words, how does a 
commentator unpack compressed language like that found in Statius?  In the very 
arrangement of his commentary Bernaerts implies that there is a precise point at which 
Statius’s verses reach a state of fixed recession on the written surface of the page.  The 
energeia inherent in each verse is then activated by his sense of euphony, which itself 
results in annotation.  Put another way, energeia impels Bernaerts to activate the reader’s 
attention by assigning them value in the book’s liminary material.  For Bernaerts, they 
have the stylistic elegance and sharpness of sententiae, exempla and similitudes, which 
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encourage the reader to join Bernaerts in a discourse reminiscent of a commonplace-
book. In other words, energeia imples the use of received authority, becoming testimonia, 
auctoritates, and thereby elements in stratagems of cultural connectivity. For Bernaerts, 
energeia evolves in settings where there is a special need to resuscitate such authority 
through annotation.   
 At first sight Bernaerts annotations seem nothing except an exercise in 
marshalling his quotations onto the page.  However, much like Lipsius in the Politica, 
who intrudes numerous times in his notes, an atypical habit for commonplace-
bookcompilers who normally kept themselves to their prefaces, Bernaerts is ever present 
in his notes.  The editor of the Thebaid is indeed present here in his own voice, connecting 
his gathered quotations so that Statius’s flowers are easily recognized. Sometimes, 
however, Statius rises above the comprehension of even Bernaerts.  When this happens 
he confesses by writing notes in the margin such as “occultus Statio intellectus” or 
“occultior Statio intellectus.”  For example, at 4.48 Bernaerts has given the following 
note:   
“& Lacedaemonium Thyre lectura cruorem) Historica face opus, ad 
illustrandum hunc locum, quem peto ex Stobaeo, apud quem Theseus 
sermone de Fortitudine: Lacedaemonij (inquit) & Argivi, super Agro Thyraeo 
certabant, visumque est eligere trecentos vtrinque, & qui ex ijs victores fuissent habent 
agrum. Quo facto Orthyades Lacedaemonius, multis interfectis, & ipse saevius, inter 
mortuos Lacedaemonios iacuit. Duo autem Argivorum, Agenor & Chromius 
superfuere, quibus digressis Argos, ut victoriam nunciarent…: Orthyades spoliatis 
pluribus hostium, trophaeum erexit, usus vulnerum suorum sanguine, inscriptsit 
Lacedaemonii de Argivis & hoc facto obijt, refert haec eadem Plutarchus in 
Parallelis, quem vide, nam non Papinij nostri solum, sed & Flori verbis ab 
hac re lumen, lib. II. cap. II. de Calphurnio Tribunio: Hoc illustrior noster, 
quod expeditioni tantae superfuit & supervixit, licet nihil scripserit sanguine, notat 
idem hoc Orthyadis factum. nec vnquam capies eius mentem, nisi 
historiam hanc scias.”65 
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(“This verse must be made historical, to illustrate this location, which I 
have sought from Stobaeus, in whom Theseus in a speech on strength 
says: ‘The Spartans and Argives, when they waged a battle over Argos and 
Thyrea, it is known that three-hundred men were selected, and those 
from them who were victorius held the field.  In fact, Orthyades, a 
Spartan, by killing many men, and himself very savage, among the dead 
Spartans lay.  Two Argives, however, Agenor and Chromius, lived, having 
gone separately to Argos, they announced that they were victorious.  In 
the words of Stobaeus: Orthyades when all was done took the armor from 
the enemy, erected it as a trophy and using the blood of his own wounds, 
he dedicated it to the Spartans.  Plutarch says the same thing in the 
Parallel Lives, which you see, for not alone of our Statius, but there is the 
light of Florus for these words concerning this affair, Book 2.2 of 
Calpunius Tribunius: Our auther is very clear, what remained and 
survived of the great expedition, he wrote nothing in blood. He notes the 
same deed of Orthyadis.  You will not ever understand his mind, unless 
you know this history.”) 
 
Because of perceived remoteness and difficulty or obscurity (“occulta”), these instances 
prompt a sense of vigor and challenge, which naturally illumines the use of occulta (and 
equates it to something like cultismo).66  When viewed as a mental challenge or 
puzzlement, energeia becomes the moment when Bernaerts feels taxed by Statius’s 
obscurity and compression and is moved, by practicality—that is, edification—to 
explain the difficulty.67   However, it is entirely congruent with the nature and purpose 
of a commonplace-book that the dialectical force of its assembled quotations, their status 
as testimony and authority, should be demonstrated and utilized in liminary 
identifications. Thus when Bernaerts begins to marshal his quotations into 
argumentative positions, he is merely suggesting possible ways that a particular verse 
could be read. 68 Moreover, the entries that Bernaerts creates follow a pattern: First, 
there is an entry which introduces a concern.  Collected underneath is a series of 
quotations that Bernaerts marks typographically in the liminal material.  Third, they are 
read consecutively with the benefit of the interlinking passages, so that Bernaerts’s 
connections may be understood.  Nevertheless, they are also eminently extractable, as 
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they have already ben extracted from the texts clearly identified in the outer margins, 
just as they would be in a commonplace-book.” 69  In the end Bernaerts’s emphasis on 
energeia participates in an evolved state of the language and literary culture, connecting 
the erudite and occulta with the merely euphonic.  
Even though Bernaerts is willing to concede that Statius’s use of language is: 
“Nusquam non electa verba, casta latinitas, hilaris color, agentes figurae, sensus acres, 
similitudinum vitalis succus, via alta, indoles rara, mira maiestas” (“Never are his words 
not choice, his Latinity chaste, tone jolly, figures active, sense keen, analogies essential, 
strength profound, character rare, grandeur wondrous.”), he is convinced that the 
impelling force behind his poetry is energeia.  When energeiac language is “occulta” or the 
mind of Statius is “occultior” his language becomes elastic, able to bear the encumbrance 
of mass information that seems bent on restricting his brevitas to non-poetic expression.  
In other words, using fewer words to say more allows Statius’s poetry to participate in a 
kind of difficulty that is a welcome stimulus and challenge. 
VI 
 Rarely does Bernaerts in his commentary close out any connection. An entry may 
end with deliberative ambivalence, but to close off a connection completely would run 
entirely counter to the mentality of the commonplace-book, much less Bernaerts’s work.  
The quotations he collects are as diverse as could be, for not coherence but plenitude was 
the guiding principle, and open-endedness his characteristic feature.  The reader-
researcher would expect to find a plurality of opinions and only a modicum of logic.  
 Bernaerts edition of Statius took shape in a relatively short period of time.  It is a 
pity that much of Bernaerts’s correspondence with Lipsius remains lost, since it would 
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certainly provide a much more vivid sense of the texture of his work.  Unlike his mentor, 
Lipsius, Bernaerts does not go back and alter his commentary, he does augment it by 
providing a commentary to Statius’s Silvae; but this work is as shockingly uninteresting 
as as his work on the Thebaid is unique.  In fact, of the few times Bernaerts’s work is 
criticized during the early-seventeenth century it always pertains to his commentary on 
the Silvae. 
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Notes 
 
1 I would like to thank Jeanine de Landtsheer her generosity during my stay in Leiden 
during the spring of 2008.  Her friendship and vast expertise in Durch Humanism has 
been instrumental in the inception of this chapter and made my stay in Leiden better 
than she knows.   
 
2 Statius, P. Statii Papinii Opera qvae extant. Io. Bernartivs ad libros veteres resensuit [sic] & scholiis 
illustrauit. Adiectis hac postrema editione, ad Syluarum libros varijs lectionibus (Antwerp, 1595). 
Bernaerts wrote commentaries on all three of Statius’s.  The dedication of his 
commentaries on Statius bears the date of 01 October 1593, and the edition was first 
published in 1595 at Antwerp by Plantin-Moretus.  It was reprinted at least five times 
from 1595 to 1618.  His full length commentary on the Silvae was first published in 1599 by 
Moretus and then again in 1618 by Blaise in Paris.  His commentary on the Thebaid has 
been little studied since the middle of the seventeenth century when it was incorporated 
into the works by Gronovius first and then Barth.   
 
3 Naturally, Joseph Scaliger was French, but since he resided in Leiden from 1593-1609 
his interest in Statius is significant.  This interest has been documented elsewhere by 
Grafton and van Dam.  It is sufficient to note at this point that he mentions his work on 
Statius as early as 1565 to Louis Chasteigner de la Roche-Posay all the while emending 
his own edition of the 1547 Gryphius publication.  By 1600 he was helping Woverius 
with his edition of scholia on the Achilleid and Thebaid, as well as Lindenbrogius’s edition 
of the Achilleid.  Moreover, he was even prompting Gruterus to his own edition between 
1601 and 1605.  Gronovius was German by birth but resided most of his life at Leiden.  
Lindenbrogius was also German. 
 
4 Harm Jan van Dam “Wandering the Woods Again: From Poliziano to Grotius” in 
Johannes J.L. Smolenaars, Harm-Jan van Dam, Ruurd R. Nauta eds. The Poetry of Statius  
(Leiden: Brill, 2008) 45-65; and “The Coming of the Silvae to the Netherlands,” in 
Fernand Delarue, Sophia Georgacopoulou, Pierre Laurens, Anne- Marie Taisne eds. 
Epicedion (Poitiers: La Licorne, 1996) 315-25.  
 
5 Harald Anderson, The Manuscripts of Statius, (Washington D.C., 2000). 
 
6 I have not unwittingly omitted the contemporary editions by Morellus, Cruceus, or 
Barth; but since these scholars are French they do not fit within the current chapter.  It 
is, however, important to note that Gevartius is aware of and had read Morellus’s 
edition, as he cites him a number of times; and he denigrates Cruceus in his Electorum 
Libri Tres (Paris: Carmoisy, 1619). 
 
7 Among these scholars Gevartius is the most sensitive in a poetic sense to Statius’s 
works.  While his emendations and conjectures are not to be made light of; there is a 
fidelity to the Silvae by Gevartius which in many ways has yet to be surpassed.  He 
seemed to have primarily cared for Statius’s poetry in and of itself, and he wanted to 
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transmit that sentiment as much as his emendations. To be sure, any of the 
abovementioned humanists would make excellent candidates for discussion; however, 
each proves to be exceedingly difficult to discuss in terms of Dutch humanism alone, 
because of the wide paths they cut within this period; all for except Bernaerts and 
Gevartius whose impact beyond their commentaries on Statius is fairly insignificant in 
the scholarly world of humanistic pursuits. In truth, Lindenbrogius, Heinsius, 
Gronovius, Lipsius and Scaliger can easily be considered a part of the success of 
Bernaerts and Gevartius.  And it is only Gronovius who manages, after Gevartius’s 1616 
edition of Statius’s Silvae, to produce his own edition of Statius’s works, a task which 
took him nearly thirty years and entailed collecting and emending countless editions of 
Statius.7  The only problem being that his legendary philological battle with Emile 
Cruceus devolves into personal animosity and pedantry—on both sides.  Nevertheless, 
the difference Bernaerts’s commentary is the most interesting Renaissance commentary 
produced on Statius.   
 
8 Poliziano’s Miscellanea was a watermark in philological scholarship for the Leiden circle 
of Lipsius and Scaliger.  See among other instances in his works: Anthony Grafton, Joseph 
Scaliger A Study of the History of Classical Scholarship (Oxford: Clarendon, 1983) 9-100.  
 
9 Harald Anderson, The Manuscripts of Statius (Washington, D.C., 2000). 
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celsum Poetam (ita censeo et appello; non hercule tumidum) et libri apud nos  veteres 
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Quintilian quite only infrequently. 
 
58“sola est, quae notari possit velut vocalitas, quae euphonia dicitur; cuius in eo dilectus 
est, ut inter duo, quae idem significant ac tantundem valent, quod melius sonet malis.” 
Quintilian, Institutio oratoria, 1.5.4. Cf: “Quod a scriptoribus elegantissimis maior ratio 
habita sit sonitus vocum atque verborum iucundioris, quae a Graecis euphonia dicitur, 
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(conquering through sweetness), becomes relevant since suavitas and suavis presume 
poetic eloquence as much as oratorical eloquence. 
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emphasis on the dynamic aspects of the process of change.  If the clearest example to 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
“Unnighting” Statius:  
Translating and interpreting the Thebaid and Silvae during the English 
Civil War 
 
During the 1640s the Thebaid exerts a powerful influence on the way in which loyalists, in 
particular, respond to the events of the English Civil War.  In it we find a narrative of 
Theban civil war that is psychologically motivated and in which the emotions of humans 
play a dominating and dominant role, so much so that English political figures during the 
1640s and 1650s critically evaluate this conflict within  man with respect to 
contemporary human turmoil.   Although Statius’s epic provides the cultural material to 
deal with conflict, the interpretation and application of his work is not fixed nor even 
confined to the Thebaid – far from it.  This is due in large part to how he presents his 
poetry: namely, through a type of universal appeal and a lack of any appreciable Roman 
connection.  The absence of immediate, local correlation is at the very heart of Statius’s 
appeal to seventeenth-century English readers.  Because Statius deals with universal  
topics, such as the pursuit of power and human frailty, that can be illuminated by the 
retelling of myth in his epic and the re-appropriation of his imaginative lyric poetry 
(Silvae), he is in fact considered by early modern English readers to write a kind of 
contemporary history.  Hence the act of interpreting the myths of Thebes or any of those 
present in the Silvae serve to illustrate and to universalize the human predicament, 
stripping his poetry of its national and patriotic appeal and replacing it with the cultural 
material to mediate a crisis of defeat.   
 To be sure, the vast majority of this chapter is devoted to how Statius’s Thebaid, a 
poem based entirely on fraternal strife between Polynices and Eteocles, is translated and 
interpreted.  Strife between those who share power is inevitable; more importantly, the 
horror of fraternal discord is always a potent and emotive force in the thoughts of early 
modern readers – this is to say nothing of Roman readers.  In describing the cursed house 
of Oedipus, Eteocles, and Polynices, in which every moral restraint, every bond of pietas 
(piety) is eradicated, Statius highlights the degraded state of human affairs (both 
political and religious) for early moderns during the Civil War, especially loyalists.  To 
help confront changing personal beliefs and concerns, while grappling with a failing 
monarchy and with religious and political revolution, Statius’s Thebaid comes to define, 
anticipate, and challenge the debates over how the nature of epic poetry speaks to the 
complexity of the times.  Other readers, however, such as Thomas May, Sir Thomas 
Fairfax, and Abraham Cowley, following the conclusion of hostilities (1646) find in 
Statius’s Silvae a means for reconciling the physical and perhaps metaphysical dissolution 
of the monarchy by acts of remembering and forgetting.  It is best, in fact, to begin this 
chapter by discussing how these significant political and intellectual figures organize, 
understand, and marshal their reactions to Statius’s Silvae particularly as they come to 
terms with perceived and actual historical memory before advancing to the longer 
discussion of the Thebaid.  
I 
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Beginning the second chapter of The History of Parliament, published in 1647, 
Thomas May remarks: 
 It cannot but be thought, by all wise and honest men, that the sinnes of 
England were at a great height, that the injustice of Governours, and vices 
of private men, were very great; which have Once called downe from 
Almighty God so sharpe a judgement; and drawne on by degrees so 
calamitous and consuming a Warre. Those particular crimes an English 
Historian can take no pleasure to relate, but might rather desire to be 
silent in, and say with STATIUS:  
---Nos certe taceamus, & obruta multa  
Nocte tegi nostrae patiamur crimina gentis.  
Let us be silent, and from after times  
Conceale our own unhappy Nations crimes.1 
 
The quotation, taken from Statius’s Silvae 5.2, is part of a eulogy dedicated to Crispinus, 
the late son of Vettius Bolanus, a former consul and general.  In this poem Statius praises 
Crispinus’s short life (a scant sixteen years) and the deeds he manages to accomplish, or 
those Statius imagines he will accomplish, like accession to the Senate.  The particular 
verses (88-89) that May plucks and then translates from Statius’s poem come amidst an 
invented speech in which Crispinus forgives his mother for poisoning him and thus 
causing his death.  In addition, by this act of forgiveness Crispinus hopes to prevent the 
Furies from seizing his mother and taking their gruesome version of vengeance.  Both 
actions cause Statius to extol him all the more.  In fact, Statius proclaims a few lines later 
that such exemplary loyalty and bravery has only been witnessed in Rome’s founding 
figures, Aeneas and Romulus, though at much later stages of their lives in comparison to 
that of Crispinus.  Returning to his speech, it is noteworthy that May does not translate 
the subsequent verses, the last of this fantastic oration, in which Crispinus reinforces his 
appeal to forgetfulness: 
exegit poenas, hominum cui cura suorum, 
quo Pietas auctore redit terrasque revisit, 
quem timet omne nefas. satis haec lacrimandaque nobis 
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ultio. quin saevas utinam exorare liceret 
Eumenidas timidaeque avertere Cerberon umbrae    
immemoremque tuis citius dare manibus amnem. 
 
(“He wreaked the penalty who hath care of those who are his, at whose 
word Loyalty hath returned and come on earth again, whom every sin 
doth fear.  Sufficient for us and deserving of our tears is his vengeance.  
Nay, could we but implore the fierce Avengers, and keep Cerberus from 
that timid shade, ay, more swiftly grant thy ghost the waters of 
forgetfulness.”)2 
 
By concluding that he wishes to have his mother drink from the river Lethe (literally, to 
drink quickly from the forgetful stream) so that she might pass swiftly into the paradise 
of Elysium, Statius presents Crispinus as a model son and citizen.  May, however, pays 
little heed to the context of Statius’s poem generally; this is to say nothing of his neglect 
of the complexity of Crispinus’s speech specifically.  
The complexity and ambiguity of Crispinus’s speech, as can be seen from the 
portion that May chooses not to translate, complicate his didactic use of history.  In his 
effort to promote Statius’s verses as a way of remembering to affect change rather than 
forgetting, May dismisses Crispinus’s concern for the afterlife of his mother and plea for 
justice to an unnamed authority.  These verses’ lack of specificity, however, leaves two 
clear conjectures for the reader to ponder.  For the first, it seems that Crispinus calls 
upon a deity, Jupiter perhaps, for intervention in his mother’s case.  This would certainly 
make sense as Jupiter has control over the Furies; and May could then easily interpret 
these verses to support his own contention of God bringing “so sharpe a judgement” on 
the people of England.3 But he does not.  The second deduction is that Crispinus could 
be referring to the emperor in his request, since the emperor is the representative of 
Jupiter on Earth and thus the person most responsible for upholding the rule of law.  But 
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this, too, is not considered by May.  By invoking only verses 88-89, May diminishes any 
gesture to authority that does not fit his purpose. 
May’s only real concern in the use of the verses he translates is how to deal with 
what Pocock describes as “the historiographic problems which authors of English 
history must face in a future beginning from its outbreak.”4 May does not exercise either 
conjecture mentioned above because his subsequent thoughts for both instances would 
force him into controverting his own practical literary concern: namely, that the Civil 
War could and should be commented on since its occurrence needs some kind of 
contemporaneous evaluation.  May responds, therefore, to only the verses of his 
translation of Statius’s poem by asserting: 
But to be silent in that, were great injustice and impiety toward God, to 
relate his judgements upon a Kingdome; and forget the sinnes of that 
Kingdom, which were the cause of them. The Heathen Historians do well 
instruct us in that point of piety; who never almost describe any Civill 
Warre, or publike affliction, without relating at the beginning, how 
vitious and corrupted their State was at that time grown, how faulty both 
the Rulers and People were, and how fit to be punished, either by 
themselves or others.5  
 
Thus, not only does May declare that to be quiet about the atrocities of citizen warfare is 
the wrong approach for a historian to take in relating contemporary events, it is 
inherently irreligious and as such an affront to God.  For May, the very act of forgetting is 
a sin and only serves as an equivocation of the events that took place; thus he states: 
“And shall we Christians, who adore the true God, and live under the Gospell-light, not 
be sensible under so heavy a judgement of our owne offences.”6     
May’s (mis)use of Crispinus’s speech is one of quite a few instances of the 
mediating influence of Statius that can be perceived in participants on both sides of the 
Civil War and afterwards in the 1650s.   Though Statius’s portrayal of Crispinus hardly 
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has the simplistic implications that May draws from them; his concluding remarks about 
Statius’s verses give some sense that he was aware of the more complicated aspects of 
Statius’s poetry: 
Nor doe any of the Roman Poets undertake to write of that great and 
miserable Civill Warre, which destroyed the present State, and enslaved 
posterity; without first making a large enumeration of such cause; how 
wicked the manners of Rome were growne, how the chiefe Rulers were 
given to avarice and oppression, and the whole State drowned in luxury, 
lusts and riot, as you may see upon that subject in two the most elegant of 
them.7  
 
May’s assertion that the two most elegant Roman poets who wrote about the decadence 
which led to civil war is well taken; but only if we assume he is speaking about Sallust, 
Lucan and Tacitus, and that by poets he means, more generally, authors.  But what if he 
means Lucan’s Pharsalia and Statius’s Thebaid; what then?  May is not entirely clear here, 
nor does the context give the reader any hint.  At present, the role of Lucan’s work in 
May’s life has been clearly defined; Statius’s has not.  The slight and hurried notions 
expressed by May are overturned in favor of the much more complicated motives 
expressed by Statius on Crispinus’s behalf through other scholar- poets, such as Sir 
Thomas Fairfax and Abraham Cowley.   
In his retirement, Sir Thomas Fairfax wrote a poem entitled, “On the Fatal day, 
Jan 30. 1648.” In his verses Fairfax channels his sorrow and guilt into a lament for Charles 
I’s death; and similar to May he expresses this anguish by referring to (one might even 
say, clinging to) his belief in God’s providence: 
Oh Lett that Day from time be blotted quitt 
And lett beleefe of’t in next age be waved 
In deepest silence th’Act concealed might 
Soe that the King-doms-Credit might be saved 
But if the Power devine permitted this, 
His Will’s the Law & ours must acquiesce.8 
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Though these are the words of an eyewitness, Fairfax’s verses have made no impact upon 
the weight of historical condemnations of the regicide. In fact, they have been utterly 
dismissed as trivial.  In response to these verses Graham Edwards refers to them as 
“pusillanimous vapourings,” while Lord Braybrooke remarks that “these wretched verses 
have obviously no merit.”9 Braybrooke claims further that they are not even Fairfax’s, but 
rather a poor translation and interpretation of Statius that had earlier been used to 
describe the massacre of St Bartholomew, something that Pepys mentions as well.10 Still, 
for Fairfax to subscribe to the notion of wanting to forget that dreadful day, while using 
Statius’s poem to declare it, seems more than coincidental as the very last line of his 
poem seems downright paradoxical.  
How can Fairfax proclaim that God promotes forgetting while he concedes that 
God fostered the actions that took place?  This is, in fact, the question that Fairfax seems 
to struggle with; since from the same poem that May uses to condemn his countrymen’s 
desire to forget, Fairfax uses it to state unequivocally that he understands personally, and 
even agrees with, Crispinus’s decision.  Using language similar to that of May, Fairfax 
charges that it is his duty to forget the King’s wretched death.  But unlike May, Fairfax 
clearly considers Crispinus’s appeal for justice to fall upon the lap of God; and since it 
was divine will that allowed the death of the King to occur, silence and disbelief are for 
the benefit of the coming generations.  Building on Crispinus’s words Fairfax attempts to 
prevent a Fury-like revenge by remaining silent in his poem about the detailed events 
and considerations that brought about the King’s execution.  Instead he concentrates on 
revealing his reaction to the regicide, mixing penitence with a desire to be exonerated.   
Fairfax, more than most, had a hand in deciding the fate of the King by winning 
at Naseby and Colchester and agreeing to punish Charles I following Pride’s Purge.  Not 
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surprisingly, then, his “Short memorials” fall silent in describing his conduct in January 
1649.  They do stress that he labors to save the King’s life; though he provides no details 
of how, only that when he was approached on 29 January to attempt a royal rescue he 
replied that he was “ready to venture his own life, but not the lives of others.”  It appears, 
then, that the regicide so traumatizes him that self-doubt gnaws at his self-presentation 
ever thereafter.  Questions, like what could he have done differently? Or what if he had intervened? 
seem to permeate his poems and writings.  These are the same kinds of questions that 
seem inherent in “On the fatal day” especially.  Brian Fairfax, Black Tom’s cousin and 
chronicler, notices this self-doubt and maintains that later in life Fairfax “never 
mentioned it [the regicide] with but Tears in his Eyes.”  Thus, remembering even for the 
lord-commander of the New Model Army, the most powerful political outfit following 
the war, was difficult, even painful.  Forgetting was not easy, but it was certainly better 
than remembering; and in Fairfax’s opinion it is a mark of loyalty to the kingdom to 
maintain such behavior.  It is, like Statius’s implication about Crispinus, honorable and 
personal. 
 Shifting the meaning of this poem once more, Abraham Cowley makes a series of 
comments which moves Statius’s poem from the practical and personal to the societal.  
Cowley in the preface to his Poems (1656) recommends, like Fairfax, a kind of social or 
societal amnesia, one that in effect openly states: 
We ought not sure, to begin ourselves to revive the remembering of those 
times and actions for which we have received a General Amnestie, as a favor 
from the Victor.  The truth is, neither We, nor They, ought by the 
Representation of Places and Images to make a kind of Artificial Memory of 
those things wherein we are all bound to desire, like Themistocles, the Art of 
Oblivion.11  
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While not an exact parallel of Statius’s poem, Crispinus’s sentiments certainly find a 
home in Cowley’s words.12  Though his deliberate appeal for amnesia lacks any sense of 
divinity, Cowley takes Fairfax’s proclamation a step further by stating in the same 
passage of the preface that “I have cast away all such pieces as I wrote during the time of 
the late troubles, with any relation to the differences that caused them; as among other, 
three Books of the Civil War it self, reaching as far as the first Battel of Newbury, where the 
succeeding misfortunes of the party stopt the work; for it is so uncustomary, as to become 
almost ridiculous, to make Lawrels for the Conquered.”  Thus he sets aside his epic 
following a series of Royalist setbacks after the Battle of Newbury in September 1643.13  
Cowley now in 1656 claims, “I would have it accounted no less unlawful to rip up old 
wounds, than to give new ones; which has made me not onely abstain from printing any 
thing of this kinde, but to burn the very copies.”14  
The physical manifestation of Cowley’s response to Statius differs from both that 
of May and Fairfax.  While the burning of his books are in some sense an expiation, 
Cowley’s actions are deliberately secular or, better put, pragmatic; though not in the 
sense that seems apparent vis-à-vis Fairfax.  It has been argued recently that we “cannot 
presume that Cowley abandoned The Civil War for the same reasons that he later 
renounced it;” that is, Cowley’s sense of political pragmatism is not simply the result of 
royalist loss.15  According to David Trotter, Cowley’s development of The Civil War is 
untenable because he could not adjust the proceedings of the Civil War to the epic 
genre.16  Specifically, for Cowley there are too many details which cloud a clear 
resolution both in terms of genre and scope, and it is certainly true that, in its 
engagement with the concrete historical detail of the Civil War, Cowley’s poem shifts 
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between genres.  A poem that begins in clear epic mode, taking a sweeping view of both 
England’s current conflict (“What rage does England it self divide”) and its previous 
military triumphs under past rulers, such as Edward III, Henry V, and Elizabeth, goes 
almost immediately awry; and Cowley is at a loss both literally and figuratively (or one 
might say form-atively) to forge ahead.  By the mid-1650s, however, Cowley needs to 
construct a type of politics and poetics of loss to explain the difficulty he faced writing 
an epic during the 1640s.   Perhaps, then, in the same way that May and Fairfax use him 
to exorcise their feelings of loss and confusion about civil conflict and regicide, Cowley is 
able to marshal the two sentiments together, allowing Statius’s Crispinus to become a 
model for loss both poetically and politically. These brief examples pale, however, in 
comparison to the most revealing case of Statian mediation during the English Civil War.  
II 
In the opening book of the Thebaid, Statius recites an infamous event which 
occurs between Oedipus and Laius, king of Thebes: namely, Laius’s death.  Instead of 
merely narrating the events for us, Statius has Oedipus admit to this crime and other 
heinous deeds while beginning to curse his sons, Eteocles and Polynices.  In Statius’s 
rendering Oedipus perceives the events of his life as a series of conditional actions all of 
which now lead to the legitimating of his imprecation, and it is during this overture that 
he mentions killing his father: 
Si bene quid merui, si me de matre cadentem 
Fovisti gremio et traiectum vulnere plantas 
Firmasti, si stagna peti Cirrhea bicorni 
Interfuse iugo, possem cum degere falso 
Contentus Polybo, trifidaeque in Phocidos arto 
Longaevum implicui regem secuique trementis 
Ora senis, dum quaero patrem… 
    (Theb. I. 60-66) 
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(If I’ve won aught the merit, if, when I 
Dropped from my mother’s womb, thy loving arms 
Enfolded me and when my feet were pierced 
Thou gavest me new strength; if I sought out 
Cirrha’s lake-waters winding in between 
The two-horned summit, when I might have lived  
Content with Polybus’ deceit, and in 
The pass of Phocis, where the tree ways meet, 
Grappled an ancient king and slit the throat 
Of that old trembling dotard in my search  
For my true father…)17 
 
Oedipus continues after these verses to confess and elaborate on the crimes he has 
committed, including his sexual encounters with Jocasta before finally reaching the curse 
itself.  This passage is, nonetheless, remarkably unexceptional in and of itself.  The death 
of Laius at the hands of Oedipus was common knowledge among learned men of 1640s-
England, Oedipus being a regular figure in both literature and theater of the time.  
Moreover, Statius does not alter Sophocles’s commonly known rendering of the Oedipus 
myth – at least at this point – so there is nothing new concerning the information being 
transmitted by our poet.  But in the English translation of 1648, the confessional nature 
of Oedipus’s speech takes a decidedly different turn and the same verses cited above read 
differently in significant ways: 
If I have serv'd thee truly, whom I found  
Nurse to my infancy, who heal'dst the wound  
They bored through my feet; If I did go  
At thy command to Cyrrha's streames, which flow  
Twixt the two-headed Hill, when I might rather  
Have staid with Polybus, my supposed Father.  
Where in the Tower of three-top'd Phocis, I  
Grappled with th' hoary King, and did deny  
Life to his trembling joints, seeking to find  
What there I lost, a Father:18 
 
Though the translator remains largely faithful to the Latin throughout the 
passage, at the end he egregiously alters the text.  The deliberately violent mutilation and 
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death of Laius expressed by Oedipus – an unknown act of treason, regicide, and patricide 
– is neither mentioned nor even implied.  The translator’s choice, to “deny life” versus 
that of slitting the throat (secuique trementis ora senis), diminishes Oedipus’s act so that it 
reads as a mere trifle or at least he is vague about the bodily violence so that Laius’s death 
almost seems gentle.  Statius’s words, however, read as an execution, lobbing off the head 
of a king or ruler is a grotesque act of treason – all the more so when a son kills his father.  
The change is somewhat akin to that of Tacitus having written that Galba had simply 
been murdered by stabbing instead of writing that his throat had been slashed; or 
Suetonius’s even earthier rendering of the same story.19  The change is indeed striking, 
almost startling.  The mention of regicide is heavy, but for the reader the translator’s 
action generates a few immediate questions: Why would he attempt, in the first place, to 
conceal the violence towards the monarch when it is a well-known part of the story? 
How often is there a clear instance of unmediated manipulation of Statius’s text? Is our a 
translator an outspoken royalist like his publisher, Londoner, Richard Royston?  What 
does “essay” mean in, An essay upon Statius, or, The five first books of Publ. Papinius Statius his 
Thebais done into English verse by T.S., with the poetick history illustrated. And, finally, just who is 
“T. S.”? 
“T. S.” is Thomas Stephens, an Anglican priest and schoolmaster at Bury-St 
Edmunds during the 1640s and 1650s.  A true vir Papinianus, Stephens translates the first 
five books of the Thebaid during this period as well as writes a commentary on Statius’s 
Silvae (1651).  Though each is an extensive effort by him, neither has garnered much 
attention since the early eighteenth century.  As such they have never been published in a 
modern critical edition of early translations of Statius’s work, and the entire secondary 
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literature dealing with Stephens amounts to a few paragraphs in a couple of books, and 
the same in a single article.20  In part, Alexander Pope is to blame for some of this neglect. 
Pope, though he never mentions Stephens by name, states that he had read “a translation 
of part of Statius, by some very bad hand,” thus minimizing Stephens’s effort.21 Even 
though Pope admits later that he liked the translation “extremely,” Stephens has 
remained anonymous and irrelevant.  This is both interesting and troublesome since on 
the one hand Pope appears to have become Stephens’s brightest pupil, highlighting 
Stephens’s skill as a commentator and translator; while on the other there is a great 
expectation by those who know Dryden’s influence on Pope that in his much maligning 
of Statius, one would anticipate Dryden, not Pope, to mention Stephens’s translation and 
condemn it, but he never does.22  One wonders why since Dryden never shied away from 
writing and publishing his thoughts, even making a sarcastic remark (in its preface no 
less) about his brother-in-law’s, Sir Robert Howard’s, translation of the Achilleid (1660). 
 It seems most likely that Stephens himself is responsible for the unglamorous 
reception his translation has had up until now, and that by his very own estimation of 
the project. In the preface he proclaims:  
The translation was meditated, midst all the clamour and imployments of 
a publike Schoole; and so, cannot be so accomplish'd, as might be 
expected from a vacant retirednesse. And, when I shall tell thee, that it 
was intended for a help to my Scholars, for understanding the Poet, thou 
wilt not wonder at my marginall explications of the Poetick story.  
 
The acknowledgment that his endeavors are to the benefit of school boys and that he has 
completed his manuscript within the confines of a grammar school easily lead to 
thoughts of his work being for amateurs by amateurs, at least by the modern scholar.  It 
can also be presumed reasonably that Stephens needs to compose this work; after all, how 
else would his students be able to read Statius?  But Stephens is certainly being as 
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modest as he is facetious here, since there is no translation of Statius’s Thebaid that 
precedes his; his is the first and only translation in English.  He further diminishes his 
work, however, by claiming that his notes are not for the serious scholar: “Those grander 
proficients, who have digested that in their owne braines, may save themselves a labour 
of glancing on them: (I would provoke no man to looke asquint:) For others that want 
bladders, however in honour perhaps they had rather sinke, safety will perswade them to 
swim with this inferiour help.”    
While Stephens modestly diminishes his work it remains a puzzle worth 
understanding why and how, at points, he deliberately misleads the reader in his 
translation when much of the time he is a remarkably faithful – this is not to say a poetic.  
In an effort to staunch his simplifying of the translation Stephens offers to qualify his 
work:  
I know the common Fate of Translations, which are seldome read intire, 
but by snatches; and such pieces onely, as are pre-judg'd by the critick 
Reader, where the Translatour is sentenc'd, according as he jumps with 
the others fancy. Yet censure me as thou wilt: So I benefit any, I have my 
end…  
 
His comments at this point generate the question of what would provoke Stephens to 
compose his translation, with or without a concern for objectivity, in the midst of such 
“clamour and imployments” in the first place if he is going to take what we might view as 
a type of nihilism.  The answer lies in his estimation of the “critic Reader.”  
Translating Statius during the 1640s, as we see with Thomas May, is a politically 
charged endeavor, one that requires Stephens to seemingly indicate quickly his political 
affiliation.  By dedicating his work to two prominent, and old, royalist patriarchs from 
East Anglia, Sir William D’Oyly and Baron William Paston (later, Sir), Stephens’s 
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political leanings appear to be clear.  Unlike the rest of the preface which was written in 
English, Stephens writes the dedication in Latin.  It reads: 
NOBILI AMICORUM PARI, Do. GULIELMO PASTON BARONETTO, 
ET Do. GULIELMO D'OYLY EQV: AVRATO, MVSARVM EXVLVM 
ASYLIS, ET RELIGIONIS PROFLIGATAE ASSERTORIBVS, PATRONIS 
EIVS PLVRIMVM HONORANDIS, THOMAS STEPHENS VOTO ET 
MANCIPI CLIENS ADDICTISSIMUS, HASCE STATIANAS PRIMITIAS, 
IN GRATI ANIMI TESTIMONIUM, L. M. M.M.D.D.C.Q.  
 
(To a noble pair of friends, Master William Paston, Baronet, and Master 
William D’Oyly, the Golden Knight, sanctuaries of the exiled muses, and 
claimants of a ruined religion, perpetual defenders of his honor; I, Thomas 
Stephens, an ally most dedicated to the purchaser dedicate these Statian 
verses as first fruits in evidence of a grateful soul.) 
 
Though the reference to D’Oyly as the “Golden Knight” perhaps stands out most 
prominently to a modern scholar, since Sir Henry Cromwell (Oliver Cromwell’s father) 
also referred to himself as such, what seems to stand out most for Stephens is that D’Oyly 
and Paston serve as stand-ins for a royalist prescriptive: defenders of the realm, re-
claimers of faith, and, just as importantly, sanctuaries for literary production.  What, or 
rather, who is missing from the preface is overwhelmingly obvious: Charles I.  There is no 
mention of “regnum,” “rex,” or some other Latinate variation of Charles.  Charles I is 
completely absent from Stephens’s dedication. 
At first glance this seems peculiar: why should there not be an ode or verse or few 
lines by Stephens dedicated to the king? After all Sherburne openly and decidedly 
dedicates his translation of Seneca to Charles I in 1648.23   Yet, Sherburne’s dedication 
gives false hope; the reality was that Charles I was already being mourned as a lost cause.  
Thomas Stanley, in fact, creates the Order of the Black Ribband to mourn the loss of the 
King following the defeat at Newbury in 1643 – the same time Cowley abandons hope of 
a Royalist victory. More importantly, when one compares contemporary dedications by 
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acknowledged royalists or loyalists to that of Stephens’s a distinct pattern emerges, one 
that it is sufficient to observe by noting Robert Herrick’s dedication to his Hesperides.  It 
reads thus: 
TO THE MOST 
ILLUSTRIOVS, 
AND 
Most Hopefull Prince 
CHARLES, 
Prince of Wales.24 
 
There is no mistaking Herrick’s appeal to Charles II; the Hesperides are not worthy of the 
King’s attention, rather it is the son who bears responsibility for inspiring him to 
produce such verses.  Thus, Herrick’s is an appeal to the future – and one that will pay off 
following Charles II’s return in 1660.  For Stephens, however, it is difficult to surmise 
with whom he associates himself, since besides the use of “eius” the monarchy seems 
little favored.  This seems to be precisely the point Stephens intends to make: the Latin 
deliberately clouds his political leanings more than it reveals them.   
Though Stephens attempts to obfuscate his political affiliation, his translation 
comes to print through the royalist printing house of Richard Royston, a relationship 
which necessarily stamps its affiliation upon the text itself and its author – at least to a 
degree.  At the time of the Thebaid’s printing Royston was in the midst of producing, 
publishing and editing, in concert with king, the Eikon Basilike, Charles I’s perspective 
about his role and duties as king.  Thus, the political nature of any publication issued 
forth from Royston’s press at this particular time would have been apparent to followers 
of the monarch.25  Upon first glance, then, this estimation presents Stephens’s 
translation as little more than that of royalist propaganda; and while Stephens’s personal 
history will certainly confirm a type of monarchal support, his translation presents a 
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sophisticated confluence of contemporary political and scholarly care and interest.  
Accordingly, it is not a typical royalist canto; the history of Thebes does not allow for 
such ease and conformity.   
Stephens in fact suggests to his reader how his tome ought to be taken.26  In his 
dedication “To the ingenuous Reader” Stephens states: 
For those Criticall pens … would have deserv'd better of the Common-
wealth of Learning, if they had held a torch to the darke and mysterious 
places of the Poem: Which, I dare say, would not be so much neglected, but 
that it is so little understood. The subject matter of the worke, is the most 
ancient of any History recorded by the Poets: And were it not preserv'd in 
our Authour, it had been, long since, worne out by Time: Appearing now 
like old ruines, which preserve the memory of a place, although the forme 
be wholly decay'd. 
 
By emphasizing the dark and mysterious parts of Statius’s poem as the impediments to 
understanding the Thebaid Stephens attempts to locate his work in the political and 
social imaginations of mid seventeenth-century English writers.  In every sense, then, 
Stephens manipulates the reception of his translation by claiming Statius to be difficult 
to understand.27  Such an attitude, in fact, seems to constitute an evasion of the critical 
task and indeed runs counter to the duty of the critic to interpret the text, to determine 
its verbal meaning, to get at its significance – all the more so for the translator during the 
seventeenth century.  Peregrine D’Oyly (no relation to Sir D’Oyly mentioned earlier) 
clarifies Stephens’s estimation here; in a prefatory ode he presents the achievement of his 
translation as: 
That crown'd our Author? where's the baies that did  
Inrich his glorious head? shall vertue rise  
To a higher pitch, and have a cheaper price?  
Yet with neglect there's safety: Seldome's praise  
Secure, but aemulation blasts the baies. 
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The Thebaid, admittedly, makes heavy demands on the literary competence of even the 
most careful reader, but it is a challenge (“aemulation” in this case) that a serious critic 
should take up rather than avoid.  Virtue itself is at stake. 
Indeed, D’Oyly’s insistence on “virtue” underscores that the normative and 
didactic function of poetry is altered during the Civil War, increasing the use of poetry 
and poets as mere objects in ever-increasing propaganda wars, as arbiters of 
righteousness and virtue as well as liars and heretics, depending upon one’s perspective 
and political affiliation.  .  Most dedications to these texts during the period at hand have 
a certain audience in mind, and beyond this a cultural encoding works to create an 
intended reader, such as the “Critick reader,” or “reader extraordinary” as Jonson puts it.  
In dedicating his work to men such as D’Oyly and Paston, Stephens presumes a rank and 
a readership for his text.28  Monarchal publications, presumably, were more interested in 
control – this text is explicitly called “dark,” for example – and show an awareness of 
how print culture can affect the opinions of the population. Their dedications construct 
a notion of a fit audience who were “true Christians, and right borne Englishmen” (or 
defenders of the faith, muses and sovereignty) within a specific community that excludes 
those who attempt to interpret or subvert the meaning of a text.  So the textual space 
that the reader of Stephens’s translation is invited to enter is one of fixed boundaries; one 
of set social rules and practices; and one of hierarchical rituals and structures.   
III 
Much of the modern criticism of the Thebaid argues, correctly to my mind, that in 
addition to communicating his own feelings and thoughts, Statius delivers to those 
willing to listen a pointed message concerning government and politics through the use 
of myth and allegory, much as Sidney argues for in his own Defense.  As Stephens’s 
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interpretation will show, this is precisely what he attempts to undertake in his 
translation of the Thebaid.  Stephens, in fact, presents the Thebaid as an instrument which 
is meant for the edification of its audience, relying heavily on the Jonsonian “reader 
extraordinary” to make his translation accessible.  The literal effort of translation by this 
point in time, as Lois Potter convincingly shows, gives way to a “sense of tone and 
aesthetic evaluation” which is “accessible to readers in proportion to their worthiness.”29  
Put in his own idiom, Stephens offers this ode in the preface of his translation of the 
Thebaid: 
“Singing in Thebes’s Ruines, hee does teach 
The listning stones to mend the breach 
Wouldst know! Read his straines Thoust find 
This shews his face, but Those his Mind.”30 
 
By declaring that Statius’s genius and intention (i.e. his “Mind”) are present for those 
who know how to access them, Statius can teach Stephens’s audience about the 
downfall of Thebes in a way that reconstructs its ruins into previous form for historical 
analysis and political allegory.  Stephens’s short, introductory poem about Statius is 
followed on the opposite facing page of the front matter by a fragment of Juvenal’s 
seventh satire.  Instead of the expected and famous – well, to viri Papiniani – 
commendation of Statius for his ability to appeal beyond the implied learned audience to 
the libidine volgi, the lusty crowd,  Stephens, intriguingly, quotes a subsequent pair of 
verses.  In Latin they read:  
tum par ingenio pretium, tunc utile multis 
pallere et uinum toto nescire Decembri.31 
 
(Genius in those days met with its due reward; many then found their 
profit in pale cheeks and in abjuring potations all through December.)32 
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Juvenal’s lament here is that poets like Statius do not have the patrons who understand 
them vis-à-vis Horace’s Maecenas, whom he mentions later on in the poem.  For 
Stephens, however, Statius deserves to have an understanding patron, albeit a 
seventeenth-century one, who has the ability to protect him and not allow him to grow 
wan and weak.  In other words, to reinvigorate Statius and the Thebaid (contra pallere) by 
shining the light directly upon him in order to have his brilliance radiate forth according 
to its merit.  But with great care Stephens does not present the ancient testimonia of 
Statius’s significance and poetic brilliance; nor does he give the laudations of any early 
moderns (e.g. Poliziano, Scaliger, Erasmus, etc.), or even his vita.  For Stephens, once he 
translates the Thebaid Statius will need no one’s recommendation; his text will speak for 
itself – or perhaps Stephens will. 
The neglect of, and impediment to, translating the Thebaid was, according to 
Stephens, its inherent darkness and mysteriousness. Stephens himself states that he will 
hold “the torch to the darke and mysterious places of the Poem,” so that it might be 
understood in terms of “the most ancient of any History recorded by the Poets.”  The act 
of illuminating is in fact carried over by Thomas Poley, who states in his commendatory 
poem of Stephens’s translation:  
Tis that which raises wonder to thy Booke. 
To see therein light out of darknesse strooke. 
Lucan and Ovid, with such easie men,  
Are fit worke for a mere Rimers pen: 
And cryptick Juvenal, though darke he be, 
We see unnighted is by Farnaby. 
 
For Poley Stephens’s translation is in essence an act of “unnighting” Statius.  But Poley 
leaves unsaid what this “dark and mysterious” characteristic is in the first place.  
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“Dark and mysterious” as a phrase connotes a lack of understanding or even 
misunderstanding; and more often than not it is found written in the explication of 
difficult parts of scriptural rather than secular exegesis. A quick glance back to chapter 
three details that there was no shortage of published editions of Statius’s Thebaid in the 
seventeenth century.  Additionally, from a review of early seventeenth-century school 
curricula it is clear that Statius was as well known to the educated classes as any other 
Roman author during this period often showing up in scattered citations of the Silvae and 
Thebaid.33 Sometimes this same observation can be about a poet’s style.  If we were to 
interpret these words in terms of style, Statius’s alleged darkness or mysteriousness 
contrasts diametrically with the eyebrow-raising label, “easie,” given to Lucan; since in 
some way this description reads as a direct attempt to remove one of the foremost 
auctores of the art of difficultà from his post and put him on the same level as Ovid.  This 
assertion is by its very nature counter-intuitive, since Statius was not known to be 
difficult in that way; nor do any of his Renaissance commentators, admirers (or 
detractors), comment on this apparent difficulty. Rather they state that Statius is 
emendantissimus (very eruditely refined), that he conquers with sweetness (“sauve quo 
vincit”), or he is tumefactus (swollen with pride in regard to his ability to imitate Vergil).  
“[E]asie,” therefore, as a term that designates stylistic difficulty must have an alternate 
meaning.  Looking again at the context it can be asserted that instead of style what is 
meant is not that Lucan is “easie,” but rather in terms of what he implies within his verse 
is easily intelligible.  In other words, according to Poley and confirmed by Stephens, 
Lucan’s story is easy to comprehend; it is very clearly a battle between republicans and 
imperialists, or Pompey and Caesar.  Statius’ story is not so clear.  
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, “[E]asie” indicated that Lucan was a conduit for the truth rather than poetic 
fantasy; yet,in order to see this clearly, we must divert our attention to these men for a 
moment.  In Sir Arthur Gorges’s translation of the Pharsalia (1614) he makes no mention 
of what he himself thinks of Lucan.  His dedication in fact speaks to how this effort is a 
present to impress his Mistress – and that his father approved of such wooing!  There is 
no talk of its importance as a historical document, epic poetry, or anything else.  He left 
this effort to his extollers in their dedicatory poems, where they are quite clear that 
Lucan’s value resides in his ability to speak the truth about imperial aspirations and 
human nature.  Their overarching conclusion is that his work is historical and true.  It is 
necessary to read them all at length to get a sense of just how pervasive this idea was: 
 
HAD Lucan hid the truth to please the time,  
He had beene too vnworthy of thy Penne:  
Who neuer sought, nor euer car'd to clime  
By flattery, or seeking worthlesse men.  
For this thou hast been bruis'd: but yet those scarres  
Do beautifie no lesse, then those wounds do  
Receiu'd in iust, and in religious warres;  
Though thou hast bled by both, and bearst them too.  
Change not, to change thy fortune tis too late.  
Who with a manly faith resolues to dye,  
May promise to himselfe a lasting state,  
Though not so great, yet free from infamy.  
Such was thy Lucan, whom so to translate  
Nature thy Muse (like LVCANS) did create  
W. R 
 
HOMER and MARO, that did Poetize,  
As much in matter, as in kinde of stile,  
Did thereby dimme the glorious deeds the while  
Of them, whose acts they meant to memorize.  
So did not LVCAN, who (in other guize)  
The gests of two great Worthies did compile;  
S'deining their high atchieuements to defile,  
Or inter-lace with idle vanities.  
Therefore how farre from Fable Truth is set,  
So farre aboue all feigners LVCAN shines;  
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While in his Muse both faculties are met,  
That with sweet Number beauteous Truth combines.  
And we to thee in endlesse debt must dwell  
For making Lucan speake our tongue so well.  
S. S. 
 
LVCAN, that first in the Imperiall tongue  
(In naked truth of acted history)  
The ciuill wounds made for an Empire song;  
Hath checkt precedent, taught succeeding Poesy,  
That flatteries and fictions may delight,  
May please a Tyrant, wrong a rightfull King,  
May please an Orphan Iudgment, wrong the right,  
Enuelop Truth, proclaime an vntrue thing.  
Lucan, that first hath showne the force of verse,  
Relating onely what was seene, felt, donne,  
Of Conqu'rors triumphs, of the Conqu'reds herse,  
All as it left, all as it first begunne.  
Not like the Trojan Theamers, fit for schooles,  
Fabling of this and that in Heauen, Earth, Hell,  
Sober to mad-men, turning wise to fooles,  
Gods to be Neat-heards, men in starres to dwell,  
Hath match't the faith, that History requires:  
Hath match't best History in choyce of phrase:  
Hath taught, that History in nought aspires  
Aboue the truth of deeds, it selfe to raise.  
This Lucan for his truth a Truch-man gaines  
As true to him, as he to Truth remaines.  
T. W. 
 
The word “truth” or its variant “true” is found so many times throughout these poems 
that there is no mistaking how Lucan was supposed to be read and thus how he was not 
to be read.  “Fabling” poets, such as Vergil and Homer, pale in comparison to Lucan’s wit, 
according to these men.  Statius garners not so much as a syllable’s worth of interest. 
Thomas May’s dedication to his translation of the Pharsalia in 1631 strikes a 
similar tone.  In it he is at pains to combine Lucan’s truthfulness with that of his prowess 
as a historian.  He states it like this:  
 THe great subiect of this stately Poem, together with the worth of the 
noble Author, haue enboldned me to present the Translation... The matter 
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of this Worke is a true History adorned and heightned with Poetical 
raptures, which doe not adulterate, nor corrupt the truth, but giue it a 
more sweet and pleasant relish. The History of it, is the greatest of 
Histories, the affaires of Rome, whose transcendent greatnes will admit no 
comparison with other States either before, or after it...   
 
To read Lucan, then, is to see the truth.34 There is no searching for any meaning, no 
mulling over who is right and who is wrong, and there is certainly no room for darkness.  
Lucan’s story happened; it is not fictive in the way of other epics.  His characters are real 
and so too their actions.  Moreover, there are no gods to confuse the situation, only men. 
It is, therefore, tempting to understand how Stephens’s translation of the Thebaid is 
received vis-à-vis Lucan’s Pharsalia – the Thebaid’s contemporary rival – after all each 
presents a bloody and horrific war between family members for control of the state.  
However, as many similarities as arise between the two epics there is one marked 
difference.  Contrary to Lucan’s Pharsalia, where the end of republicanism (and hence the 
Republic itself) is given a gruesome death, the Thebaid is clearly about monarchal control.   
IV 
While it is true that Lucan is regaled as the poet who perhaps best represented 
an emerging republican ideology and the political actions of Parliamentarians from the 
1620s to the 1640s, it is also true that other classical epicists, such as Ovid, Vergil, and 
even Statius, are never out-shown by him, either as vehicles for political discourse or 
(especially) as models for poetical virtuosity in the normative and didactic realms.  
Keeping the latter in mind, it becomes equally  tempting to argue that Stephens intends 
to set himself against both of Lucan’s translators, Thomas May and Sir Arthur Gorges, 
since there are numerous characteristics about the Thebaid which make it a stronger 
candidate for disabusing one of the notions that civil war will have a result with 
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anything positive in nature.  Still, the present-day assertion that republicanism is present 
in the minds and, therefore, the actions of seventeenth-century political operatives is 
difficult to eschew completely.  Indeed, there is clear evidence that political thought 
prior to the Civil War is suffused by the political ideas drawn from both Roman and 
Renaissance republics (like Venice); and, moreover, the passion with which these 
assertions are made deeply affect the political milieu of the period.  However, in 
presenting the likes of Lucan as a culmination of the political thought and action of 
republicanism there is an obfuscation of the distinction between the civic vocabulary in 
the run-up to the war and the contentions for a kingless rule following 1649. Using 
Lucan to symbolize a burgeoning constitutional republicanism is hardly unique, nor 
surprising – see More’s Utopia, Shakespeare’s Coriolanus and Julius Caesar, or Bacon or 
Sidney.  Constitutional law and custom made moot the search of other (even ideal) 
models of governance – constitutional and parliamentary debate rarely converged in any 
meaningful or substantive way.  In the end, these debates always take the monarchy for 
granted; it is part of the custom – republican political thought has to imagine that the 
monarchy is always the secondary method of governing, which is rejected as facetious at 
best.35  The Thebaid never presumes that the people could rule more effectively without a 
monarch, only that tyranny is improper government; so too joint government for that 
matter.  In the end, however, nearly any observation on civil war that one can derive from 
the Pharsalia, can be had from the Thebaid. So what, again, is the point of “easie?” Perhaps 
an additional tact will help clarify. 
The extollers of Stephens saw their translator’s efforts as an action akin to poeisis, 
building from Statius’s text a poem which becomes his own and owes nothing 
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necessarily to Statius except its moral, making Statius’s Latin merely a medium through 
which Stephens works.  The way, in fact, that they expresses this action was through a 
comparison between poetry and painting, and between the actual and the ideal.  In 
specific, they attribute to Stephens the same abilities that the ancient painter Apelles 
had.  It is worth taking a considerable look at their statements.  They read, in order: 
Quis novus hic Hermes vatem felicibus umbris  
Evocat? & lucum cultore superbum  
Elysium viduat? Manes, quibus esse sodalis  
Dignatus f[…] m[...]rent; passim innuba laurus,  
Et P[...]bi marcent myrti, florentque cupressi.  
Post C[...]m quisnam Venerem tentaret Apellem?  
Hoc fac[…]s! Authoris tamen hic Veneres, Charitesque  
Spirat, & in versu redivivus Statius omni… 
Reginaldus Bekenham 
 
… To overdraw  
Were errour in Apelles 'gainst the Law  
Imagery commands, since in these arts  
The beauty of the liknesse wonder darts,  
And makes the miracle, Hence flowes your fame,  
We can but onely say 'tis not the same.  
The short-liv'd issues then of such, whose braine  
Needes others workes as bladders in the maine  
Of wit and fancy, these we terme Translation;  
You 's brooke no other Title then creation 
Rob: Baldocke 
 
ARt, Sir, workes miracles: she can Revive  
Men dead, in years and Fame, and bid them Live;  
And speake a Language which they knew not, and  
More sense perhaps, then They did understand.  
(Some Comments courteously bely, and wit  
Authors into more Raptures, then they writ.)  
Your Statius ne're knew English sure…  
His text owes wit unto your Paraphrase.  
Which you so turn'd, wrought, sweat untill you hit  
What Statius in English should have writ… 
Strange Artist! who doest thus miraculously  
Paint Shapes: And then paint'st Day to view them by. Clem: Paman.36 
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Apelles’s appeal to these English scholars signifies the efforts of both poets and painters 
to represent the actual and ideal in their works.  The point of these allusions to Apelles is 
intriguing as connections between poetry and painting; but primarily they are used for 
expressing the “Art” needed to create both symbolic and realistic works, a feat that is 
inherently difficult to do, but one which is given great light  by recalling Jonson’s 
response in Underwood to the poem of Sir William Burlase. 37  
In his poem, Burlase (Underwood 52: “A Poem sent me by Sir William Burlase. The 
Painter to the Poet.”) relates the painter’s difficulty in painting the hidden qualities of a 
person’s worth; that is, values that are easily assessed though not expressed.38  (He is, in 
fact, trying to depict Jonson’s worth.)  Indeed, Jonson’s reply is that Burlase’s real 
problem is not painting Jonson’s inner worth, but containing his own within a 
prescribed limit, namely, a small canvas.39  In other words, how is he, Burlase, supposed 
to limit all that he can see?  Jonson refigures Burlase’s complaint into a question of 
idealization versus the truth, quipping: “You made it a brave piece, but not like me.” The 
problem for us then, as Jonson presents it, echoes the division being played out between 
Statius and Lucan; for, at least according to those who have chosen to comment, Lucan 
represented truth and Statius art.  For Jonson a poet is able to express in “black and 
white” the inner qualities of any person he deems appropriate because he is free to do so.  
So he does not have to idealize, since, if he wants, he can name the qualities he wishes in 
a person, offering a true (at least to him) depiction of that person.  In reality, however, 
what Jonson suggests is that the poet has the ability to be didactive and normative 
through (actual) description. 
Looking at Baldocke’s assertion above that Stephens’s efforts are comparable to 
Apelles’s, one notices precisely the same contrast Jonson draws for Burlase.  The Apelles-
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Stephens idealization comments on how Statius swerves around the truthful and “easie” 
Lucan (as May and Gorges’s extollers would have it), so that he becomes the nominclator 
of actualization through idealization.  Since Statius and Stephens rely on the reader, the 
onus of interpretation falls squarely back upon him.  For in offering to depict Thebes 
Stephens’s work becomes a type of historical poetry, or rather “Poetick History,” 
recording and describing the realities of experiences which as poetry it necessarily 
transforms and idealizes.  Therefore, the use of Apelles by Stephens’s extollers to 
describe what he achieves clearly prevents a comparison with Lucan, and makes Lucan’s 
work indeed “easie.” 
V 
Now having moved past Statius’s and Stephens’s contemporary rivals there is one 
literary giant left to deal with: Vergil.  Interestingly, Stephens does not mention Vergil 
but in his notes, which as mentioned before are rather simplistic and unassuming, 
though, not necessarily uninteresting.  The same holds for his notes that cite Vergil; most 
of the time they are nothing more than mythological references.  This lack of citation 
does not mean, however, that Vergil is absent from Stephens’s mind or text.  In fact, I 
would argue it is quite the contrary seeing as how the Troy myth is a predominant theme 
of royalist poetry during the period. As Nigel Smith has argued, “Despite the military 
victories of Parliament in 1644 and 1645, royalist pamphlets continued to exploit epic 
language right up to the execution of Charles, even if they turned to the Troy legend as a 
far more fitting source than the Roman civil wars... But while the epic fittingly framed 
royalist degeneration, other epic theorists and practitioners were led to redesign the 
genre in very different terms.”40  While Smith is concerned about the creation of puritan 
or parliamentarian epic theory he overlooks how Stephens’s translation of the Thebaid so 
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easily inverts and complicates the perceived royalist failure to create epic by both co-
opting and preceding the Troy myth through a Vergil-Statius dynamic. 
Vergil is the poet who stands as the authorizing source for Latin poets writing 
about Thebes.  That is, Vergil is the poet who signifies civilization and legitimates the 
vast project of establishing empire, national destiny, and heroic identity through Aeneas, 
“a vertuous man in all fortunes” and “so excellent a man in every way,” as Sidney put it.  A 
career that included epic within its trajectory cannot but engage with the Aeneid, 
whether it comes in the first or seventeenth century.  Certainly, that was the case for 
Statius; so it must be for Stephens as well.  Thus, Vergil’s authority is, in this sense, 
inseparable from the narrative fiction of the Thebaid, as much as it is the Aeneid.   
There is no greater proponent of Vergil’s epic in England prior to the 1640s than 
Sidney, and it is to him we turn in order to see how Vergil’s relationship with Statius 
was perceived in its poetical and epic terms.  According to Sidney: 
Nature neuer set forth the earth in so rich tapistry, as diuers Poets haue 
done... Her world is brasen, the Poets only deliuer a golden…so it seemeth 
in him her vttermost cunning is imployed, and knowe whether shee haue 
brought foorth so true a louer as Theagines, so constant a friende as Pilades, 
so valiant a man as Orlando, so right a Prince as Xenophons Cyrus: so 
excellent a man euery way, as Virgils Aeneas: neither let this be iestingly 
conceiued, because the works of the one be essentiall: the other, in 
imitation or fiction: for any vnderstanding knoweth the skil of the 
Artificer, standeth in that Idea or fore-conceite of the work, & not in the 
work it selfe.41 
 
Sidney recognizes Vergil’s brilliance is in his imitative quality and fictive ability; but his 
primary excellence lies in the intent of the work itself, the “fore-conceite” or “Idea.”  
What the author intends by his poem is of paramount importance for Sidney.  For him 
there must a preconceived message for his audience to apprehend.  Sidney’s epic poet 
therefore needs to create a “golden” world in order to achieve this goal.  Stephens, too, 
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has recognized Sidney’s conceit that the natural world is of a brazen nature, while the 
poets’ is golden; but he inverts them.   
Stephens has Statius as part of the brazen world in the front matter of his 
translation. There he is represented as a bust with the laureate crown, under which is 
this poem: 
Minervas Laureate breaths, whose face  
Is heere acquainted first with brass:  
His lofty stile, yet smooth and trim,  
Can make ev'n Tumours beauteous seem  
Romes Orpheus, who creates a GROVE,  
Which t'o thers Musicke could but move:  
Singing Thebes's Ruines, hee does teach  
The listning stones to mend the breach  
Wouldst know him! read his straines Thoust find  
This shews his face, but Those his Mind. 
 
For Stephens, Statius is only concerned with brass not gold.  He sings of “Ruines” 
brought about by “fraternas acies” and “regna profanis” not “conderet ubrem” and “altae 
moenia Romae.” Vergil’s epic is precisely the opposite of the Thebaid.  Sidney, in fact, in 
his only comment on the Thebaid, recognizes this fact when he remarks that the Thebaid is 
about “the violence of ambition in the two Theban brothers.” It is, therefore, inherently 
different from the Aeneid, where the violence is underscored precisely because it is 
attached to an effort that is un-virtuous and un-heroic.  Certainly the Aeneid, in its last 
books, is remarkably violent; however, the violence is condoned as ultimately necessary; 
Aeneas is not a character who can be labeled ambitious nor prone to violence for its sake 
alone.  It is only for the sake of civilization and acts of pietas that Aeneas employs his 
arma.  The Thebaid is precisely the opposite of the Aeneid in this regard; thus the violence 
attached to ambition is immoral.   
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Stephens’s effort at translation therefore has to renegotiate and re-imagine the 
normative and didactic aspect of the Sidneian poet’s expectation of heroism.   Instead of 
relating an inspirational, heroic tale of civilization and empire, Stephens’s times call for 
historical perspective through “Poetick History,” a perspective that anticipated a bleak 
future full of rage, impiety, indecency, and Godly revenge.  Statius invents, and Stephens 
adopts, the story of internecine warfare between Oedipus’s sons Eteocles and Polynices 
within the ethics and ideology of Vergil’s poem, but calls into question everything the 
Aeneid would have us believe about heroic enterprise and imperial culture.  Stephens, 
therefore, inverts Sidneian poetics. 
In the Apology for Poetry Sidney presents a seemingly dichotomous argument, one 
that appears to present the moral value of poetry, while also including historians as part 
of the poetic enterprise; since history could direct, charm, and motivate its readers with 
images of an archetype-virtue as well as could poetry.  When compared to the strict 
historian, the poet was in Sidney’s mind especially valuable and significant, for:  
the Poet (as I sayd before) never affirmeth.  The Poet never maketh any 
circles about your imagination, to coniure you to believe for true what he 
writes. Hee citeth not authorities of other Histories, but even for hys 
entry calleth sweete Muses to inspire into him a good invention; in troth, 
not labouring to tell you what is, or is not, but what should or should not 
be.42 
 
Sidney, consequently, proclaims that poetry supplies its readers with an ideal moral 
standard.  Poetry  is normative sinces it teaches moral, civic and religious values to 
England. Poets pursued a transcendental truth. 43 But what does it say about Statius and 
Stephens that their epics do none of these things?   
Stephens is quite clear in his translation that there are no heroes to be found in 
the Thebaid.  Where Statius uses the word “hero,” Stephens always translates it as 
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“champion,” the definition of which at the time has little to do with heroism and 
everything to do with violence.  The most critical instance of this use happens to be its 
first.  At 1.41, Statius utters: “quem prius heroum, Clio, dabis?”   Now, it is quite clear that 
Statius intends to call into question, at least here, whether his characters should be 
deemed heroes by the verses following his initial question: 
…inmodicum irae 
Tydea? laurigeri subitos an uatis hiatus? 
urguet et hostilem propellens caedibus amnem 
turbidus Hippomedon, plorandaque bella proterui 
Arcados atque alio Capaneus horrore canendus. 
 
(Tydeus, untrammeled in his wrath? Or the laurelled seer’s sudden chasm? 
Stormy Hippomedon too is upon me, pushing the river his enemy with 
corpses.  And I must mourn the fight of the overbold Arcadian, and sing 
Capaneus in consternation never felt before.)44 
 
These verses are hardly endorsements, and they beg the question: Why would Statius 
want to start with such un-heroic characters?  Stephens, however, alters Statius’s 
questioning tone by translating the same passage in this way:  
What Champion (Muse) do'st first remember? Is't  
Inraged Tydêus? or Apollo's Priest,  
Buried before he's dead? Or is't the proud  
Hyppomedon, whose slaughters stop the flood  
That overwhelm'd him? Or wilt weep the tale  
Of young Parthenopaeus funerall?  
When that's spun out, take Capanêus, and tell  
(But with a greater horrour) how he fell.45 
 
There is no question for Stephens of whether or not there are heroes in the Thebaid.  There 
are none. Eteocles is a full of rage and deceit, Polynices of anger and bitterness.  The 
Argive band who attack Thebes represent horrifying excess or pathetic deficit: Tydeus 
dies gnawing the skull of the man;  Jupiter strikes down Capaneus after he challenges the 
gods; Hippomedon becomes blinded by fury; and Parthenopaeus strikes one as a coward.  
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Heroism is replaced by nothing more than thuggery in the Thebaid, with the leaders 
indistinguishable from common soldiers – their heroism dissolves into human actions.  
Consequently, these are not the heroes defined as those “ancient Bastards, that the Poets 
called Hero's, or demy gods, have bin esteemed Sonnes of a god, and of a mortall woman, 
or of a Goddesse, and of a mortall man because of their admirable, and above humane 
vertue, as Hercules, Achilles, Aeneas, Romulus, and others;” or those “Princes, and men of 
conspicuous power (anciently called Heroes) a luster and influence upon the rest of men, 
resembling that of the Heavens.”46  
The denial of heroism flies directly in the face of the prevailing epic theory, not 
only by Sidney as noted above, but in Stephens’s contemporaries Hobbes and Davenant.  
Hobbes in fact states that: 
…the Poets, (whose work it is by imitating humane life, in delightful and 
measur’d lines, to avert men from vice, and encline them to vertuous and 
honorable actions)… But the subject of a Poeme is the manners of men, not 
naturall causes; manners presented, not dictated; and manners feyned (as 
the name of Poesy imports) not found in men.47 
 
The normative aspect of poetry is therefore maintained by Hobbes, since heroic poetry 
(that is, primarily epic poetry) must pertain to virtue, honor, and manners of mankind.  
But as noted at the beginning of this chapter the manners and actions of mankind are 
necessary to forget, at least for Fairfax and Cowley.  For May, however, who is 
presumably writing his history at the same time Stephens is translating, something else 
is in the air.  The King is not quite dead yet. This fracture of divine governance has its 
parallel in the wholesale collapse of heroism.   
 For May it is an “impiety to God” to forget to relate “his judgement upon a 
kingdome.”  Therefore, he is loath to make that mistake even if he has to be severe in his 
181 
 
assessment.  Stephens similarly draws his own stakes; from the ruins of Thebes he will 
teach Statius’s mind, and hence his memory.  Stephens’s recognition of Statius’s world as 
brazen reasserts itself in identifying the world of Thebes with the world of man.  In other 
words, Thebes which provided the negative model for Athens and Rome with regard “to 
notions of the proper management of city, society, and self” now is the reflection of 
London and England at large.  The memory of the Civil War has altered Froma Zeitlin’s 
plausible theory about Athens’ tragic interest in Thebes “as the site of displacement.”  
Rather, much as Hobbes conceived:  
Time and education begets experience; Experience begets memory; 
Memory begets Judgement, and Fancy; Judgement begets the strength 
and structure; and Fancy begets the ornaments of a Poeme.  The Ancients 
therefore fabled not absurdly, in making memory mother of the Muses.  
For memory is the World (though not really, yet so as in a looking glasse) 
in which the Judgement the severer Sister busieth her selfe in grave and 
rigide examination of all the parts of Nature, and in registring by Letters, 
their order, causes, uses, differences and resemblances.48   
 
But whereas Hobbes intends his statement to be used to produce epic poetry which is 
virtuous and honorable and without divine inspiration, his estimation can only come at a 
distance from Charles I’s death.  It cannot be assumed beforehand.  Nor for Stephens 
does Davenant’s assertion hold true, that: 
to derive my Theme from elder times, as thinking it no little mark of 
skilfulness to comply with the common Infirmity; for men (even of the 
best education) discover their eyes to be weak, when they look upon the 
glory of virtue (which is great actions) and rather endure it at distance 
than near; being more apt to believe, and love the renown of Predecessors, 
than of Contemporaries, whose deeds excelling theirs in their own sight, 
seem to upbraid them, and are not reverenc'd as examples of Virtue, but 
envi'd as the favours of Fortune: But to make great Actions credible, is the 
principal Art of Poet  
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Perhaps this perspective could be spawned and maintained at a distance in time and 
space from England; but for those in the midst of the Civil War it is certainly not the 
case. 
Still Davenant and Hobbes do have some insight to offer.  Davenant in assessing 
his epic predecessors Vergil, Homer, Lucan and Statius states that: 
Statius (with whom we may conclude the old Heroicks) is as accomptable 
to some for his obligations to Virgill, as Virgill is to others for what he owes 
to Homer; and more closely than Virgill waits on Homer, doth Statius attend 
Virgill, and follows him there also where Nature never comes, even into 
Heaven and Hell: and therefore he cannot escape such as approve the 
wisdom of the best Dramaticks...49  
 
That is, because Statius follows Vergil so closely he necessarily shares the same flaws; 
namely, relying too much on tragedians.  But, if that is so he also parallels Vergil’s virtues 
which Hobbes defines: 
As the Description of Great men and Great Actions is the constant is the 
constant designe of a Poet; so the Descriptions of worthy circomstances 
are necessary accessions to a Poeme, and being well performed are the 
Jewels and most pretious ornaments of Poesy.  Such in Virgil are The 
Funerall, The House of Astragon, The Library, and the Temples, equall to his, or to 
those of Homer whom he imitated.50  
 
For the both of them, then, epic is nothing less than an attempt to reestablish the 
education of princes:  
The Common Crowd (of whom wee are hopelesse) wee desert; being 
rather to be corrected by lawes…then to be taught by Poesy…Nor is it 
needful that Heroique Poesy should be levell’d to the reach of Common 
men; for if the examples it presents prevaile upon their Chiefs, the delight 
of Imitation…will rectify by the Rules…51   
 
But, as Hobbes admits, since epics traditionally reflect on the glory of the ruler in whose 
reign they are written, it is only fitting in the circumstances that Gondibert uses fictional 
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characters, taking the scene of heroism away from the historical stage.  In this sense, “the 
royalist epic imagination retreats or internalizes, in a somewhat similar way.”52  
In imperial Rome, then, as well as seventeenth-century London, events at Thebes 
still instruct the audience; but Thebes is no longer the other.  It has become the self: civil 
war, monarchical power and problems of dynastic succession are real concerns.  In brief, 
monarchy, inheritance of it and its role in society similarly confront Thebes, Flavian 
Rome, and London in the Thebaid. Thebes is a metaphor to examine civil war and its 
concomitant problems.  
One way in which Roman imperial epic could address the topic of civil war was 
to engage the Aeneid.  The nature of the relationship between Vergil’s poem and the 
establishment of the principate after the civil wars between Antony and Octavian is 
controversial now, but for early moderns the poem created a link between the two. 
Specificially at stake for them is Vergil’s connection between himself and Augustus, and 
the way he incorporates the gods into the arrangement of the narrative.  For example, in 
the Aeneid, with the obvious exception of Juno, the Olympian gods act to help and to 
benefit the Roman state, highlighting simultaneously Augustan Rome. Remember, 
Jupiter’s speech in book one begins by discussing Rome’s earliest history, then moves 
towards the peace that followed Augustus’s victory in civil war.  The teleological thrust 
of Jupiter’s speech is replicated by the account of Roman history that Vulcan puts on 
Aeneas’s shield, a narrative that also begins with the archaic city and culminates with 
Augustan Rome.  In linking formal features of epic to the Roman state, Vergil creates an 
entirely new relationship between politics and epic, one which wins him praise from 
Hobbes. 
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For the choyse of your subject you have sufficiently justified your selfe in 
your Preface.  But because I have observed in Virgil, that the Honor done to 
Aeneas and his companions, has so bright a reflexion upon Augustus Caesar, 
and other great Romanes of that time, as a man may suspect him not 
constantly possessed with the noble spirit of those his Heroes, and believe 
you are not acquainted any great man of the Race of Gondibert, I adde to 
your Justification of the purity of your purpose, in having no other motive 
of you labour, but to adorne virtue, and procure her Lovers; then which 
there cannot be a worthier designe, and more becoming noble Poesy. 53 
 
Clearly Hobbes cannot praise Statius in the same way.  The Theban story is particularly 
contaminated – and that corruption extends to the poet himself.  The “reflexion” that 
Statius, and Stephens for that matter, is neither bright nor honorable.  There is neither 
virture nor her lovers to be found in the Thebaid.   
VI 
There is no explanation given by Stephens why he ends his translation where he 
does; but if the course of the Thebaid is kept in mind, the reason is apparent.  The first five 
books present very little in the way of physical civil strife, Statius intends to build his 
narrative into a crescendo during the last seven books, where the horrors of war are on 
full display.  The outcome is indeed nothing positive, tyranny is exchanged for tyranny 
and the destruction of Thebes and its citizenry is complete.  Civilization has come to a 
halt; and a foreign king dispatches the Argives as well as Creon. 
Stephens’s deliberate manipulation of the story suggests a specific reading of the 
Thebaid as a warning just as ominous to royalists as to parliamentarians.  The Thebaid ends 
with decivilizing acts, opposite to the Aeneid, such that not even the gods watch the 
humans destroy themselves though Jupiter is the one who has set everything into 
motion.  Contra Smith’s assertion that the Hobbesian and thus the royalist “epic poet is a 
slave to nature, to a repetition of what is naturally probable, not what is allegorized or 
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personalized fantasy” Stephens is working with fantasy and allegory.54  It seems, in fact, 
that the allegorization of Oedipus at the beginning of the epic is the overthrow and then 
contamination of the divine right to rule by the Parliamentarians.  By overthrowing the 
king, Oedipus pollutes the political structure of Thebes absolutely; so that no matter 
what occurs afterward, its structure is irrevocably altered for the worst possible 
outcome.  
Jupiter’s role in the Thebaid is the most critical key to understanding Stephens’s 
translation and interpretation.  In many ways it seems that Jupiter explains why 
Stephens would choose to translate the Thebaid at all.  As has been noted already, 
Statius’s antecedents, Lucan and Vergil, weigh heavily on Thebaid both in terms of its 
reception and its structure.  One of the substantial differences noted about the Aeneid but 
not about the Pharsalia so far is how the role of the gods affects the outcome of each 
poem.  In the Aeneid the gods conspire to foster Aeneas’s task of nation-founding.  In the 
Pharsalia the gods are completely absent, there is no religion and there is no god.  The 
actions of Caesar, Pompey, Crassus and Cato are their own.  The Thebaid, however, posits 
something unique in epic poetry of the ancient sort: divine retribution and annihilation.  
Naturally, there are some relation to the Illiad and Odyssey, where the gods fight amongst 
themselves, on the one hand, and where a single god pursues his victim, on the other.  
But Statius is clear in the Thebaid: both Thebes and Argos will be utterly erased through 
the actions taken by Jupiter.  And as with Buchanan and Grotius, taking a closer look at 
Jupiter’s role not only explains more fully Stephens’s assertion that the Thebaid is dark 
and mysterious, it also sheds light on Stephens himself during the 1640s and what will be 
termed here a cumulative approach to translating the Thebaid. 
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In the first book of the Thebaid (1.214-47) Jupiter makes a speech which notes the 
reasons for Thebes’s and Argos’s destruction.  It is worth quoting in full: 
terrarum delicta nec exaturabile Diris 
ingenium mortale queror. quonam usque nocentum                  
exigar in poenas? taedet saeuire corusco 
fulmine, iam pridem Cyclopum operosa fatiscunt 
bracchia et Aeoliis desunt incudibus ignes. 
atque adeo tuleram falso rectore solutos 
Solis equos, caelumque rotis errantibus uri,                 
et Phaethontea mundum squalere fauilla. 
nil actum, neque tu ualida quod cuspide late 
ire per inlicitum pelago, germane, dedisti. 
nunc geminas punire domos, quis sanguinis auctor 
ipse ego, descendo. Perseos alter in Argos                 
scinditur, Aonias fluit hic ab origine Thebas. 
mens cunctis imposta manet: quis funera Cadmi 
nesciat et totiens excitam a sedibus imis 
Eumenidum bellasse aciem, mala gaudia matrum 
erroresque feros nemorum et reticenda deorum               
crimina? uix lucis spatio, uix noctis abactae 
enumerare queam mores gentemque profanam. 
scandere quin etiam thalamos hic impius heres 
patris et inmeritae gremium incestare parentis 
appetiit, proprios (monstrum!) reuolutus in ortus.               
ille tamen superis aeterna piacula soluit 
proiecitque diem, nec iam amplius aethere nostro 
uescitur; at nati (facinus sine more!) cadentes 
calcauere oculos. iam iam rata uota tulisti, 
dire senex. meruere tuae, meruere tenebrae                 
ultorem sperare Iouem. noua sontibus arma 
iniciam regnis, totumque a stirpe reuellam 
exitiale genus. belli mihi semina sunto 
Adrastus socer et superis adiuncta sinistris 
conubia. hanc etiam poenis incessere gentem                
decretum; neque enim arcano de pectore fallax 
Tantalus et saeuae periit iniuria mensae. 
     
(Earth’s sins and mind of man that no demons of vengeance can satiate I 
do protest.  How much longer shall I be driven to punish the guilty? 
Weary am I of raging with flashing bolt, the busy arms of the Cyclopes 
have long been faint and the Aeolian anvils out of fire.  And indeed I 
suffered the loosing of the Sun’s horses under a false driver, the burning of 
the sky as the wheels ran wild, the world caked with Phaethon’s ashes.  It 
availed not; nor yet that you, my brother, with your strong spear let the 
sea go at large through territory not its own.  Now I descend to punish 
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two houses, my own blood.  One stream branches to Persean Argos, the 
other flows from its fount to Aonian Thebes.  The character stamped on 
all of them abides.  Who would not know of Cadmus’ calamaties, how 
often the host of Furies, summoned from their infernal dwellings, made 
war, the evil joys of mothers and their wild wanderings in the forests, the 
gods’ reproaches best unspoken.  Scarce in the space of daylight and of 
night expelled could I enumerate the unholy ways of that race.  Why, this 
impious heir essayed to climb into his father’s bed and defile the womb of 
his innocent mother, returning (of monstrous!) to his own origin.  He, 
however, has paid an everlasting penalty to the High Ones, casting 
daylight away, and no longer does he feed upon our air; but his sons 
(outrageous deed!) trampled his eyes as they fell.  No your prayers are 
answered, dire ancient.  Your darkness has reserved, ay truly, to hope for 
Jupiter its avenger.  I shall bring warfare on the guilty reigns and tear the 
whole deadly stock out from the root.  Let Adrastus’ gift of his daughter in 
marriage unblessed of heaven be my seed of battle.  This line also I have 
resolved to assail and punish for false Tantalus and the outrage of the 
cruel banquet have not vanished from my secret heart.)55 
 
Of the many interesting things that Jupiter utters there are a couple which stand out in 
terms of what has been said so far.  First, is his characterization of Oedipus’s imprecation 
as tenebrae, here translated as “your darkness.”  Second, is his assertion of the earth’s 
complicity in Thebes’s and Argos’s guilt; that is, all of humanity by way of these two 
cities is impious, or disloyal to God.  As such, Jupiter has the license to destroy humanity 
down to its roots because of the crimes of the kings.  These are obvious enough.  What is 
needed now is to see how Stephens translates these verses (245-309): 
 But at Ioves high command the gods resort  
To heavens Star-chamber: 'Twas the inner Court  
Where they assembled, equally between  
The East and Western houses: whence was seen  
The confines of the earth and seas: The God  
Shining i'th' mid'st, strikes terrour with the nod  
Of his majestick countenance: A on  
He sets him downe, in his bespangled throne.  
The rest stand, and expect: not one presum'd  
To sit, till leave was beckned: Then they assum'd  
The Demy-gods, toth' place they had assign'd;  
And th' heaven-begotten Rivers: Nay the wind  
Comes whistling too; but's breath was stopt with fear.  
Thus having fill'd the starry Quire, they wear  
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Such Majesty about them, that the face  
Of heav'n's amaz'd: Such beauty fills the place,  
That more then day breakes thence: The roofe's all gold,  
The beames of Chrysolite hidden flames doe hold.  
Having commanded silence, all the round  
Gave care and trembled: (for within that sound  
Was an unchang'd decree; the Fates did make   
His words a law:) thus then aloft he spake.  
The tainted earth; and mans polluted soul  
I here impeach, whom vengeance can't controul.  
How long shall guilty cryes awake my rage?  
This arme is tir'd with thundering. 'Tis an age  
Has wearied out the Cyclops. Ev'ry cinder  
In Vulcans shop's burnt out. I would not hinder  
Thy horses (Phoebus) ranging where they list  
To fire the world, when their false guide was mis't,  
Hoping they would refine't: But all in vaine,  
As was thy labour, Neptune, when the Maine,  
Rais'd by thy trident, found a way to passe  
Beyond its bounds, and wash'd Earths dirty face.  
Now come we arm'd with vengeance 'gainst two Nations  
Sprung from our loynes: One's Greece, the habitations   
Of Perseus: T'other's Thebes, built in that tract,  
Which men once call'd Aonia: One neglect  
Has seiz'd on all their soules. Who does not know  
Cadmus his ruines? Whilst the powers below,  
Charm'd from their darker vaults, oft quarreld here.  
D'ee see their Matrons wicked joyes? D'ee heare  
The out-cryes from their groves? I would conceal  
Those daring sins that strike at heav'n: to tell  
All those lewd manners, which defile that place,  
One day and night would be too short a space.  
Yet O Edipus, more fruitfull in his sin,  
Covets his Fathers bed, and strives to win  
Strange pleasures from his Mother. Who, before him,  
E're forc'd a passage to that wombe that bore him?  
But just revenge has reach'd him: He has banish'd  
All day, and comfort: Heav'n it selfe is vanish'd  
Out of his sight: whil'st his malignant brood  
(Wicked beyond all president) have stood  
Triumphing o're his blindnesse. Th' hast obtain'd,  
Old Mischief, what thou ask'dst:Thy night has gain'd  
Ioves eare, and's hand: Ile arme their rage, and mock  
At th' ruine of both kingdomes: All that stock  
Ile root and branch destroy. The quarrel's spun  
With ease: Adrastus pitying's exil'd son,  
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Joyn'd to that Line unhappily, shall give  
Assistance. 'Tis decreed: Nor must they live.  
Deceitfull Tantalus sticks in our breast:  
We han't digested yet his bloudy feast.  
So spake the God: 
 
At points Stephens’s translation reads dramatically different from what Statius offers.  
He adds words (e.g. Star chamber) that are not there in Statius’s Latin and removes some 
that are.  He has altered the translation to read as he wishes it to read, making Jupiter 
much more sinister and frightening than Statius represents him. In Stephens’s version 
Jupiter even mocks the destruction of Thebes and Argos!  Stephens’s translation recalls 
the vengeful God of the Old Testament.  And while this comparison may seem a bit 
facile, it is my contention that Stephens did in fact read Statius’s Thebaid as a type of Old 
Testament allegory. 
VII 
In order to understand what Stephens offers his readers in his translation, we 
must start by understanding who his audience really is.  As stated previously, Stephens 
has an idea of who would be reading this version of the Thebaid: students and “critick 
readers.”  But he knows as well that this assertion is somewhat facetious.  For out of the 
prefatory odes a distinct audience emerges.  Even though Stephens’s background remains 
somewhat elusive, I have managed to discover that he took degrees from Jesus College, 
Cambridge during the 1630s.  Enrolling as a sizar in 1629, he becomes a scholar in 1633, 
takes his B.A. in 1633-34 and his M.A. in 1637.  Barring 1630, when all students were 
dismissed because of the outbreak of plague – which kills 35,000 people in London alone 
– Stephens is in residence at Cambridge from approxiamately 1631 to 1637.  It was a time 
that shapes his outlook, and he seems to have developed a lifelong attachment to the 
place; so that after leaving he never lives more than twenty miles from Cambridge at any 
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given time, eventually returning in 1661 to take his D.D. and living at Fen Ditton (1665-
1677), dying at Cambridge in 1677.  It is no real surprise then to find that the contributors 
to Stephens’s edition, made up of Reginald Bekenham, Clement Paman, Charles 
Woodward, Robert Baldocke, Thomas Poley, William Copinger, and Peregrine D’Oyly, 
are a Cambridge coterie.   
It is necessary here to distinguish these men a bit before moving on.  The first 
three, Bekenham, Paman, and Woodward, are Stephens’s peers.  They enroll at Caius and 
Sidney Sussex colleges, respectively, during the years 1628 to 1639.  Following their time 
at Sidney, Paman and Woodward become deeply involved in the Anglican Church, with 
Paman becoming the vicar of Thatcham, Berkshire, and Woodward being ordained a 
deacon at Norwich and a priest at Lincoln.56  Their interest in religion is shared by 
Stephens, who in 1640 is ordained a priest at Norwich under Richard Montague, and 
where Woodward would become a deacon under Joseph Hall in 1642.  Bekenham, while 
he probably shared their interest in religion, took his degrees (B.A. and M.A.) from Caius 
college, being installed as a Fellow from 1646-1652, a time during which he would have 
had to been a puritan of sorts to be admitted to Cambridge. 57 As for Baldocke, Poley, 
Copinger, and D’Oyly they are Stephens’s brightest students at Bury St Edmunds.  In 
fact, it is safe to assume that since Copinger and D’Oyly enroll in St. John’s College they 
received a local scholarship from Bury.58  Baldocke and Poley meanwhile enroll in 
Pembroke College.59   
Two characteristics seem to stand out among Stephens and his friends.  In 
attending the colleges each did, their allegiances primarily fell with the royalists; and 
each, with the exception of Paman, has strong ties to East Anglia, returning to live and 
work following their stints at Cambridge.60 East Anglia was a much richer region during 
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the early seventeenth century, where a learned clergy spread out into small and intimate 
parishes, and religious proclivities combined with geographical proximity to Cambridge 
brought both gentry and would-be students into more intimate and more frequent 
acquaintance in its colleges.61  In fact, the conditions attached to many endowments, and 
the provisions enjoined by numerous statutory regulations ensured that college and local 
community were constantly participating in each other’s lives.62  Stephens’s college life 
then “emerges in the realm of social history as it appears within the realm of political 
history and the history of ideas: not as the educational equivalent of the centralizing 
institutions of the Tudor state, but as one of the mechanisms which contributes to the 
regional differentiation which is the characteristic feature of English socioeconomic 
structure at this time.”63   
That being said, the Laudian reforms at Cambridge, promulgated most vigorously 
by John Cosin, have a profound effect on Stephens, Paman, Bekenham, and Woodward.64  
For Stephens specifically the presence of William Beale and Richard Sterne, who become 
Masters of Jesus College in 1631-34 and 1634-44, respectively, seems undeniable.65  A 
graduate and fellow of Jesus, Beale was made Archdeacon of Camarthen when Laud was 
Bishop of St David’s; he was a staunch supporter of the new ceremonies and a man whom 
Prynne accuses of being the “creature” of Archbishop Laud.  Proceeding D.D. in 1635, 
Sterne defends two interesting theses: First, “It is lawful for a priest to exercise civil 
power;” and, second, “Sin is an adequate cause of divine enmity.”  The first is an open 
attack on the idea that civil and ecclesiastical authority are separate, Calvin’s two 
swords argument.  The second promotes “a theology that places emphasis on sin, not on 
the divine decrees.  Sterne argues that, if our sinfulness is sufficient cause for God to 
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condemn us, we do not need to seek an account of how and why God himself decides on 
the numbering of the reprobate.”66  
Sterne’s interest brings us back to Statius. For in his translation of Jupiter’s 
speech Stephens has given the same argument as Sterne’s second thesis, only elaborating 
Sterne’s assertion by naming the earth as tainted and dirty (which Statius does not 
offer), man’s soul (which does not quite represent ingenium accurately) as polluted, and 
calls attention to sins deliberately exposed to heaven – none of which was Statius’s 
intent.  Jupiter’s hatred to be sure is palpable in Statius’s Latin, but Stephens’s insistence 
on calling Jupiter’s punishment “vengeance” does not follow, since Tisiphone is the fury 
and therefore the executor of vengeance.  Statius’s use of poenas and punire has meanings 
of punishment but not necessarily vengeance.  Why then does Stephens focus so 
intensely on vengeance?  Why is he so concerned with divine retribution in 1648?  To 
answer these questions we have to dig a little deeper into Stephens’s past. 
VIII 
In 1642 Stephens was given the opportunity by vice-chancellor Richard 
Holdsworth to give two sermons at the Church of St Mary the Great, Cambridge.  These 
sermons seem to have been Stephens’s first foray into public life, and perhaps such an 
honor inspires him to become the much more visible person he becomes afterward – 
though, that remains to be determined.  What is immediately intriguing and apparently 
paradoxical about this opportunity is that Stephens is an Anglican priest and 
Holdsworth a Puritan, who presides over a program (established in 1641) to recharge St 
Mary’s Puritan base by bringing in more Presbyterian-leaning priests to give sermons.  
Holdsworth, however, is a moderate, and he appears to have been unmoved by this 
attempted shift in program.  Stephens remembers the occasion thusly:  
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For the first of these Sermons was preacht in the University immediately 
after his Majesty of blessed memory had retired into the North to avoid 
the rude and unseemly deportment of the tumultuous rabble, so to escape 
the raging of the waters and the madness of the People: Where the 
acceptance which is found arose not from any intrinsick worth it had (I 
dare not flater my self with so vain a conceit) but from the suitablenesse 
of the subject to the affections of that learned and religious Auditory: For 
the good King having Lately passed that way, had left so deep an 
impression upon the hearts of the Loyal Students that any man was 
welcome to them who was a memoria (his shall I say? Or) their 
Remembrancer of him… 67 
 
Stephens, then, came to Cambridge to celebrate the king’s return from Scotland in 
November 1641.68  More importantly Stephens notes how Holdsworth is directly 
responsible for helping him determine what kind of sermon he ought to give: 
And here it had dyed with that Generation that soon after passed away, 
had it not come to the knowledge of some of Country-Committee-men, 
four years after (some men have long ears) for whom I have reason to bless 
God, who raised them up as instruments to make me be thought worthy 
to suffer any thing for that righteous cause.  Yet the Reverend and pious 
Vice-chancellor [noted as Doctor Holdsworth] obliged me then to another 
course; to supply which, the Second Sermon was prepared, (upon a Text 
which had been blasphemed in that Pulpit not long before) which 
happened soon after the Signall battail of Edghill. But alas! When I came 
to suck the breasts of my dear Mother I found them rub’d over with gall 
and wormwood: The Scene was chang’d Athens was turned to a Mar’s 
Hill.  The Musick of Apollos harp could not be heard for the noise of 
trumpets: For on the night before, that MAN OF BLOOD came down 
with a troop of horse, which was then his only command (the Cockatrice 
at that time was but an egg) and had blockt up the Pulpit with his 
Janizaries; so that prudence bad me retire, unlesse I would mingle my 
blood with my sacrifice.69  
 
 Stephens’s sermon was on Judges 21.25: “In those dayes there was no King in 
Israel; every man did that which was right in their own eyes.” He begins by describing 
the how the political and religious atmosphere has been polluted by fanatics and those 
who think they know best for everyone:  
Then those dayes have been, and they have been in Israel too; we have 
Scripture for it, sayes our Phanatick, and why may they not be again?  This 
place I confess is plain enough, and as well urged on this occasion, as his, 
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who maintained his heterodox opinions from St. Pauls opinion Cor. I.II. 
Of necessity heresies must be amongst you----But wo be to that man by 
whom these things come to pass.  When Every man must be his own 
Carver, and sits Judge upon his own actions, there is no King indeed, but 
whole legions of Tyrants… Kings we may have still, but no Subjects to 
obey; everyman will be his own Ruler, yet every man as unruly as he was 
before.70 
 
The sermon is clearly against men of extreme ideologies. In this case those men would be 
the Puritans in Parliament, who in their zealotry decided that no king is better than 
Charles I.  For such actions Stephens proceeds to accuse these “subjects” of being 
“Zorahs and Eshtaols enough, factious Towns and Cities, which can furnish us with a 
tumultuous brood of discontented Brethren, which think their borders are too straight, 
they must let out their appetites, and make more room for their active souls.”  These 
Danites, as he eventually calls them, would alter law and religion in order to gain what 
they wished, thinking nothing of tradition or precedence. 
Stephens’s argument, while using all examples from the Old Testament presages 
the commission of Dowsing while commenting sarcastically on the dismantling of 
religion (for the bill concerning the “Innovations in religion and abuses in government in 
Oxford and Campbridge” was given its first reading in August 1641): 
But if the severity of the Law do restrain such private Burglaries, yet Gods 
house is sure to go to it.  There be Idols in the Temple: force open the 
Doors, break down the Windows, let the spies enter and the armed men 
keep passage: but once in, tis not the Altar and Rails will serve them, no 
the Vestry and Library, yes the poor mans box shall be suspected to have a 
golden image in it: Nay there is no place secure, there is an Idoll in the 
Desk: away with the book of Comon prayer, teare it to pieces: There is an 
Idoll in the Pulpit too, or rather the Priest of Idolls; hale him, pull him out, 
tear off the sacred Vestements from his superstitious shoulders: The 
Surplice and the Hood: Cherubims and Seraphims must away, nay the 
very stones of the pavement shall be torn up, because men kneel upon 
them; Thus, O God, do they break down the carved works of thy house 
with axes and Hammers.71 
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According to Leedham-Greene, “Orders for the moving of communion tables from the 
east end of churches and chapels, and for the removal of altar rails and images, however, 
expressly include universities… Rather than proceeding directly against the university 
and colleges, Parliament chooses to direct its attack against individuals like John Cosin, 
Master of Peterhouse, who was arrested in November 1640 and impeached in March of 
the following year.”72  William Beale (noted above as Stephens’s former mentor) is 
reported on for an anti-Parliament sermon, and then arrested in the summer of 1642.73  
As for the arrival of the infamous Mr. Dowsing, whose role was the “utter demolishing, 
removing and taking away of all Monuments of Superstition or Idolatry,” he did not 
arrive at Cambridge until 21 December 1642, where he found that King’s and Christ’s had 
obediently dismantled their altars in 1641, and Peterhouse, Jesus, and Trinity had taken 
some action in advance of the visitation but much remained.”  Still, superstitious 
pictures, statues, and “chancels were levelled and all Laudian trappings were 
destroyed.”74  
Of these actions the most offensive to Stephens is the removal of the Common-
prayer Book and vestaments, since to remove them is no different than attempting to 
remove a king.  Stephens puts it this way: 
‘Yet let me tell you there is not great difference between having no King, 
and a King no whit obey’d’ Or if any be, the latter is the most extreme, if 
malum culpae exceed that of poenae for so we alter it from a punishment 
of God to a sin of our own.75 
 
For a people who thinks they know better than God and king, the Civil War, now in full 
swing following Edge Hill, as Stephens mentions, and Charles I may be the punishment 
for England’s selfish populace.  He even goes so far as to say, “But were he as detestable 
for his vices as he is now honourable for his vertues, this were no fair plea for our 
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disobedience: A wicked King may be an effect of Gods wrath against a Nation ; but the 
removal, the taking away this wicked King, that’s hotter, that’s plain fury, Hos. 13.11.”  
Stephens would rather the subjects of Charles I endure his presence (a pestilence, 
though it may be) and profit from it: 
Suppose him very wicked, he has the more need of thy prayers to make 
him better.  Suppose him to be a Tyrant, he will give the fairer occasions 
to exercise thy virtue of Patience. Suppose him to be a Persecutor, hee’l do 
thee a courtesie, he will send thee to Heaven by violence.  It is not oleum 
gratiae, but Dominii, that Kings are anointed with:76  
 
The point that Stephens makes here is quite striking.  On the one hand the oil of grace is 
something that comes from acceptance of Jesus Christ as one’s savior, it is a spiritual 
grace.77  The oil of the Lord (oleum Domini) is a direct line from Christ to the king.  It is 
not administered by the Church, as it was prior to Henry VIII.  So Stephens begins to 
question his audience as to what type of Christian congregation  St Marys is: 
For let me seriously put the question: Are we Christians? Do we know the 
virtue of an Oath? What think we then of that solemn Oath of our 
Allegiance? An Oath which can receive no dispensation, no absolution 
from what power soever: Are we Protestants? Nay one step farther; are we 
Protestors? What think we then of that branch of the late Protestation, 
that I will maintain the establisht doctrine of the Church as it stands in 
opposition to Popery and Popish Innovations:78 
 
Stephens’s oath to the Church then proves critical for the subsequent actions of his life 
and in fact it proves critical to his translation of Statius’s Thebaid; for by taking his oath 
he is prevented from taking any other state compelled oaths, such as the Vow and 
Covenant in the following year, 1643.   
IX 
The way oaths, or more specifically covenants, are used by Stephens is perhaps 
the most challenging and fruitful way to understand his translation of the Thebaid. The 
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use of covenant in the 1640s (“cov’nant”, Stephens) rings of a politicized lexicon. In the 
Thebaid, Stephens used it to portray Eteocles’s usurpation of Polynices’s time to rule: 
“Such was the Brethrens discord, such sterne Ire  
Had set an edge, on their untam'd desire.  
 At length they cov'nant, year by year, t'exchange,  
By course, their Crownes for banishment: …  
And yet the world had not us'd then to guild  
Their seiled roofes, nor had it learn'd to build  
Piatzo's rais'd with Graecian marble … 
No pretious Goblets made their wine look neat,  
No plates of gold were sullied with their meat:  
'Tis a bare power they seeke, an empty prize,  
A naked kingdome crownes their victories.  
Thus whilst both strive for a neglected soile,  
The humble throne of Cadmus, they defile  
Religion and themselves: The laws and right  
Are beaten down, alive and dead they fight.”79 
 
Stephens’s translation is deliberate and careful; the use of covenant replaces foedere in this 
instance by Statius.   Still, when given the opportunity to portray Eteocles and Polynices 
as power grabbing tyrants Stephens is clearly restrained.  In fact, by using terms such as 
“cov’nant” and “Brethren” where Statius’s Latin is precise and holds no tangible political 
value, Stephens mollifies the behavior in such a fashion as to ironize Parliamentarian 
attitudes towards contemporary attempts to reorient power through covenant and 
religion.   
What Stephens recognizes is that the discussion and representation of religion 
and broken covenant is at the heart of the Thebaid.  There is no doubt that Stephens could 
have presented the Thebaid as just another diatribe against the wickedness of tyrants – 
and as was shown above tyranny was clearly on his mind in the sermons; instead he 
seems to recognize that these are portrayals of antithetical monarchical behavior, not 
incitements of anti-monarchical opinion, as displayed so far in the first sermon.  Statius’s 
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presentation of limited rule and contractual or elective elements in Eteocles’s oath to rule 
may display the gap between a true monarch and a tyrant; but by portraying the oaths as 
covenants Stephens changes their perceived obligation.  In an oath, God is only involved 
as a witness, judging human testimony and threatening wrath if it should be proven 
false.  In a religious covenant, God becomes involved as an active party in a contract, 
containing mutual obligations.   
To understand why Stephens would use such a term, perhaps we should turn to 
Hobbes for an explanation, post-dated though it may be.  Hobbes’ attempt to use an 
appeal to covenant as a justification of absolute submission to civil authority is a 
historical oddity that he develops as a means of caricaturing the covenant arguments put 
forth by the Puritan (literally, Presbyterian) “first movers” during the Civil War. For 
them, it was Charles I’s breaking of covenants that led to evidence of killing of his own 
people; specifically his swearing of an oath of office was cited. 80   
During the Civil War the Protestation of 1641, the Vow and Covenant, and 
Solemn League and Covenant of 1643 of the Long Parliament are all declared to be 
renewals of England’s national covenant.  As a measure to hasten loyalty to the Church of 
England the Protestation is introduced to the House of Commons in 1641, hence 
Stephens’s appeal to Protestors and Protestation.  It is initiated in response to the 
perceived threat of papal authority influencing Charles (or more specifically his army) to 
subdue and dissolve Parliament.  While it is primarily aimed at preserving the Church of 
England, the oath, for those who take it, also maintains that one must defend the 
monarchy, while upholding a “duty of allegiance” and defending His Majesty’s royal 
person and estate – as well as the power and privilege of Parliament, the lawful rights 
and liberties of the subject, and every person that shall make this Protestation.81  In 
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essence the Protestation makes loyalty to the king conditional, dependant upon the 
king’s willingness to uphold religion and law – a characteristic very similar to that 
outlined in the Scottish National Covenant of 1638. 
 Hobbes adopts the assumption of the necessity for “consent” and “agreement” as 
the basis for civil government.  But, and this is the crucial point, instead of ending up 
with a theory of the conditional and limited nature of a subject’s duty of obedience and 
the assertion of a popular right of resistance, Hobbes ends up by affirming the 
unconditional character of the obligation of obedience, and the absolute right of a ruler 
to issue commands that subjects have no right to resist.82  As early as 1641-42 (the years 
of Stephens’s sermon) it becomes clear that some English pamphleteers are in line with 
the Scottish covenanting doctrine, specifically indicating that the king could be held 
accountable for breaking his covenant.83  Still, the Protestation does not explicitly 
contradict the Oaths of Allegiance and Supremacy.  While there are some who portray it 
as the English National covenant, Royalists present the argument that for those who 
take the oath it would be sacrosanct to break their oath in harming the King.  As a result 
the Vow and Covenant of 1643 leaves out the critical terms concerning the king’s person, 
precluding any argument that the Royalists can make.84 
 The Solemn League and Covenant is a far less taxing document.  In it there is a 
return to the former Parliamentarian arrangement that the Civil War was in fact being 
fought for the king’s protection.85  Nevertheless, this document is to draw the most 
response from Royalists precisely because it is the most widely impressed of the Long 
Parliament’s oaths of loyalty.  Hence, being tendered to more people provoked more 
response, especially at Cambridge in 1644 and Oxford in 1647 – these are the years in 
which Parliament authorize the wholesale expulsion of Royalists, Anglicans and those 
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who would not take the oath at each of these institutions.86  The Royalist response 
details that the Covenant is unlawful at its very core, since it lacks the appropriate 
reciprocal and voluntary nature allowed in a contract.  In fact, since the Covenant lacks 
reciprocity, it is argued, God would not ordain it, thus making it an affront to God.  
Moreover, as the king is God’s chosen voice on earth the Covenant would need his 
approval; when it is not given the Covenant is nullified and Jewish precedent from the 
Old Testament is identified. 87  
X 
 This brings us nearly full circle.  By deliberately interpreting foedus to mean 
covenant Stephens displays precisely in what light he intends his work to be read.  Using 
covenant in its religious sense foreshadows Fairfax’s rewriting of Statius while at the 
same time demanding that the reader recall and revisit just how seriously the political 
and social culture changes from 1640 to 1648.  Just like Eteocles and Polynices destroy 
their state and polis over a broken covenant, so too had the royalists and 
parliamentarians England – and Charles I had yet to be executed. 
 The darkness Stephens imagines to be found in the Thebaid stems precisely from 
its subject in Stephens’s mind: Godly retribution.  The “long eares” of memory which 
Stephens mentions in the preface to his sermon given in 1642 cannot be confined merely 
to the 1640s, but to history more generally.  Through the “ruines” of Thebes Stephens 
writes of the degenerate nature of England, which is now without a king, and hence, for 
him, has become godless.  The wrecklenssness, the recurrent iniquities, the tyranny of 
individual judges have led not merely to the annihilation of one party, but that of both – 
if we allow ourselves to oversimplify the fractured nature of Royalists and 
Parliamentarians. 
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 If it is assumed – and I think rightly – that Stephens begins translating the 
Thebaid after 1645 his outlook would have had to been dire.  In some sense this too 
explains why Stephens leaves his work unfinished.  During 1646-47 it is quite clear that 
Charles I could have a prominent, if reduced, role in the governing of England; since 
popular sentiment is against those who had overthrown him.  Yet, where Stephens leaves 
off indicates in no uncertain terms what civil war brings. 
 In book five of the Thebaid Hypsipyle recounts the tale of the Lemnian womens.  
In it the gory details of civil strife are related.  In a striking description of what has been 
wrought she describes (5.337-567) how Polyxo murdered everyone with only wrath (ira) 
in mind. 
“Their slaughter'd corps, or with nimble fires  
Consum'd them. Glutted Venus now retire  
With all her Furies, from the Towne sh'ad sack'd:  
And then their leisure serv'd to recollect  
Their deeds: to tear their haire; and dew their face.  
Our fruitfull Isle was knowne by th' site, a place  
Once stor'd with wealth, Armes, Men; inrich'd of late  
By th'  Getick triumph: Now's an empty state,  
Torne from the world, not byth' Seas breach, nor by  
The enemies force, or an unluckie skie,  
There's none alive to plough the ground, there's none  
To cut the Seas: Houses are silent growne:  
Blood covers all: black gore the fields does staine:  
We, onely  wee, i'th' spacious streets remaine;  
And th' angry Ghosts hover about the spires.  
I too, did build  a pile for lofty fires  
I'th' inner Court o'th' Palace, throwing on't  
My Fathers Armes, and robes our Kings were wont  
To wear, and's Scepter: Then I sadly stood  
Nigh the amaz'd flames: my sword was staind with blood:  
Where I wept ore the cheat o'th' empty pile,  
Fearing their  rage; and prayd, that by this wile  
My Fathers Fate, and doubtfull fears of death  
Might vanish. For these  merits, they bequeath  
This punishment, his Kingdome; I must sit  
I'th' royall Throne: Such faith, my craft did get.  
Could I refuse then, thus beset? I went:  
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But call the Gods to witnesse my intent,  
My faith, and my unspotted hands. I gain'd  
A bloodlesse Empire: ('twas a dire command:)  
Poor, sad,  beheaded Lemnos. Sorrow tore  
Their waking souls, by this time, more and more:”88   
 
For Stephens, much as Hypsipyle, the kingdom of England has now become the 
punishment.  The invocation of gods as witness recalls once more the focus on covenant; 
and a kingdom without a king is no longer a kingdom.  There is no more tradition, it has 
literally been thrown out, destroyed, or burnt – much as Dowsing did to the icons and 
paraphernalia of the Anglican churches.  Hypsipyle’s realization of what has been lost 
speaks louder and more eloquently than Stephens can. 
 Ending his translation here is more than appropriate; it is necessary.  In the 
following books Statius details the death and destruction of two leading cities of Greece.  
Though Theseus does preserve Thebes from utter ruin in Statius’s story, the fate of 
Thebes is sealed.  It will be completely destroyed in the generation that follows.  The 
uselessness of translating the subsequent books is clear; and the lack of them only serves 
to underscore how Stephens feels concerning the monarchy in England.  There is not one; 
hence, there is no recourse to a monarch in his prefatory material.  The lack of pietas / 
duty that Stephens is so stridently attempting to point out in his sermon (“Are we not 
Protestors?”) is no longer; and just as Eteocles and Polynices cannot maintain their own 
covenants, neither can Royalists and Parliamentarians.  The inversion of Vergilian heroic 
poeisis, one that civilizes through arms and poetry, is clearly not lost on Stephens.  The 
“easie” truth of Lucan repells Stephens, turning him rather to the darkness of Statius’s 
allegory.   
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
Slavery, Empire and Tyranny: Dryden, Pope and Statius 
 
 
As was established in the last chapter, poetic language is a form of memory; in the case of 
Stephens, May, Fairfax and Cowley it is fragmented and residual of previous texts, 
collecting their own traditions and cultural anxieties.  Sometimes their intertextual 
recollections may be allusive requiring a skilled reader, sometimes overt and pompous.  
Other readers of Statius such as Poliziano, Bernaerts and Lipsius thought that they 
should be concealed and only revealed by those who had invested as much learning as 
they in seizing such allusions.  Yet, their ancient counterparts, apart from perhaps 
Seneca, thought otherwise.  Ovid delights in stealing and then altering Vergil’s serious 
six-footers into trifles; while Vergil openly imitates Lucretius and Ennius.  Whatever the 
case, readers of Statius knew their new text defined its own occasion, such origins are 
narrative fictions created specifically for the present moment. 1 
In the case of Stephens’ Thebaid his translation entails the management of loss, a 
lot of it.  Statius’s text is no longer present, but only lurks behind his translation, 
temporarily displaced by it. Though inaccessible to those who do not have access to the 
original language, it haunts the page like a phantasm for those who do.  Still, what went 
unmentioned in the previous chapter is that the original text has already been displaced 
and replaceed several times through the activities of early modern editors.  As a result, 
there is no longer an “original,” only a series of perceived originals.  Classical scrolls give 
way to medieval codices that give way to the editio princeps.  Toward the end of the 
seventeenth century composing a translation, a translator would work from as many 
different editions as he could buy or borrow. His sense of the original Latin poems 
becomes colored by the work of previous commentators, and by the translations and 
imitations which various hands (skilled or otherwise) had produced.  In many respects, 
he does not work in a field defined classically, but rather created by learned scholiasts.  
In this era the translator has several different kinds of material available to him out of 
which he may reconstruct Homer’s or Vergil’s texts.  The distinction between author and 
translator begins to be blurred. 2 
Recently, there has been recognition of translation as a cultural transaction, and 
in large part much of this contemporary figuration of translation finds its way out of the 
thoughts of scholars like Walter Benjamin, according to whom, “[t]ranslation is so far 
removed from being the sterile equation of two dead languages that of all literary forms it 
is the one charged with the special mission of watching over the maturing process of the 
original language and the birth pangs of its own.”3  In essence, translation is a process of 
understanding one’s own culture through modes of change, where the reader mutates 
into the translator and then back. As Hammond says, “Through translation one confronts 
the mystery of how a sense of selfhood and identity persists in spite of change.  On the 
one hand, the characteristics of a writer should be recognizable even when he has been 
translated into another language: we should recognize what it is which individuates him.  
On the other, the translator seeks to conform his own genius to that of his original, losing 
himself to some degree.” 4 
 From my own perspective, much of Benjamin’s thought parallels those thoughts 
about translation flourishing during the second half of the seventeenth century, when, 
following the Restoration, the cottage industry of translation publishing becomes a 
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leading sector of the book trade.  The reasons for this shift are many and varied and not 
up for discussion here; however, it can be said that with the solidification of the 
vernacular as the popular and official language of communication on both the continent 
and in England there is a sharp rise in the demand for translations, especially of classical 
authors.  The resolve of Bacon in 1623 to say that “modern languages will at one time or 
another play bank-rowtes in books,” turns out to be inopportune, if not wholly 
inaccurate. In response to the growth of such an enterprise there is as well an increase in 
the discussion about what makes a good translation and what makes a translation good.5  
In England, at the time, John Dryden directs this discussion. In fact, it is through him 
that the first deliberate discussion of a type of translator’s taxonomy takes shape.   
Although it is easy enough to find Dryden discussing the merits of different types 
of tranlsation styles, in his Preface to Ovid’s Epistles (1680) we find his first and most cited 
treatment of the topic.  In part, he states: 
All translation, I suppose, may be reduced to these three heads: 
First, that of metaphrase, or turning an author word by word, and 
line by line, from one language into another… The second way is that of 
paraphrase, or translation with latitude, where the author is kept in view 
by the translator, so as never to be lost, but his words are not so strictly 
followed as his sense, and that too is admitted to be amplified but not 
altered…The third way is that of imitation, where the translator (if now he 
has not lost that name) assumes the liberty not only to vary from the 
words and sense, but to forsake them as he sees occasion; and taking only 
some general hints from the original, to run division on the ground-work, 
as he pleases… 
Concerning the first of these methods, our Master Horace has 
given us this caution: 
 
Nec verbum verbo curabis reddere, fidus 
Interpres –  
 
Nor word for word too faithfully translate; as the Earl of Roscommon has 
excellently rendered it.  Too faithfully is, indeed, peda ntically: ‘tis a faith 
like that which proceeds from superstition, blind and zealous.6  
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Dryden’s assertion here rests on the assumption “that the meaning of a source text is 
fixed and largely known (or at least knowable).” 7 As a result, the concern for him is how 
this meaning is best conveyed to his target audience. If Dryden’s bases his threefold 
scheme on the degree of “literalness,” then he arbitrarily decides where to place his cut-
off points or substitutions; besides, in practice most translations fluctuate in this regard 
anyhow.  It seems that Dryden wants us to consider translations in terms of a range: 
“from extreme freedom at one end to exact metaphrase at the other.”8  Still, if he holds 
that the distinction between metaphrase and imitation where the latter brings the poem 
to the reader and the former the reader to the poem, then he is not concerned about the 
range away from one extreme or another but rather the underlying principle. As 
Martindale observes, Dryden’s idea of paraphrase is “not so much arbitrary as 
tendentious,” since he merely alludes to a mean between freedom and metaphrase.  
Moreover, there is something “provocatively” misleading about dragging Horace’s 
authority into his argument. In the Ars poetica Horace is not talking about translation in 
the narrower post-classical sense at all, but about the Greeks concept of imitatio.  Horace 
would of realized, as Dryden does later, that paraphrase homogenizes translations 
produced during a given period, so that the alieness of the original is lost.  Where there is 
little risk as Horace hints the sensibilities of the audience are not provoked and hence 
enriched.  For Dryden, the practitioner of metaphrase, attentive to this dullness, does not 
attempt to smooth over the rough manner which “help to make an author’s style 
distinctive, but to highlight them.”9 At a certain point, however, there is a translator who 
says one thing and does another.  Stephens, for instance, figures himself a metaphraser, 
when in fact his translation is a paraphrase according to Dryden’s rules.  Thus, remains 
Dryden’s concern for pre-set knowledge.  
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As was seen in the previous chapter an assumption of pre-set knowledge is highly 
suspect, especially concerning Statius.  If anything has been shown throughout this 
dissertation it is that Statius’s work is highly mutable and shows itself to be a willing 
partner and accomplice to unique interpretation – translation or otherwise.  Since there 
was no real precision or long-standing argument about what Statius’s poems provide to 
his reader, his poems allow readers and translators to fill in and rebuild the text in 
whatever ways they think appropriate, an approach that corresponds to Dryden’s 
thoughts about paraphrase.  But as Dryden will himself prove, there is a fine line between 
paraphrase and imitation, one which he will cross frequently.  
Dryden’s handling (or mishandling) of this task marks the difference between the 
prior chapter and the present.  Whereas Stephens writes an “essay” on Statius’s Thebaid, 
Dryden’s Aeneis together with his maligning of Statius will bring Pope to cross the 
translation threshold from paraphrase to imitation. Specifically, what is at stake in this 
final chapter is what Dryden says about Statius in light of Vergil and how Pope responds 
to Dryden’s Aeneis within his translation of the first book of the Thebaid.10   Naturally, this 
goal is not that simplistic since Dryden speaks about Statius in a variety of contexts and 
over the course of his entire career, and Pope’s translation of Statius has quite a long 
period of gestation and revision before being published.  The result, however, of reading 
Dryden in order to unpack Pope’s translation provides a unique opportunity to view the 
early development of his poetry and perhaps open a new discussion of Pope’s 
politicization, which usually begins with discussions of Windsor Forest. 
I 
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There is little exaggeration in stating that Dryden’s thoughts about Statius are 
detrimental to his reception from the end of the seventeenth century until quite recently,  
specifically within literary criticism of Great Britain and the United States of America.  
In general, from Dryden forward there is much more of a concerted effort by poets and 
critics to rank classical poetry and poets (beyond Vergil and Homer) that did not take 
place earlier.  Naturally, there were disagreements, but a truly concerted effort to solidify 
some type of universal order does not happen until the mid-seventeenth century. 
Whatever we may conclude as truth for ourselves once the Linnean push begins it 
gathers enough strength to maintain itself until the present – though taking a good 
beating first from the Romantics and later the post-Moderns.  Though this does not 
mean that Statius’s works vanish from the poetical consciousness, that happens more 
towards the end of the eighteenth century; it does mean that Statius’s appeal and 
relevance grows dimmer both poetically and politically from this era forward.11 
It is an interesting paradox that the beginning of Statius’s demise should come at 
the hands of Dryden, whose poetry in so many ways reflects that of Statius’s, especially 
in terms of occassional poems and poetical miscellany – excepting satire, of course.  
Dryden is no Milton or Spenser, just as Statius is no Vergil or Homer.  This observation, 
however, does not diminish what each achieves in and through his poetry.  It seems that 
Dryden himself does recognize that Statius’s poetry is a great deal similar to his own.  In 
many ways this recognition of self in Statius’s poetry seems to scare Dryden into 
choosing other poets for promotion besides Statius.  In one of his first remarks about 
Statius, Dryden says: 
A famous modern Poet us'd to sacrifice every year a Statius to Virgil's 
Manes: and I have Indignation enough to burn a D'amboys annually to the 
memory of Johnson. But now, My Lord, I am sensible, perhaps too late, 
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that I have gone too far: for I remember some Verses of my own Maximin 
and Almanzor which cry, Vengeance upon me for their Extravagance, and 
which I wish heartily in the same fire with Statius and Chapman: All I can 
say for those passages, which are I hope not many, is, that I knew they 
were bad enough to please, even when I writ them… and am resolv'd I will 
settle my self no reputation by the applause of fools ... If the Ancients had 
judg'd by the same measures which a common Reader takes, they had 
concluded Statius to have written higher than Virgil…Yet Virgil had all 
the Majesty of a lawfull Prince; and Statius onely the blustring of a 
Tyrant.12 
 
The act of burning Statius’s Thebaid and George Chapman’s Bussy D’ambois may strike the 
modern reader as a bit extreme, but what Dryden is truly concerned with here is 
underscoring his own lack of consideration, and, what he will later obsess over, 
“judgment.”  In other words, Dryden’s close readings of both Chapman and Statius show 
him that whereas Vergil and Jonson master the art of learned imitation and restraint, 
Statius and Chapman never do.  Nor does Dryden himself until, according to him, much 
later.  In other words, Chapman and Statius represent for Dryden attempts at pleasing 
the very learned at the expense of achieving poetic legitimacy. 
 Intigruingly, the quotation above is written, not at the end of Dryden’s career, but 
in the middle of it when he is at the height of his popular influence.  The context of this 
statement, which has been reduced here,  is the preface to The Spanish Fryar, a play about 
monarchical usurpation.  As much as he derides Statius, Dryden is himself guilty of the 
same praise that Juvenal extends to Statius.13 At the end of the passage Dryden comes 
clean: what is truly at stake for him in Statius’s poetry is its perception as nothing more 
that the mere “blustering of a Tryant.”  Statius is for Dryden a representative of 
unrestrained autocracy and usurpation both in a political and poetical sense.  That 
Dryden defines Vergil as the “lawfull Prince,” in contrast to Statius, serves all the more to 
accuse Statius of denigrating poetry instead of elevating it.  For this reason, Statius 
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becomes a favorite frame of reference for what Vergil is and is not (and hence what other 
poets ought to stive for), for the remainder of Dryden’s career. 
Dryden reinforces Vergil’s primacy throughout his career, making that his 
criticism of Statius is all the more arresting.  In the preface to Sylvae; or, The Second Part of 
Poetical Miscellanies (1685), for instance, Dryden and Tonson provide the reader with this 
quotation: “Non deficit alter / Aureus; & simili frondescit virga metallo.” (Another 
golden one is not lacking; and a branch of a similar metal sprouts.)  The quotation is from 
Vergil’s Aeneid (6. 143-44), and, according to Hammond, its meaning is twofold.  The 
Sibyl dictates to Aeneas that he must break a branch from a golden tree in order to find 
his way through the underworld, and as soon as he breaks this branch a new branch, 
equal in every way, will sprout.  So this second volume is equal to the prior volume, 
Miscellany (1684).  Consequently, since this volume is dominated by translations from 
Vergil, Horace, and others it does not fall short of the first volume in any way; moreover, 
by implication Dryden and his fellow translators are the second branch, worthy of, if not, 
rivaling their poetic forebearers.  To put it another way: “to be second is not to be 
secondary.”14 
When a close reading of Dryden’s various translations in the Sylvae is completed 
there is a clear distinction about his approach to translation.  Rather than restrain 
himself with stricutes pertaining to metaphrase or “Paraphrase, Translation with 
Latitude,” Dryden actualizes a completely Augustan translation style:  He composes 
poems that he thinks classical authors themselves would produce if they were 
Englishmen living in the seventeenth century.  As a result, Sowerby notes that Dryden 
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“approaches his original very much in the spririt advocated by Horace for successful 
imitation and keeps to his Augustan formula: 
nec verbo verbum curabis reddere fidus 
interpres, nec desilies imitator in artum, 
unde pedem proferre pudor vetet aut operis lex. (Horace, Ars Poetica, ll. 
133-5)15  
 
To further underscore this approach Sowerby provides both Jonson’s paraphrase of his 
verses –  “Not to imitate servilely, as Horace saith, to catch at vices, for virtue” –  and his 
verse translation: 
For being a poet, thou mayst feign, create, 
Not care, as thou wouldst faithfully translate, 
To render word for word: nor with thy sleight 
Of imitation, leap into a strait, 
From whence thy modesty or poem’s law 
Forbids thee forth again thy foot to draw. (Jonson, ll. 189-94)16  
 
Dryden’s admiration for Jonson needs no belaboring here; stated simply, Jonson thinks 
that an imitative poet succeeds only by following a poet’s virtues not his vices.  Taking 
this literally Dryden gets rid of a poet’s “vices, the obscurity, the scabrous verse, the hard 
diction, and the overstrained figures and strained metaphors.”17  Instead Dryden gives the 
“great Augustan virtues of clearness, purity, and ease.” 18 By altering each poet’s work 
Dryden fits the ancient text nicely within his own contemporary poetical and even 
political perspective.  Dryden’s translations, consequently, are nothing short of polished 
and untangled, and more often than not startlingly unlike the verses by the original 
author. 
 The observation that Dryden maintains complete freedom to alter poetry in 
translation strikes at the heart of his thoughts about translation; so much so that one 
may wonder whether his style is criticized or cherished at the time.  The answer is 
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overwhelmingly positive.  In his response to Dryden’s transaltion of Persius, William 
Congreve clarifies what he sees in Dryden’s work: 
Thou great Revealer of dark Poesie. 
Those sullen Clouds, which have for Ages past, 
O’er Persius’ too-long-suff’ring Muse been cast, 
Disperse, and fly before thy sacred Pen, 
And, in their room, bright Tracks of Light are seen. 
 
Old Stoick Virtue, clad in rugged Lines, 
Polish’d by you, in Modern Brillant shines 
 
So now, whatever Praise, from us, is due, 
Belongs not to Old Persius, but the New. 
For still Obscure, to us no Light he gives; 
Dead in himself, in you alone he lives. 
So stubborn Flints their inward Heat conceal 
‘Till Art and Force th’ unwilling Sparks reveal; 
But thro’ your Skill, from these small Seeds of Fire, 
Bright Flames arise, which never can Expire.19 
 
Congreve’s focus on Dryden’s illumination of Persius by dispelling the gloomy clouds 
that surround him recalls the contrast between Lucan and Statius in the previous 
chapter.  There the difference between light and dark and easy and difficult suggested  
that Stephens and his cohort were interested in making the politically dark implications 
of the Thebaid manifest.  Congreve, in contrast, is simply thrilled to have Dryden, the 
“great Revealer,” translate Persius’s difficult Latin into skilful English, or what he 
dreadfully enjambs “Modern Brilliant shines.”  The “unwilling” and “obscure” (i.e. 
“sullen”) nature of Persius’s poetry yields before Dryden’s “sacred pen,” according to 
Congreve. The resulting picture indicates that Persius lay unread because he is both 
inelegant and uneloquent.  There is not a hint of the political or philosophical difficulty 
contained with his verses.  But why should there be? The verses are no longer his, they 
are Drydens; and Congreve would not have it any other way.  
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 The over-corrected nature of Dryden’s Persius is not the point, however.  Dryden 
knows perfectly well that he is re-creating Persius in his own way.  Rather the aspect of 
revision and rereading, whether through historical, political, or poetical lenses, is the 
point.  And to this end, Dryden is remarkably consistent in what he chooses to use as a 
criterion for deriding poets, Statius in particular: lack of restraint.  Paradoxically, of 
course, Dryden shows none himself; but as shown earlier he is at the very least conscious 
of his own faults and attempts to better them.  In a later treatise he offers this thought:  
The remark, I must acknowledge, is not so proper for the colouring, as the 
design; but it will hold for both.  As the words, &c., are evidently shown 
to be the clothing of the thought, in the same sense as colours are the 
clothing of design, so the painter and the poet ought to judge exactly, 
when the colouring and expressions are perfect, and then to think their 
work is truly finished.  Apelles said to Protogenes,--that he knew not 
when to give over.  A work may be over-wrought, as well as under-
wrought; too much labour often takes away the spirit by adding to the 
polishing so that there remains nothing but a dull correctness, a piece 
without any considerable faults, but with few beauties; for when  the 
spirits are drawn off, there is nothing but caput mortuum.  Statius never 
thought an expression could be bold enough; and if a bolder could be 
found, he rejected the first.  Virgil had judgment enough to know daring 
was necessary; but he knew the difference betwixt a glowing colour and a 
glaring… 20  
 
While the allusion to Apelles again reminds us of the same made in Stephens’ edition of 
Statius, here Dryden intends Apelles to remind the reader that, as much as he (Dryden) 
may seem to over-extend himself in his translations, he recognizes that the best poetry 
shows restraint and has as its primary characteristic, “judgment.”   
In many ways, the restraint for Dryden is not found in terms of interpretation, 
but rather in terms of who is worthy of translation.  For Dryden Statius is simply not 
worthy, his poetry is excessive and “glaring.”  Statius tries too hard; continuously 
competing with Vergil’s poetry and legacy perverts his own poetry, causing him to polish 
it into a dull luster and create something that is over-wrought. Equating Statius’s poetry 
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to a type of useless substance of Caput Mortuum – the residue of distillation “good for 
nothing, but to be flung away, all vertue being extracted” – while contrasting Vergil as a 
poet with judgment and taste, highlights Dryden’s interest in perfection versus revision.  
On the one hand, Dryden allows for them both, they are necessary components of the 
creative process, Art.  On the other, the indecision by Apelles and Statius creates 
ambiguity and imperfection, and a product that is indefinitely mutable.  While this 
characteristic is prized by former readers of Statius, for Dryden the continual fussing by 
the artist does not allow for moral direction and instruction, or more importantly a type 
of any legitimation.  Though Vergil may not excite the fool on the street, as Statius may; 
his restrained and curt verse provides Dryden with a type of directed, moral and poetical 
latitude.   
II 
 
 Still, what is it that attracts Dryden to Vergil?  Dryden’s lifetime (1631-1700) 
corresponds with the bloodiest and most revolutionary changes in religious, social and 
political life that England has experienced.  At Dryden’s birth Charles I claimed, as did 
his father, James I, to rule by divine right.  During the 1640s there is the Civil War and 
Charles’s beheading.  Subsequently, there is Cromwell and the Protectorate, the 
Restoration of Charles II, and, finally, the Glorious Revolution. For anyone it would have 
been tempting to support whichever side seemed to be at an advantage and forsake it 
when it was not.  Certainly, Dryden does his share of flip-flopping: one easily notes his 
panegyrics to Cromwell and Charles II.  Yet at the end of his life Dryden found in Vergil a 
poet who understands political revolution and the office of poet laureate for what it 
ought to be, a platform from which to advise and admonish monarchs.21 
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Despite the widespread admiration of the Aeneis by Pope, Scott, Saintsbury, 
Tillyard, Brower and others, Dryden has had, ever since Milbourne in 1698, a small but 
vocal army of detractors.  The standard complaint turned against his work is its frequent 
and excessive amplification of Vergil’s meaning.  Van Doren accuses Dryden of 
composing verse translation in terms of formulae, that is, of laying in “a fund of phrases 
with which he could expand any passage that seemed to him curt.”  Dryden himself was 
well aware that Vergil “studies brevity more than any other Poet,” but he also recognized 
that Vergil “had the Advantage of Language, wherein much may be comprehended in a 
little space.”22 As Corse puts it, Dryden feels that  “way to please the best Judges is not to 
Translate a Poet literally; and Vergil least of any other.”23  
 What Dryden means by not translating a poet literally is explained at some 
length in his Dedication: 
The way I have taken, is not so streight as Metaphrase, nor so loose as 
Paraphrase: Some things too I have omitted, and sometimes added of my 
own.  Yet the omissions I hope, are but of Circumstances, and such as 
wou’d have no grace in English; and the Additions, I also hope, are easily 
deduc’d from Virgil’s Sense.  They will seem (at least I have the Vanity to 
think so), not stuck into him, but growing out of him.24  
 
Here Dryden finds the median way, instead of his earlier position, where “Paraphrase, or 
Translation with Latitude,” in the Preface to Ovid’s Epistles (1680), he holds a course in 
between the extremes of imitation and metaphrase.25  Still, at nearly twice the length of 
Vergil’s poem Dryden adds a good deal more. In fact as Corse carefully demonstrates he 
often goes in the direction of imitation, “where the Translator (if he now has not lost that 
Name) assumes the Liberty not only to vary from the words and sence, but to forsake 
them both as he sees occasion.”26 “Dryden’s figurative language (‘not stuck into him but 
growing out of him’) tells something important about his theory of translation, not 
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readily apparent from this constant shuffling of critical terms: his additions to Vergil, 
rather than the result of some mechanical operation, are part of an organic process.”27  
 Corse proves his claim by looking at a “particularly curt passage” of Dryden’s 
Aeneis and Vergils’ Aeneid: Dido’s cursing of Aeneas: 
spero equidem mediis, si quid pia numina possunt, 
Supplicia hausarum scopulis et nomine Dido 
Saepe vocaturum.28 
 
Dryden offers these verses: 
Yet if the Heav’ns will hear my Pious Vow, 
The faithless Waves, not half so false as thou, 
Or secret Sands, shall Seplchers afford 
To thy proud Vessels, and their perjur’d Lord. 
 
Corse takes the time to note Dryden’s substitutions and his insertions.  For the former he 
has: “Heav’ns,” “hear my Pious Vow,” “Waves,” “secret Sands,” “Sepulchers afford;” the 
latter: “The faithless,” “not half so false as thou,” “Or,” “and To thy proud Vessels,” “and 
their perjur’d Lord.”  It is easy to see from Corse’s observations that Dryden’s 
subsitituitions constitute well over half of the passage.  Still, though Dryden’s varies from 
his source, the sarcastic epithets “faithless,” “false,” and “perjur’d” reiterate, with a 
vengeance, that earlier epithet, perfide (366); while the epithet “proud” cuts several ways 
at once: it glances at the splendid appearance of the “Vessels,” at the pride Dido took in 
restoring the “ruin’d Fleet” (541), and at the arrogance the ships assume from association 
with Aeneas, “their perjur’d Lord.” Thus, most of his additions grow out of Vergil, and 
serve a special purpose – “to heighten the sense of outrage Dido feels at being abandoned 
by her lover.”29  
 The use of substitutions allows Dryden to swerve away from his initial assertion 
about the value of epic poetry:  
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A heroic poem, truly such, is undoubtedly the greatest work which the 
soul of man is capable to perform.  The design of it is to form the mind to 
heroic virtue by example; ’tis conveyed in verse, that it may delight, while 
it instructs.  The action of it is always one, entire, and great. 
 
It is true that the greatness of subject demands the intrusion of “Heav’n” and “Pious 
Vows,” since they elevate Dido’s sentiment to relfect Aeneas’s virtue by example.   So he 
continues: 
Even the least portions of them must be of the epic kind: all things must 
be grave, majestical, and sublime; nothing of a foreign nature, like the 
trifling novels, which Ariosto and others, have inserted in their poems; by 
which the reader is misled into another sort of pleasure, opposite to that 
which is designed in an epic poem.  One raises the soul, and hardens it to 
virtue; the other softens it again, and unbends it into vice. 
 
Though Dryden launches his dedication with reference to epic’s use for the “Soul of 
Man,” he does not at all address such a subject.  In fact it appears that as soon as he 
mentions the good intentions epic retains he begins to note how easily an epic poet can 
be side-tracked into following the vices that Horace and Jonson have pointed out.  This 
kind of contamination leads  him to introduce Statius: 
Statius, as Bossu has well observed, was ambitious of trying his strength 
with his master Virgil, as Virgil had tried his strength with Homer.  The 
Grecian gave the two Romans an example … Virgil imitated the invention 
of Homer ...  Statius, who, through his whole poem, is noted for want of 
conduct and judgment … went out of his way, as it were on prepense 
malice, to commit a fault …  On these terms, this Capaneus of a Poet ingag'd 
his two Immortal Predecessours, and his Success was answerable to his 
Enterprise. 
 
Dryden’s final blow, “this Capaneus of a Poet,” draws attention to the hubristic nature of 
Statius’s poem.  For Dryden, Vergil and Homer reach a stage of apotheosis, they are  gods.  
Statius’s fault is that he attempts to outdo what cannot be outdone.  Humans do not rival 
gods, ever.  Dryden goes on to say, in a very rambling manner, that what is stake in the 
Aeneid is not the myth of Aeneas, but rather political revolution.  Zwicker proclaims 
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Aeneas to be Augustus Caesar to Dryden; thus to celebrate Aeneas is to celebrate the 
overhaul of the political and moral spheres that Augustus brought about.30 As a result, 
Dryden’s Aeneis is about moral conduct and how conduct reflects political and pragmatic 
behavior.  Unlike the Homeric poems the Aeneis is not concerned with “justice, charity, 
and honor;” but rather with how moral fiber is “entwined with political objectives.”31  
III 
 
Before turning our attention to Pope’s translation we would do well to look once 
more at Dryden’s Preface to Ovid’s Epistles, since we have yet to fully understand what is at 
stake for Dryden in imitation.  To define what he thinks imitation is Dryden sets as an 
example the Pindaric efforts of Cowley and Denham.  Because Pindar’s notoriously 
difficult poetry does not easily translate from Greek, Dryden praises the efforts of 
Cowley to “contrive” Pindar “into our Tongue.”  In specific, Dryden maintains that since 
Pindar is “wild and ungovernable” Cowley has every reason to ignore the conventions of 
paraphrase and metaphrase, and instead imitate.  He states: 
I take Imitation of an Authour in their sense to be an Endeavour of a later 
Poet to write like one who has written before him on the same Subject: 
that is, not to Translate his words, or to be Confin'd to his Sense, but only 
to set him as a Patern, and to write, as he supposes, that Authour would 
have done, had he liv'd in our Age, and in our Country...32 
 
Remarkably this is precisely what Corse has demonstrated that Dryden does within his 
translation of Vergil; namely he brings him into seventeenth-century England.  Yet, 
Dryden offers a caveat in the Preface: 
But if Virgil or Ovid, or any regular intelligible Authours be thus us'd, tis no 
longer to be call'd their work, when neither the thoughts nor words are 
drawn from the Original: but instead of them there is something new 
produc'd, which is almost the creation of another hand…33 
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For Dryden, Vergil is “intelligible” and hence readily accessible; or at least he was in 1680.  
In 1697 Dryden has has come full circle, from: “Let he who is inquisitive to know an 
Authours thoughts will be disapointed in his expectation”; to now realizing that:  
Imitation of an Authour is the most advantagious way for a Translator to 
shew himself, but the greatest wrong which can be done to the Memory 
and Reputation of the dead.34  
 
 In some sense Pope’s Thebais must be read with this final sentiment in mind, since 
it responds both to Dryden above and Stephens before.  Stephens, if we remember, 
proposes a similar sentiment in his own prefatory poem  in which he states that the 
casual reader sees more or less only the poetical flourishes of Statius, those things that 
wow a crowd; whereas for the critic reader Statius’s mind is available for investigation.  
Now in 1697, as Corse shows, Dryden attempts to translate the mind of Vergil in his 
Aeneis.  It is fair, then, to ask a couple of questions at this point:  Why, if Dryden has 
strayed from his own contention, admittedly nearly twenty years old, can one not 
question his treatment of Statius?  What if some wit thought Statius “wild and 
ungovernable,” would he then be worthy of imitation? Is his mind worth knowing? Pope 
thinks so. 
IV 
The generic question, Why Statius? which has been asked throughout this 
dissertation so far, again has much to offer.  Dryden dislikes the Thebaid precisely because 
of its ambiguous nature, poetically, morally and politically.  Pope, however, revels in 
Statius’s preceived ambiguity.  In the Thebaid there is opportunity for Pope to express 
himself; or as he says in his Essay on Criticsm: 
True Expression, like th’ unchanging Sun, 
Clears, and improves whate’er it shines upon, 
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It gilds all Objects, but it alters none.35 
 
These words offer Pope’s early perspective on translation; the idea that someone else’s 
poetry needs improvement is an idea that he most certainly derives in large part from 
Dryden.  In fact, in his letters is it clear that Pope relies on Dryden to inform a great deal 
of his translation methodology.  For example, in a letter to Ralph Bridges Pope states: 
But you have made me much more proud of, and positive in my Judgment, 
since it is strengthened by your’s.  I think your Criticismes, which regard 
the Exrpession, very just, and shall make my profit of them: To give you 
some proof that I am in earnest, I will alter three verses on you bare 
objection, tho I have Mr Dryden’s Example for each of them.  And this I 
hope you will account no small piece of obedience, from one, who values 
the Authority of one true Poet above that of twenty Critics or 
Commentatours.36   
 
So one wonders if the Pope is making some kind of overture to his Thebais in the verses 
cited above, since it too is published in the same volume as the Essay, by denoting that his 
poetry is a type of gilding, turning silver (Latin) to gold (English).  In fact, Pope carries 
on: 
Some judge of Authors' Names, not Works, and then 
Nor praise nor blame the Writings, but the Men. 
Of all this Servile Herd the worst is He 
That in proud Dulness joins with Quality, 
A constant Critick at the Great-man's Board, 
To fetch and carry Nonsense for my Lord. 
What woful stuff this Madrigal wou'd be, 
To some starv'd Hackny Sonneteer, or me? 
But let a Lord once own the happy Lines, 
How the Wit brightens! How the Style refines! 
Before his sacred Name flies ev'ry Fault, 
And each exalted Stanza teems with Thought!  
 
The Vulgar thus through Imitation err; 
As oft the Learn'd by being Singular; 
So much they scorn the Crowd, that if the Throng 
By Chance go right, they purposely go wrong; 
So Schismatics the plain Believers quit, 
And are but damn'd for having too much Wit.37 
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Whether these lines are a bit of jab at Dryden for his much maligning of Statius, I doubt.  
However, Pope does present  an  interesting case for Statius here if we are so inclined to 
consider it.  In Dryden’s criticism of Statius, there is not a single instance where he gives 
a specific example of how Statius goes awry in his poetry.  He does give one instance 
where a story Statius relates seems to him out of place and faulty; but not the poetry 
itself.  In fact, the only time Dryden mentions specifc verses of  Statius (Theb. VI, 400-1) 
he praises them as the “true Image of their Author,” “wonderfully fine,” and “would cost 
me an hour, if I had the leisure to translate them, there is so much Beauty in the 
Original.”38  Whatever the case, Pope recognizes that though some poets are accused of 
being dull, that by following the consensus and not thinking for one’s self an opportunity 
is missed. 
   
V 
There has been a recent effort to read Alexander Pope’s Windsor Forest as his first 
politically charged poetic work – even if it is a somewhat understated effort.  The claim 
is one that rests primarily on Pope’s careful handling of verses 407-412 and 413-422, and 
in particular the half verse that states, “Slav’ry be no more.”  These four words, indeed, 
offer the modern reader and scholar much to ponder, as early eighteenth-century 
discussions of trans-Atlantic slavery are quite rare, at least among the more famous 
authors of England.  But the claim that Windsor Forest is Pope’s first politically poetic 
venture is perhaps jumping the gun a bit, for a few years prior to its production Pope 
publishes his translation of Statius’s Thebaid; wherein there is clearer and more 
substantial evidence of Pope’s political and social concerns, making it perhaps his first 
political poem. 
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 The First Book of Statius’s Thebais is the title Pope gives to his translation and its 
context poses a challenge to the view of Pope’s unease with entering the political fray of 
the early 1700s. Pope claims to have begun translating the Thebaid around 1703 at the age 
of fifteen; and while there is no evidence to suggest he did not begin then, this claim has 
allowed many prior scholars to underestimate and overlook the significance of his 
translation. By the time of its first publication in Lintot’s Miscellaneous Poems and 
Translations (1712), Pope had overhauled much of what he had written nine years earlier, 
making his text not one of juvenilia but rather a poem that engages topics of a serious 
nature: namely slavery, empire and tyranny.   
Revised, expanded, and politicized during the political foment of 1708-09 when 
the acts strengthening the Protestant succession were finalized – substantiating any 
anti-Catholic sentiment – Pope’s Thebais has an important place in his writing as a whole.  
The Thebaid’s subject of Civil War needed little if any provocation as an interesting and 
appropriate subject to undertake.  The topics of tyranny, folly, usurpation, banishment, 
and foreign invasion would not be missed by a contemporary English audience.39  As 
such, while his translation should not be regarded as the culminating poem of the first 
phase of his career, that is still Windsor Forest, the Thebais comments on Pope's England in a 
way that is perhaps less ambiguous than that presented in Windsor Forest.   
VI 
It has been argued that Pope’s translation of Statius can be read as his first foray 
into political satire.40  This, I think, is not quite accurate.  While his translation may be 
seen to have elements of satire, it would be hasty to conclude that the entire translation 
should be included under that rubric.  For it is no more a satire than Dryden’s translation 
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of the Aeneid.  Moreover, like Dryden’s Aeneis, Pope’s Thebais is one which is interested in 
the political discourse and atmosphere of the day, and it can and should be read, in that 
way; Pope “distilled a subtle but unmistakable commentary on his own time and place – 
its civil war, revolution, agony between pretender and incumbent; its suspension 
between Williamite disappointment and Hanoverian prospect, its rape upon 
constitutional kingship, its party strife, and its fickle and compliant people.” 41 
Moreover, Pope presents Statius as Dryden does Vergil, bringing Statius in line with 
English and a purifying Augustan poetics.  As a result, just as he will do in the translation 
of the Iliad, and paralleling Dryden’s translations, Pope omits the low ideas and poetry he 
finds in Statius’s Thebaid, refusing “to follow Statius into what he considers instances of 
bathos, or extravagant hyperbole,” leaving untranslated a substantial portion of the first 
book.42   
 Pope’s translation begins in an overstated manner.   “Fraternal rage, the guilty 
Thebes’s alarms, / Th’ alternate reign destroyed by impious arms,” is far from Statius’s 
“Fraternas acies alternaque regna profanis / decertata odiis sontesque euoluere Thebas / 
Pierius menti calor incidit.” From the outset his translation bypasses Dryden’s 
conception of metaphrase, and immediately Pope begins rewriting what Statius offers.  
“Profanis” does not translate into “guilty” and nowhere does one find an equivalent of 
“impious arms.”  Still, Pope’s translation does not strike the casual reader as shockingly 
incorrect; if anything it sounds very much like what one might imagine Statius’s epic to 
be about: rage, guilt and impiety.  After all, it is a story of fraternal strife (a more literal 
rendering of “fraternas acies”), imprecation and destruction.  Pope is all too aware of this 
expectation; and, as Dryden before him, he eschews the course of the strict metaphraser 
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who enjoys nothing more than accounting for dull correctness.  Instead Pope plays to his 
audience’s interest: that is how He translates Statius.   
Without overburdening ourselves with the countless times Pope chooses to alter 
the vocabulary of Statius’s text, it is significant to account for a good deal of how he 
reads Statius’s text.  At points, and again similar to Dryden, Pope freely adds and 
substitutes words which heighten the effect of his Thebais.  In verse six, for example, Pope 
translates “gentis” as “nation,” a seemingly benign substitution. However, by altering the 
sense of gens from race, clan, line or tribe to something much broader, the reader is 
quickly made aware that Pope’s emphasis is going to be openly social and political.  
“Nation” suggests not just a political body, but more so a heterogeneous body-politic or 
an aggregate of communities.  Gens, on the other hand, for Statius in this instance is 
deliberately confined to the house of Cadmus, the ruling house of Thebes and it has no 
inherent authority beyond the city-state of Thebes.  Pope’s displacement of “nation” for 
“gentis” begins an effort of gradually rewriting Statius’s Thebaid, so that it reflects Pope’s 
concerns not Statius’s.  In fact, Pope clearly states that he feels compelled to change 
Statius’s work to suit his perspective: 
You will find, I doubt not, upon reading, that Statius was none of 
the Discreetest poets tho he was the best Versifyer Next to Virgil: In the 
Very beginning he Unluckily betrays his Ignorance in the rules of Poetry 
(which Horace had already taught the Romans) when he asks his Muse 
where to begin his THEBAID & seems to doubt whether it should not be, ab 
Ovo Ledeao? when He Comes to the scene of his Poem & the Prize in 
Dispute between the Brothers he gives us a Very Mean Opinion of it – 
Pugna est de paupere Regno. Very different from the Conduct of his Master 
Virgil whi at the Entrance of his Poem informs his reader of the Greatness 
of its Subject. Tantae Molis erat Romanam Condere Gentem – there are 
innumerable Litle faults in him among which I Cannot but take notice of 
one in this Book where speaking of the implacable Hatred of the Brothers 
he says, the whole World would be too small a Prize to repay so much Impiety: 
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Quid si peteretur crimine tanto 
Limes Uterque poli, quem Sol emissus Eoo 
Cardine, aut portu Vergens prospectat Ibero? 
 
This was pretty well one would think already but he goes on 
 
Quas procul Terras obliquo Sydere Tangit 
Avius, aut Boreae gelidas, madidive tepentes 
Igne Noti? –  
 
After all this what could a Poet think of but Heaven it self for the Prize but 
what follows is astonishing 
 
Quid si TyriaePhrygiaeve Sub unum 
Convectentur Opes? 
 
I do not remember to have met with so great a fall in any ancient Author 
whatsoever – I should not have insisted so much on the faults of this Poet 
if I did not hope you would tak the same freed with and revenge it upon 
his Translator.43 
 
Pope’s insistence on Statius’s faultiness allows for a wide berth in altering and 
heightening his translation.  Though his concern that Cromwell be as critical of his 
translation as he is of the original is a bit facetious, Pope’s insistence on rectifying 
Statius’s verse is remniscent of Dryden’s Persius and Congreve’s approbation.  Just as 
important his concern to elevate Statius’s poetry to its proper place, that is of elevating 
his topic to meet its required epic standard, comes deliberately from Dryden’s translation 
of the Aeneid. 
Moving only slightly ahead in the translation to verses sixteen and seventeen, 
while keeping Pope’s description in mind, Statius tells the reader where in the history of 
Thebes he intends to begin his epic:  “limes mihi carminis esto / Oedipodae confusa 
domus.” (Let the confused house of Oedipus be for me the threshold of my song.)  Pope 
translates them as: “And Fix, O Muse! The barrier of thy song / At Oedipus – from his 
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disasters trace the long confusions of his guilty race”.  It is obvious how Pope alters the 
sense of Statius’s lines here; however, the peculiarity of “disaster” and  “guilty race” are 
striking.  Domus can easily follow gens in its Latin variances, since gens can retain a local 
sense vis-à-vis tribe or clan in its definition. But where “guilty” and “disaster” can be 
found in Statius’s text boggles the mind at this point.  It is only later and through a 
thorough investigation that it becomes apparent that Pope views the citizens of Thebes 
as guilty of wilfully yoking themselves to a tyrant and therefore deserving of the disasters 
that Oedipus brings upon them.  Tangentially, one wonders if Pope has Lear in mind 
here?44 
These two instances only begin to indicate the kind of liberty Pope takes with 
Statius initially; his politicization is not completely manifest at this point.  Pope is quite 
right to imagine that Statius’s epic is full of rage, impiety, and guilt; but it is interesting 
to see how quickly this evolves.  Building on the nuanced manipulation of “nation” for 
gens Pope increasingly turns his readers eyes toward tyranny and empire.  When, for 
example, Statius states (1.28-34): 
ipse tuis alte radiantem crinibus arcum 
imprimat aut magni cedat tibi Iuppiter aequa 
parte poli, maneas hominum contentus habenis,                 
undarum terraeque potens, et sidera dones. 
… nunc tendo chelyn; satis arma referre 
Aonia et geminis sceptrum exitiale tyrannis 
 
Pope translates: 
 
Tho’ Jove himself no less content would be 
To part his throne and share his Heav’n with thee[?] 
Yet stay, great Caesar! And vouchsafe to reign 
O’er the wide earth, and o’er the wat’ry main; 
Resign to Jove his empire of the skies, 
And people Heav’n with Roman deities… 
Meanwhile permit that my preluding Muse 
In Theban wars an humbler theme may choose. 
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Of furious fate surviving death she sings, 
A fatal throne to two contending kings… 
 
Beyond the nearly doubling the verse count to say the same thing, Pope’s translation is 
stunningly different from Statius’s text.  The agency of Jove is completely over-ridden by 
Pope, and he applies “contentus” to him rather than Caesar (Domitian), to whom it 
belongs.  The offbeat and overextended translation irons out the syntactic complexities 
which exist in Statius’s text. Pope confuses the arrangement of words so that an intricate 
and puzzling event occurs.  Our very effort to overcome the difficulty of the lines in Latin 
involves us in them, and the text becomes the context of reality. In the translation, 
however, Pope raises the eye-brows by inserting “empire” where it is not found nor 
understood. Compounding this addition as well as deliberately softening Statius’s 
“tyrannis” with “kings,” Pope ostensibly creates an expectation by the reader that 
Statius’s story concerns primarily “empire” and imperial asperations, when in fact Statius 
seems little concerned with empire per se but rather the destructive nature of civil war in 
general.   
 
Making matters ever more complicated and intriguing, Pope introduces overtly 
Christian overtones and a sense of providential nature with the additional use of 
“Heav’n.” In doing so he sets up his audience to read the last line: “A fatal throne to two 
contending kings,” in terms of the contemporary debate over divine right to rule. This is 
the only time in Book One that Statius uses the term “tyrannis” (or its variants) to 
describe Eteocles and Polynices, at no other point does he reiterate it.  Yet, Pope does not 
metaphrase or paraphrase, instead he imitates.  By combining “Heav’n” with “kings” Pope 
directs the reader to remember William III’s usurpation during 1688, the action which 
creates the moral and political conundrum now in play at the beginning of the eighteenth 
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century. By softening his translation initially, Pope leaves room to amplify and alter the 
content of Statius poem so that he can orient his reader to rethink the constitutional 
kingship and party strife in the name of “empire” and “fate.”   
Since Pope’s introduction to his translation lacks the expansiveness of Dryden’s 
Dedication to the Aeneis, the initial verses become a type of paratext.    And from the 
briefest of surveys it is apparent how Pope conceives and produces his poem from that of 
Statius’s. Still, it bears looking a Dryden’s Dedication to gain some more perspective on 
what Pope can aspire to in terms of translating contemporary political ills into his poem. 
In a passage of the Dedication, Dryden says: 
we are to consider him [Vergil] as writing his Poem in a time when the 
Old Form of Government was subverted, and a new one just Established 
by Octavius Caesar: In effect by force of Arms, but seemingly by the 
Consent of the Roman People.45  
 
As Pope knew that Stuart loyalists maintained that the Glorious Revolution came about 
through armed insurrection, a coup that held the pretense of defending liberty and 
property; in fact in result it was sedition, rewriting England’s “laws and constitutions.”  
Dryden indicts the usurpers throughout his Dedication: 
The Commonwealth had receiv’d a deadly Wound in the fromer Civil 
Wars betwixt Marius and Sylla.  The Commons, while the first 
prevail’d, had almost shaken off the Yoke of the Nobility; and Marius 
and Cinna, like the Captains of Mobb, under the specious Pretence of 
the Publick Good, and of doing Justice in the Oppressours of their 
Liberty, reveng’d themselves, without Form of Law, on their private 
Enemies…Such was the Reformation of Government by both Parties.  
The Senate and the Commons were two Bases on which it stood; and 
the two Champions of either Faction, each destroy’d the Foundations 
of the other side: So the Fabrique of consequence must fall betwixt 
them: And Tyranny must be built upon their Ruines.  This comes of 
altering Fundamental laws and Constitutions…Thus the Roman 
People were grosly gull’d; twice or thrice over; and as often enslav’d 
in one Century, and under the same pretence of Reformation. 46 
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The political jibe here is openly directed at William III and his followers who, in 
Dryden’s eyes, had precipitated the establishment of tyranny in lieu of elective kinship.  
It is clear as well the “Oppressours of their Liberty” and “Tyranny” built on ruins is in 
Pope’s mind as he translates the Thebaid.  So much so that he amplifies Dryden and Vergil, 
or better Dryden’s Vergil, through Statius.  For in contrast to Dryden, for whom Charles 
II had been a savior of sorts; for Pope, William was nothing but a tyrant,  as a result there 
is a repeated inference on the faultiness of ruling monarchs in his text.  Pope as 
mentioned earlier makes quite clear how the monarchs are to be phrased, by the term 
tyrant and always in collusion with slaves, slavery and empire.  But this is to be expected, 
for like Statius Pope has no real experience with a ruler who is benevolent, or at least 
seen to be so.47   
One need only to glance for a brief period, say verses 192-264, to get a sense of 
how Pope’s Thebais crescendoes into thunderclaps of politicized vitriol: 
But Fortune now (the lots of empire thrown) 
Decrees to proud Eteocles the crown. 
What joys, O Tyrant! Swell’d thy soul that day, 
When all were slaves thou could’st around survey, 
Pleas’d to behold unbounded power thy own, 
And singly fill a fear’d and envied throne! 
But the vile vulgar, ever discontent, 
Their growing fears in secret murmurs vent; 
Still prone to change, tho’ still the slaves of state, 
And sure the monarch whom they have to hate; 
New lords they madly make, then tamely bear, 
And softly curse the tyrants whom they fear. 
And one of those who groan beneath the sway 
Of kings imposed, and grudgingly obey, 
(Whom Envy to the great, and vulgar Spite, 
With Scandal arm’d, th’ ignoble mind’s delight) 
Exclaim’d – “O Thebes! For thee what fates remain, 
What woes attend this unauspicious reign? 
Must we, alas! our doubtful necks prepare 
Each haughty master’s yoke by turns to bear, 
And still to change whom changed we still must fear? 
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These now control a wretched people’s fate, 
These can divide, and these reverse the state: 
Ev’n Fortune rules no more – O servile land, 
Where exiled tyrants still by turns command! 
Thou Sire of Gods and men, imperial Jove! 
Is this th’ eternal doom decreed above? 
 
These verses attest to all the criticism that Pope can muster concerning contemporary 
woes. He repeatedly gives voice to his displeasure of the Protestant claim to the throne in 
1688, William’s desire to rule without Parliament, and William’s belief that he should 
inherit the throne not James – one wonders whether Pope even considers mentioning 
Eteocles and Polynices at all.  The use of tyrant, empire and slaves would raise the 
hackles of many of his readers.  In case they are uncertain, Pope at points delivers his 
message with startling clarity: 
Must we alas! Our doubtful necks prepare, 
Each haughty Master’s Yoke by turns to bear, 
And still to change whom changed we still must fear? 
 
 “Each haughty Master’s yoke” insures that Pope does not in fact play favorites, Whigs 
and Tories are part and parcel of the corruption of the “state” – which is another of 
Pope’s additions not found in Statius.  And though they may dislike their current 
circumstance, Pope labors to call them no better than slaves doing their master’s bidding: 
And one of those who groan beneath the Sway 
Of Kings impos’d, and grudgingly obey… 
 
Pope regains his composure only to to sidestep Statius once more, concluding a 
series of damning blows with: “O Thebes! For thee what Fates remain, / What Woes 
tend this inauspicious Reign?”  Pope achieves here much the same that the earlier 
quotation of Dryden’s Aeneis – Dido’s curse – does: namely, it heightens the effect of 
Statius’s work and grows out of it.  Pope is in fact inventing Statius.  The idea redigning 
and inventing gives Pope some pause, and he takes a good deal of time to consider it in a 
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letter to Ralph Bridges.  In it he writes about Homer and his experiecnce thus far with 
him: 
But tho’ I speak thus of Commentators, I will continue to read carefully all 
I can procure, to make up, that way, for my own want of a Critical 
understandingin the original Beauties of Homer.  Though the greatest of 
them are certainly those of Invention and Design, which are not at all 
confined to the Language: For the distinguishing Excellencies of Homer 
are, (by the consent of the best Criticks of all nations) first in the 
Manners, (which include all the speeches, as being no other than the 
Representations of each Person’s Manners by his words:) and then in that 
Rapture and Fire, which carries you away with him, with that wonderfull 
Force, that no man who has a true Poetical spirit is Master of himself, 
while he reads him.  Homer makes you interested and concern’d before 
you are aware, all at once; whereas Virgill does it by soft degrees.  This, I 
believe, is what a Translator of Homer ought principally to imitate: and it 
is very hard for any Translator to come up to it, because the chief reason 
why all Translations fall short of their Originals, is, that the very 
Constraint they are obliged to, renders ’em heavy and dispirited.48 
 
Pope’s insistence that to translate well the translator must not become “heavy and 
dispirited” is certainly found in his Thebais.  And as Dryden noted earlier, Statius is a 
Capaneus of poets, which allows poet to be as spirited as he desires in his translation. 
VII 
The bitterness of Pope’s tone and the liberties that he takes in his translation 
suggest that his rendering has been seasoned by the same long periods of reflective 
thought, which inform much of Windsor Forest. Yet, unlike Windsor Forest, there is not 
much in the way of obscurity and ambiguity in his translation. The Thebaid presents a 
story that neither lacks complication nor avoids uncomfortable and uneasy perceptions.  
There is considerable potential for discomfort and unease in the context in which Pope’s 
translation is written and revised, since in some ways the poem contributes to the 
debate, both polemic and poetic, that accompany the negotiations that ends in the 
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Treaty of Utrecht, and brings the Tory Peace. This makes his translation of Statius all the 
more poignant.  
Although Pope’s Windsor Forest is cautiously, if not moderately, cast among other 
Tory poems, his Thebais is a poem that greets the public in very different manner. While it 
is true that the praise of liberty and the revilement of servitude is a Whiggish enough 
sentiment, and that the denigration of Norman tyranny might have appealed to those 
Whigs who did not notice the implied comparison between the Norman Williams and 
their hero, William of Orange, Windsor Forest comes nowhere near the tendentiousness 
that the Thebais achieves.49 Certainly, “it is inscribed to a Tory minister, lauds Queen 
Anne for being a Stuart, and, as Addison seems to have noted, says nothing of 
Marlborough.”50 But when the most politically partisan passage of the poem comes in 
the vision of banished vices at the end of Father Thames's prophetic speech it is hardly as 
impressive as the biting attack that Pope delivers to both parties in his Thebais.51 
Detailed exposure to imperial culture, past and present, directs Pope’s attention 
to its power and transitory nature.  Even Rome, which had collected the whole of 
Europe, Mediterranean, and parts of the Mid-East, had been destroyed by Caesar before 
it began – the fate of imperialism is actually the result of political demise, as Pope’s 
Thebais shows.  For Pope, Dryden’s Aeneis was more than a vehicle for drawing attention 
to contemporary politics, or judging William and the Glorious Revolution.   By imitating 
Vergil, Dryden shows Pope an image of himself as poet: a man unafraid of criticizing the 
mythology of empire and tackling politics. For Dryden, politics and empire were always a 
matter of character.   As Zwicker points out, “The political circumstances of Dryden’s 
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translation are bared out in the translation itself, where Dryden never misses the 
opportunity to heighten contemporary political issues.” 52 
In one sense Dryden is absolutely correct that imitation is the worst thing a 
translator can do, since he is no longer translating but rather setting the author “as a 
Patern, and to write, as he supposes, that Authour would have done, had he liv'd in our 
Age, and in our Country.”  On the other hand, imitation is the only time when a 
translator has true freedom.  For Dryden, Statius blusters like a tyrant and is a Capaneus 
to Vergil’s Jupiter.  For Pope, however, Statius blusters like a tyrant because he truly 
understands what it means to live under one.  Where Dryden sees political and moral 
ambiguity, Pope sees the vesitiges of empire and Tyranny.  As for Capaneus, well, Pope 
puts it this ways: 
Then to fierce Capaneus thy verse extend, 
And sing with horror his prodigious end.53   
 
There is only one carry-over from the Latin here, “horror” (horrore), and even here Pope 
has altered the lines so that they can be both positively and negatively read.  Prodigious 
and horror are both good and bad things.  Statius is ambiguous; Pope for once is too. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
vestigia Statii 
 
 It is a difficult task to end this sweeping overview of the reception of Statius and 
his works the Thebaid and Silvae in the early modern period.  There is still so much more 
that can be said about him that I hesitate to belabor the point any longer.  So perhaps it 
is best to summarize what has been said so far and leave the playing surface prepped for 
more at a later date. 
 From Dante forward early moderns enthusiastically read Statius alongside other 
classical Latin poets such as Virgil and Lucan.  Statius’s reputation during the early 
modern period is well established, and in examining few of his readers we now have 
some sense of how they interpreted Statius – how they made sense of his relationship to 
other ancient poets, how they understood his political sympathies, and above all how 
they labored to understand poems notorious for their opacity and difficulty.  In contrast 
to Virgil and Lucan who were perceived clearly to state their poetic (and even political) 
ends, and thus to guide the reader, Statius offered no such guidance.  The compressed 
nature of his poetry, in form and content alike, forced readers to fill in, rebuild, and 
expand wherever necessary.  This process yielded a uniquely participatory form of 
reading that came to be associated specifically with Statius.   
From 1481-86, the Italian humanist Angelo Poliziano carried that association a 
step further by formally theorizing a poetics rooted in his reading of Statius that places 
interpretive agency in the hands of the individual reader.  Far from discouraging, the 
distinctive mutability of Statius’s poetry invited readers to introduce his works into a 
variety of political, legal, religious, and literary debates from fifteenth-century Italy to 
eighteenth-century England.  Famous readers from George Buchanan to Alexander Pope 
found in Statius an indispensable poetic resource for the discussion of everything from 
natural law to slavery.   
If this dissertation has done anything, I hope it has shown that Statius had 
remarkably broad appeal during the early modern period.  His readers really did try to 
understand “his mind” as much as his poetry.  In the Table Talk of Martin Luther, which is 
as apochrapha as anything else, it is noted that of the very last thing that Luther spoke 
were lines 12.816-17:1 
uiue, precor; nec tu diuinam Aeneida tempta, 
sed longe sequere et uestigia semper adora. 
 
(I beg, you, live! And do not test the divine Aeneid, 
But follow its footsteps from afar in everlasting adoration.) 
 
Why anyone would have Statius on his mind as they draw their last breath is perhaps a 
question for another time.  What is just as significant is that these lines should move 
Luther to utter them.  In the quotation above, excised from their context they read as a 
caveat, an admonition to all about the danger of rivaling divinity.  For Statius they mean 
simply this: that he hopes his poem will always be thought of when one reads and recites 
the Aeneid.  For Luther they mean something else.   
Much as Fairfax and May twisted Statius’s words to mean something entirely 
different from their intended meaning, so too does Luther.  In fact, the context of these 
words shows somewhat clearly – as clearly as a dying person can be – that Luther is 
thinking of his work in reforming Christianity itself.  He knows that as time advances his 
work will be overshadowed by a burgeoning new form of Christianity, but much like 
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Statius he is content to follow in its footsteps seeking a smaller form of glory.  Statius is 
to Vergil as Luther is to Paul. 
Of course, this last instance of reception could be expanded much more, but it is 
time to stop.  Statius was of critical importance to the early modern period.  Some of the 
greatest minds of the period were fascinated by him of the course of their entire lives – 
even to their deathbeds.  It is time for us to be as well. 
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